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Introduction
This thesis is a collection of three essays in economics of ageing.
The research question of the first two chapters was motivated by the willingness to
investigate about the effects of the recent financial crisis on saving behavior and
the possible effects of pension reforms applied in several European countries on
informal care provision. Instead the third chapter employs a statistical approach
to treat the problem of non-classical measurement error with recall data affected
by heaping and rounding. While this chapter is not strictly related to economics of
ageing, applications of this method can be useful to treat problems of non-classical
measurement error also with health variables such as the recall number of hospital
days or the expenditures for health care which can be affected by this type of
rounding mechanism.
The first chapter is titled “How the Experience in Financial Stock Markets Affect
Stockholding and Portfolio Choice” and investigates about the long-lasting effects
of the financial crisis on stock market participation. In the last decade financial
stock markets have been affected by several downturns, but in the long run it is
supposed that equities give a premium with respect to other less risky financial
assets. An analysis on the past performance of the German stock market (DAX)
confirms this idea. Investing in stocks markets could have been a great oppor-
tunity but many Europeans have not participated. Moreover if the experience
of negative returns has long-lasting effects, we may expect even lower participa-
tion in the market than we saw before the crisis. Within a behavioral finance
approach I allow for the presence of some impressionable financial years and I
consider two types of experience in financial stock markets: a potential and actual
experience. The potential experience is the observed performance of the stock
market when individuals start saving for retirement as predicted by the standard
life-cycle model (after age 40), the actual experience is the observed performance
of the stock market after the first investment in stocks or shares. Using European
data from SHARE and SHARELIFE, I find evidence for the presence of financial
impressionable years. Myopic loss aversion and disappointment aversion are found
when potential experience is considered: individuals who experienced periods of
downturn in the market when they are expected to start saving for retirement are
more willing to stay out of the market. Myopic behavior is also found for actual
iii
experience: investors who had a good (bad) actual experience with stocks within
three years after their first investment are more (less) willing to participate in the
financial stock market later in life. Findings also suggest that many Europeans
may have invested in stocks to hedge against inflation.
The second chapter titled “Occupational Choices and Informal Caregiving Among
Young Old Europeans” wants to analyze the effect of occupational choices on infor-
mal caregiving. In the recent years many European countries have adopted pension
reforms to postpone retirement age. This could lower the informal long-term care-
giving potential provided by young old. Using European data from SHARE I
investigate about the effect of occupational choices on informal caregiving, both
in probability and time, taking into account household formation between a care
giver and a care recipient. Four different types of care recipients are considered:
parents, grandchildren, adult children and other people who live outside the fam-
ily. The occupational choices are considered as binary: participating or not in the
labour market. Women who never participated in the labour market are distin-
guished from those who worked in the past, because the choice of never entering
in the labour market was made in a distant past and it is more related to family
preferences. Endogeneity of the occupational choices are also checked using the
potential eligibility to pension benefits based on pension reforms. Results show
that there is a positive effect of being not employed on coresiding with a parent
or an adult child and on the informal care provision, especially for women and for
care given to look after grandchildren. The endogeneity problem is relevant for
women as it is considering coresiding as an alternative choice of providing informal
care outside the household. Households with a woman who never worked provide
more care inside the family and the woman is usually the one who specializes on
care provision. A simulation of a pension reform with an increase of one year
in the eligibility age to receive a public pension benefit, based on the estimated
parameters, suggests that demand for formal care may increase a lot, but less for
countries which adopt flexible time working arrangements policies for young old.
The third chapter is titled “Estimating the Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution
on error-ridden micro data” and it is based on a joint work with Gugliemo Weber.
We estimate the Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution (IES) using Italian data
from SHIW (Bank of Italy). The consumption data from SHIW are based on recall
questions and are affected by severe heaping and rounding. The measurement is
non-classical. To treat the heaping and rounding we apply a multiple imputation
technique proposed by Heitjan and Rubin (1990), following Battistin et al. (2003),
to model the coarsening process and to impute true consumption expenditures. We
also propose an extension to consider the panel feature of the data. We estimate
the Euler equation using four different estimators: the log-linearized version, the
standard GMM estimator (EGMM), and two GMM estimators proposed by Alan
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et al. (2009) which both assume a classical measurement error, the first one is
more efficient (GMM-K) and the second one is more robust (GMM-D). We show
that EGMM and GMM-K estimators produce implausible estimates of the IES
when recall data are used. Instead when multiple imputations of non-durable con-
sumption are used the GMM-K estimator produces plausible estimates in line with
the recent micro-based literature (in the 0.5-0.8 range), and the overidentifying re-
strictions are not rejected at least if I focus on a sample of couples. Parameter
estimates using the log-linearized version and GMM-D estimator turn out to be
similar to the ones based on the previous method, but less precise and do not
change much when we use reported or imputed consumption.
v

Introduzione
Questa tesi è una raccolta di tre saggi sull’economia dell’invecchiamento.
L’argomento di ricerca dei primi due capitoli è motivato dalla volontà di studiare gli
effetti della recente crisi finanziaria sul comportamento di risparmio delle famiglie
e il possibile effetto delle recenti riforme pensionistiche, applicate in varie nazioni
europee, sull’assistenza informale. Invece il terzo capitolo utilizza un approccio
statistico per trattare il problema dell’errore di misura non classico riscontrato
nei dati interessati da problemi di arrotondamento e concentrazione. Nonostante
il capitolo non sia strettamente legato al tema dell’economia dell’invecchiamento,
l’applicazione di questa tecnica può essere utile per risolvere problemi di errore
di misura non classico che si possono riscontrare anche in variabili sulla salute,
per esempio il numero riportato di giorni trascorsi in ospedale o le spese sanitarie,
valori che possono essere influenzati da questo tipo di arrotondamento.
Il primo capitolo titolato “How the Experience in Financial Stock Markets Affect
Stockholding and Portfolio Choice” vuole analizzare gli effetti nel lungo periodo
delle crisi finanziarie sulla partecipazione nel mercato azionario da parte delle fa-
miglie. Nell’ultima decade i mercati finanziari sono stati interessati da diversi
movimenti negativi, ma nel lungo periodo si suppone che i titoli azionari diano un
premio rispetto ad altri strumenti finanziari meno rischiosi. Un’analisi sui passati
rendimenti dell’indice borsistico tedesco (DAX) conferma quest’idea. Investire nei
mercati azionari avrebbe potuto essere una grande opportunità ma molte famiglie
europee non partecipano e non hanno mai investito nel mercato. Inoltre se l’a-
ver sperimentato un rendimento negativo del mercato ha effetti nel lungo periodo,
possiamo aspettarci una ancor più bassa partecipazione nel mercato di quella che
già c’era prima della crisi. Con un approccio di finanza comportamentale, assu-
mo che ci possano essere degli anni finanziari “impressionabili” e considero due
tipi di esperienza con i mercati finanziari: un’esperienza potenziale e una attuale.
L’esperienza potenziale è definita come il rendimento del mercato finanziario nel
periodo in cui si inizia a risparmiare per la pensione come viene predetto dal mo-
dello standard sul ciclo vitale (dopo i 40 anni), l’esperienza attuale è definita come
il rendimento del mercato finanziario osservato dopo il primo investimento in titoli
azionari. Utilizzando dati europei SHARE e SHARELIFE, trovo evidenza riguar-
do alla presenza di anni finanziari impressionabili. Quando l’esperienza potenziale
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viene considerata, si trova evidenza empirica anche per la presenza di avversione
miope ad una perdita o alla perdita rispetto ad un guadagno certo: gli individui
che sono stati interessati da periodi negativi del mercato quando ci si aspetta che
avessero iniziato a risparmiare per la pensione hanno maggior probabilità di restare
fuori dal mercato. Un comportamento miope viene riscontrato anche per l’espe-
rienza attuale: gli investitori che hanno avuto una buona (cattiva) esperienza con
il mercato azionario entro i tre anni successivi al primo investimento hanno una
maggiore (minore) probabilità di partecipare nei mercati finanziari più tardi nel
corso della vita, mantenendo una quota azionaria nel loro portafoglio. I risultati
inoltre suggeriscono che molte famiglie europee potrebbero aver investito in azioni
per proteggersi dall’inflazione.
Il secondo capitolo titolato “Occupational Choices and Informal Caregiving Among
Young Old Europeans” vuole analizzare gli effetti delle scelte occupazionali sul-
l’assistenza informale. Negli ultimi anni molte nazioni europee hanno adottato
riforme pensionistiche per posticipare l’età pensionabile. Questo può abbassare il
potenziale di assistenza informale fornito dai giovani anziani. Usando dati europei
SHARE studio l’effetto delle scelte occupazionali sull’assistenza informale, sia in
termini probabilistici che di tempo, tenendo in considerazione la possibilità della
formazione di un nucleo familiare tra fornitore di assistenza e potenziale riceven-
te. Quattro diversi tipi di destinatari di assistenza sono individuati: i genitori,
i nipoti, i figli adulti e altre persone che vivono al di fuori del nucleo familiare.
Le scelte occupazionali sono considerate come binarie: partecipazione o non nel
mercato del lavoro. Le donne che non hanno mai lavorato sono distinte da quelle
che hanno lavorato in passato, perché la scelta di non entrare mai nel mercato del
lavoro è una decisione fatta in un lontano passato per donne con più di 50 anni e la
scelta è più legata a preferenze familiari. L’endogeneità delle scelte occupazionali
è controllata usando la potenziale idoneità a ricevere una pensione pubblica ba-
sandosi sulle riforme pensionistiche. I risultati mostrano che c’è un effetto positivo
dell’essere non occupato nel risiedere con un genitore o con i figli maggiorenni,
nel fornire assistenza informale, specialmente da parte delle donne e per badare ai
nipoti. Il problema dell’endogeneità è particolarmente rilevante per le donne, come
è importante considerare la possibilità di risiedere con il potenziale assistito come
una scelta alternativa rispetto al fornire assistenza informale al di fuori del proprio
nucleo familiare. Inoltre, le famiglie con una donna che non ha mai lavorato for-
niscono più assistenza all’interno della famiglia e le donne sono solitamente coloro
che si specializzano in questo tipo di compito. Una simulazione di una riforma
pensionistica che considera l’incremento di un anno dell’età pensionabile, basata
sui parametri stimati, suggerisce che la domanda di assistenza formale potrebbe
aumentare parecchio, ma in misura inferiore in quegli stati europei che adottano
e permettono maggiormente l’utilizzo di politiche d’orario flessibili per i giovani
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anziani.
Il terzo capitolo si intitola “Estimating the Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitu-
tion on error-ridden micro data” ed è basato su un lavoro congiunto con Guglielmo
Weber. Nello studio stimiamo l’Elasticità di Sostituzione Intertemporale (ESI)
utilizzando dati italiani SHIW (Banca d’Italia). I dati sul consumo nell’indagine
SHIW sono raccolti con domande di richiamo che sono affette da problemi di ar-
rotondamento e concentrazione. L’errore di misura non è classico. Per trattare
il problema di arrotondamento e concentrazione applichiamo una tecnica di im-
putazione multipla proposta da Heitjan e Rubin (1990), seguendo Battistin et al.
(2003), per modellare il processo di arrotondamento e imputare la vera spesa per il
consumo. Riguardo alla tecnica, proponiamo anche un’estensione per considerare
la caratteristica longitudinale dei dati. L’equazione di Eulero è poi stimata con
quattro diversi stimatori: una versione log-linearizzata, il classico stimatore GMM,
e due stimatori GMM proposti da Alan et al. (2009) che considerano entrambi un
errore di misura classico, il primo più efficiente (GMM-K) e il secondo più robu-
sto (GMM-D). Nei modelli stimati mostriamo che gli stimatori EGMM e GMM-K
producono stime non plausibili dell’ESI quando vengono utilizzati i dati riportati.
Invece quando vengono usate le imputazioni multiple sul consumo non durevole,
lo stimatore GMM-K produce stime plausibili, in linea con la recente letteratura
basata sui dati micro (nell’intervallo 0.5-0.8), e i vincoli di sovraidentificazione
non vengono rifiutati, almeno se si considera solamente un campione di coppie. Le
stime dei parametri utilizzando la versione log-linearizzata e lo stimatore GMM-D
si rivelano simili rispetto a ciò che viene ottenuto utilizzando il metodo preceden-
te, però in modo meno preciso, e a prescindere dall’utilizzo dei valori riportati o
imputati sul consumo.
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1 How the Experience in Financial
Stock Markets Affect
Stockholding and Portfolio Choice
ABSTRACT
In this chapter I investigate the long-lasting effects of financial crisis on stock
market participation. If the experience of negative returns has long-lasting effects,
we may expect even lower participation in the market than we saw before the
crisis.
Within a behavioural finance approach I allow for presence of some “impression-
able” financial years and I consider two types of experience in financial stock
markets: a potential and actual experience. The potential experience is the ob-
served stock market performance when individuals start saving for retirement as
predicted by the standard life-cycle model (after age 40), the actual experience
is the observed stock market performance after the first investment in stocks or
shares. Using European data from SHARE and SHARELIFE, I find evidence for
presence of financial impressionable years. Myopic loss aversion and disappoint-
ment aversion are found when potential experience is considered: individuals who
experienced periods of downturn in the market when they are expected to start sav-
ing for retirement are more willing to stay out of the market. Myopic behaviour is
found also for actual experience: investors who had a good (bad) actual experience
with stocks within three years after their first investment are more (less) willing
to participate in the financial stock market later in life. Findings also suggest that
many Europeans may have invested in stocks to hedge against inflation.
1
Chapter 1
1.1 Introduction
In the last decade financial stock markets have been affected by several downturns
such as the Net economy bubble in 2001 and the sub-prime mortgage crisis in 2007,
followed by the European debt crisis in 2009. The last one was defined as the worst
financial crisis since the Great Depression of 1929. Actually it is not possible to
study yet if the last downturns may leave a scar on households saving behaviours
and portfolio choices. However these events are not new in the financial history
(see for a full review Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). After the Second World War
several downturns and recessions occurred such as the first oil crisis (1972-1973),
the second oil crisis (1979), the Black Monday (1987), the US savings and loan
crisis, the Japanese asset price bubble and the Swedish financial crisis (1989-1992).
Despite the poor performance of the stock market indexes during those periods,
it is supposed that in the long run equities give a premium return with respect to
other less risky financial assets as bonds. An analysis on the past performance of
the German stock market (DAX) confirms this idea: in the long run investing in
stocks or shares could have been a huge opportunity to increase savings.
However many European households do not participate in the financial stock mar-
ket holding stocks directly or indirectly through mutual funds or individual retire-
ment accounts. Many Europeans never invested at all (Cavapozzi et al., 2011).
Households who do not hold stocks or shares are more willing to have financial
distress (Angelini et al., 2009). Investing in stocks or shares is important also
for old individuals because stock holding later in life has been associated with a
bequest motive (Kim et al., 2012) or also with precautionary saving for possible
future health problems (Ameriks and Zeldes, 2004).
Why many Europeans do not hold risky assets is an open question. It has been
explained by financial illiteracy (van Rooij et al., 2007), information costs (Guiso
et al., 2003), or non-standard preferences. I focus on the last explanation to inves-
tigate if there could be long-lasting effects of periods of downturns on households
saving behaviour. In particular I would like to study the effect of macroeconomic
variables related to financial markets on the past decision of investing at least
once in the risky market and the decision of holding stocks or shares for those who
invested in the past.
The idea of the paper is related to the permanent effect of macroeconomic shocks
on individual decisions making (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2009) or risk taking
(Malmendier and Nagel, 2011). Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009) find a relation-
ship between recessions and beliefs: individuals who experienced a recession during
formative years believe that luck is the most important driver of individual success,
support more government redistribution, and have less confidence in institutions.
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1.1 Introduction
Starting from this idea, I suggest that there are some “impressionable” years when
macro events affect financial decisions. I consider two periods of life: when indi-
viduals are supposed to start precautionary saving for retirement (Carroll, 1994;
Attanasio et al., 1999), after age 40, as predicted by the standard life cycle model,
and after the first direct or indirect investment in the stock market. The stock
market performance in the first period is defined as the potential experience. It
is potential because it can potentially affect each individual, even those who have
not invested in the risky market. The performance of the market after the first
investment is defined as the actual experience and it can be thought also as a
proxy for the investment outcome at different time horizons.
The standard theory does not provide support for impressionable financial year
because it assumes that agents take into consideration all the past information
to make their decisions. Thus, I consider a behavioural finance approach and in
particular by the concepts of mental accounting (Thaler, 1985) and narrow framing
decisions (Barberis et al., 2006).
Within this theoretical background, I test if there is evidence for some impres-
sionable financial years and if individuals are myopic loss averse (Benartzi and
Thaler, 1995) or disappointment-averse (Gul, 1991; Ang et al., 2005). If myopic
loss aversion is found for the potential experience, there will be an empirical evi-
dence for the presence of scarring effects of periods of downturn on stock market
participation.
In the analysis I use data from SHARE, especially the retrospective data from
SHARELIFE and macroeconomic German data such as: inflation rate, short-term
bonds rate and measures of the Performance DAX index. Probit regressions are
run for the potential experience on having ever invested in stock or shares checking
for several controls and for childhood conditions. Probit regressions with a sample
selection are estimated to analyze whether actual experience affect past investors
decisions on continuing to hold stocks later in life. The sample is selected because
only past investors had an actual experience. The potentially experienced macro
variables are used as instruments for the sample selection.
Results suggest that there is myopia for both types of experience. There is evidence
for myopic loss aversion and disappointment aversion for potentially experienced
returns: cohorts of individuals who experienced a downturn in the market when
they are supposed to start saving for retirement are more likely to stay out from
the risky market. Even if myopic loss aversion and disappointment aversion are
similar concepts, I provide evidence about the best reference point. Individuals
are more disappoint averse if they potentially experienced lower returns than a
certain equivalent like returns from short-term bonds. For actual experience, the
experienced returns after the first investment are positively correlated with the
3
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propensity to continue holding stocks later in life, but this is significant only for
the actually experienced returns within three years from the first investment.
The research question is linked to other topics as lack of trust in the financial
market (Guiso et al., 2008) and the reinforcement learning theory (Kaustia and
Knüpfer, 2008). Kaustia and Knüpfer (2008) analyze the IPO subscriptions in
Finland and they find that positive past IPO returns increase the probability to
participate in a subsequent offering. They underline the importance of studying
the initial experience, because inexperienced investors are less likely to act strate-
gically. In my case SHARELIFE provides data about the first year of investment
in several type of assets. While individuals have the same experience, they could
have different financial literacy and act differently according to it. A recent paper
by Bucher-Koenen and Ziegelmeyer (2013) find that financially literate individuals
are less likely to exit the market during financial crisis and they can participate
at the recovery of the market while illiterate sell their participation in stocks or
shares and their losses become permanent. However the financial literacy later in
life can increase with past financial experiences and the lack of previous experience
may be considered also as a proxy of financial illiteracy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the the-
oretical background, Section 3 presents data and descriptive analysis, Section 4
presents the econometric model and results for potential experience, Section 5
presents the econometric model and results for the actual experience and Section
5 concludes with a short discussion.
1.2 Theoretical background
Within a behavioural finance approach, the existence of impressionable financial
years is theoretically supported by myopia (Thaler, 1985) and narrow framing
(Barberis et al., 2006). Thaler (1985) introduced for the first time the concept
of mental accounting on decision making process (myopic behaviour). Mental
accounting assumes that financial investors tend to evaluate decision at a time,
keeping it separate from other evaluations in a broader context, such that they
tend to make more short-term decisions rather than long-term ones. Barberis et al.
(2006) extend the idea and introduce the concept of narrow framing. Starting from
evidence that often people are averse to small and independent gambles, even if
they are actuarially favorable, they argue that risk aversion is not enough to explain
this behavior but it is considering a narrow framing where agents evaluate a gamble
in isolation and separately from other risks.
During impressionable financial years, experience with stock markets is supposed
to affect household saving behaviour. Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009) find an
4
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association between beliefs and recessions during formative years with respect to
other periods of life. I assume that if financial impressionable years exist, they
should be related to saving decisions. Hence, I consider as the most important years
the period when individuals start planning for retirement, after age 40, as predicted
by the standard life cycle model, and the period when inexperienced investors enter
for the first time in the market. As previously introduced, potential experience
is the experienced performance of the financial stock market after age 40, when
individuals start precautionary saving for retirement (Carroll, 1994; Attanasio
et al., 1999). Between age 40 and 60 is the period when households save the most,
because earnings are at a peak and at the same time expenses for children bearing
are declining and home mortgages are paid off. Attanasio et al. (1999) in their
simulations of consumption and income profiles with demographic effects find a
consumption peak at around age 40 with a later peak at age 45 if they take into
consideration also income uncertainty. Using this result, I consider as potential
experience the experienced returns between age 41 and age 45. This assumption
seems plausible if we have a look at the European data: the median enter age
in the risky market is 43, with just small differences across countries (Cavapozzi
et al., 2011).
A behavioural finance approach seems appropriate to test if periods of market
downturn can leave a scar on households saving behaviour with household head
who have narrow framing. Households who had a potentially bad experience could
reduce their willingness to invest directly or indirectly in stocks or shares. In
particular I consider the concept of myopic loss aversion and its extensions. Myopic
loss aversion (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995) proposes a combination between two
principles of the behavioral finance: loss aversion and mental accounting. Loss
aversion is a concept from prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and
it describes a decision-making bias where investors tend to be more sensitive to
decreases in wealth (loss) than increases (gains). With respect to the expected
utility theory outcomes are evaluated as a gain or loss relative to a reference
point. Within myopic loss aversion, individuals are too anxious and evaluate the
performance of their portfolio on a short-term basis. Benartzi and Thaler (1995)
show that the observed equity premium is consistent with a moderate degree of
loss aversion at an investment horizon of approximately one year.
Ang et al. (2005) introduced a similar concept: the disappointment aversion. It
differs from the myopic loss aversion, because the reference point identifies a loss
which is determined endogenously. Basically it is the certainty equivalence of a
lottery that is a source of elation or disappointment for the investor. The disap-
pointment for outcomes below expectations is assumed to be stronger than the
elation related to outcomes exceeding expectations.
The prediction of myopic loss aversion is based on deterministic decision the-
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ory proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). According to their cumulative
prospect theory, an individual derives utility from changes in wealth, which is
captured by the value function
vLA (x) =
xα if x ≥ 0−λ (−x)β if x < 0
where x is the nominal or real return on stocks and the reference point is the last
time wealth was measured because x is a change in measured wealth. Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) estimate λ = 2.25 and α = β = 0.88. Following Fielding and
Stracca (2007), I consider the linear loss aversion with α = β = 1, and I use also
a convenient representation of disappointment aversion:
vDA (x) =
x+ e (x− E [x]) if x ≥ E [x]x+ d (x− E [x]) if x < E [x]
where d > e > 0 which means that disappointment is more important than elation.
For the disappointment aversion, the reference point of the investment in stock is
its expected value.
In the empirical analysis I consider two cases of loss aversion: when experience
is measured with nominal returns and real returns (nominal returns net to the
inflation rate). And I consider one case of disappointment aversion where the
reference point is the short-term bonds rate.
The literature about myopic loss aversion identifies three key variables: informa-
tion horizon, evaluation frequency1, and decision frequency (Hardin and Looney,
2012). Information horizon is defined as the period of time over the prospective
payoffs are presented. Evaluation frequency is the time passed between reviews of
past returns. Finally the decision frequency is the rate of adjustments made by
investors on their portfolios.
For the potential experience I assume an information horizon of 5 years and an
evaluation frequency of one year, while I do not make any assumption about the
decision frequency.
Beside the potential experience, I consider also another type of experience: the
actual one. The actual experience is a measure of the stock market performance
1Benartzi and Thaler (1995) argue that even if evaluation period and horizon of the investment
are two completely different concepts, if an investor has an evaluation period of one year, he
behaves similarly as having one year of investment horizon.
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after the first investment in stocks and it is a total return measure of the market.
The actually experienced returns are also a proxy for the investment outcome after
a determined time horizon.
If individuals are supposed to invest in a diversified portfolio and with a long-
run perspective, the investment outcome should relatively care to them and their
later participation in the risky market should not be related to its performance.
If a myopic behaviour is considered it is plausible to expect that households who
actually experienced a good performance after their investments have a higher
participation in stock market also later in life. Anyhow previous studies find that
the financial decisions are affected by the state dependence (Alessie et al., 2004;
Ameriks and Zeldes, 2004). Alessie et al. (2004) suggest that once households
decide which asset classes to participate in, they are not likely to revisit their
decision. They analyze the dynamics of ownership of different type of risky assets
using data from the Dutch CentER Savings Survey 1993-1998 and they find that
they are driven by state dependence, because adjusting portfolio arises costs from
buying or selling assets, or from asset-type specific learning, such as the cost
of acquiring new information. Same results have been found by Ameriks and
Zeldes (2004) who analyze US data from the TIAA-CREF (Teachers Insurance
and Annuity Association - College Retirement Equities Fund) and find that over a
10 year period (1987-1999), half of the sample did not any change in their portfolio
allocation.
At the same time a disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman, 1985) can occur. The
disposition effect has been defined as the tendency to hold loser stocks too long
and sell winner stocks too early. If investors are reluctant to realize losses they are
less likely to revise their decision on stock market participation. From a theoretical
point of view, it is not clear which behaviour can be more relevant for inexperienced
investors dealing with their first experience.
1.3 Data and descriptive analysis
The micro data source is the Survey of Health Ageing and Retirement in Europe2
(SHARE), a multidisciplinary and cross-national panel database of micro data on
2This chapter uses data from SHARE wave 4 release 1, as of November 30th 2012 or SHARE
wave 1 and 2 release 2.5.0, as of May 24th 2011 or SHARELIFE release 1, as of November 24th
2010. The SHARE data collection has been primarily funded by the European Commission
through the 5th Framework Programme (project QLK6-CT-2001-00360 in the thematic pro-
gramme Quality of Life), through the 6th Framework Programme (projects SHARE-I3, RII-
CT-2006-062193, COMPARE, CIT5- CT-2005-028857, and SHARELIFE, CIT4-CT-2006-
028812) and through the 7th Framework Programme (SHARE-PREP, N° 211909, SHARE-
LEAP, N° 227822 and SHARE M4, N° 261982). Additional funding from the U.S. National
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health, social-economic status and social and family networks of about 28,000 indi-
viduals aged 50 or over. The analysis is conducted using the first three waves: Wave
1 (2004-05), Wave 2 (2006-07) and Wave 3 - SHARELIFE (2008-09). SHARELIFE
data is particular attractive because it collects detailed retrospective life histories.
SHARE questionnaire provides useful data to analyze household portfolio and es-
pecially stock market participation in 2004-05 and 2006-07 checking for several
current individual and household characteristics. Meanwhile SHARELIFE adds
the possibility to consider childhood conditions and past investment decisions in a
type of asset: first it is asked whether the respondent has ever invested in stocks
or shares, mutual funds and individual retirement accounts and then it is asked to
recall the year when he bought those assets.
The year of the first investment can be affected by recall bias. However the inter-
view was organized to reduce this problem: the major life events are first fixed on
a timeline like marriage, children birth, job episodes, and then the other events
such as the first investment in stocks or shares. Havari and Mazzonna (2011)
check for internal and external consistency of childhood conditions, between age 0
and 15 using SHARELIFE finding that overall respondents seem to remember well
also the event in their early life. The first investments in stocks or share rarely
happened during the war and before 1950 and the only cases in SHARELIFE are
found for Sweden and Switzerland.
Households are selected from ten countries: Northern European countries like
Denmark and Sweden, Central European like Austria, Belgium, France, Germany
and the Netherlands, and Southern European countries like Italy and Spain. I do
not consider Eastern European countries (Czech Republic and Poland) and Greece
because stock markets are quite new and they are not much developed, then only
few individuals participate in.
The main sample consists of 10,785 financial respondents who participated in
SHARELIFE and in at least one of the previous waves. When they participated
in both first two waves, the most recent interview is considered. The financial re-
spondent is the person who is responsible for financial decisions within a household
and who answer the financial section of SHARE questionnaire3.
Institute on Aging (U01 AG09740-13S2, P01 AG005842, P01 AG08291, P30 AG12815, R21
AG025169, Y1-AG-4553-01, IAG BSR06-11 and OGHA 04-064) and the German Ministry of
Education and Research as well as from various national sources is gratefully acknowledged
(see www.share-project.org for a full list of funding institutions).
3In Wave 1 it was possible to define more than one financial respondent within a household. I
consider them as different households. When the financial respondent is homemaker, if the
partner information is available, the partner is assumed to be the financial respondent. If she
does not have a partner or the partner has not been interviewed, the household is excluded
because I do not assume that homemakers can plan for retirement.
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The sample does not consider the very old respondents, born before 1920, and very
young, born after 1961, because of the availability of the potentially experienced
returns. I also exclude individuals who lived abroad when they potentially or
actually experienced the performance of the financial markets. The later in life
participation in stocks or shares considers 9,895 households. The sample is slightly
smaller because of the availability of the actually experienced returns: financial
respondents who invested before 1960 or who does not remember the year of their
first investment are indeed excluded.
For the stock participation, I consider both direct and indirect participation, and
I assume that mutual funds and individual retirement accounts have a share of
assets invested in stocks.
From a descriptive analysis it is possible to observe that many Europeans have
never directly or indirectly invested in stocks or shares (see Figure 1.1). Overall
only 53% have invested at least once in a risky asset. High participation is observed
in Northern European countries (85% in Sweden and 74% in Denmark), and in
Switzerland (64%), Belgium (63%) and France (63%). Lower possession is observed
in Austria (26%), Spain (26%) and Italy (22%). Then, only 40% of Europeans hold
stocks in 2006-07.
Many Europeans exit from the market: 32% of European households do not hold
anymore stocks or shares in their portfolios later in life (see Table 1.1).
The later participation of past investors among the European countries is quite
different: in Sweden only 7% of the past investors do not hold stocks in Wave2,
while in Italy half of them do not hold stocks later in life.
Table 1.1 presents the set of variables used in the empirical analysis and some
descriptive statistics. Individuals who decided to invest in stocks or shares are
from the younger cohorts, they are richer, more educated and healthier later in
life and have a better family background. It is interesting to note that 31% of
financial respondents experienced a downturn in the market one year after their
first investment, and 43% experienced a return from stocks lower than the short-
term bond rate.
The main macrodata is the computed experienced returns and volatility rate from
the DAX Performance index4. The DAX is the main German stock price index
4Daily data for the DAX Performance index are from Datastream International since 1st Jan-
uary 1965, and from the website boerse.de since 30th September 1959. Yearly data are
available since 1950 from the website boerse.de, too. The DAX index was introduced in July
1988 and it has been normalized to 1,000 index points at 31 December 1987. Since 1988 the
index has been reconstructed on a daily basis until 1959. In the analysis I consider stock
market data after 1960.
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and it is based on the 30 largest and most actively traded listed companies on the
Frankfurt Stock Exchange. It includes dividends and it is not tax adjusted.
German stock market data are used for all the considered European countries
because, the DAX index is one of the most important stock market in Europe, and
it is a good proxy for financial market performance net from effects by national
government policies on stock prices. After the currency reform in 1948 with a
90% devaluation of its value, Germany has been one of the country with the most
stable and low inflation in the western Europe (see Figure 1.2 and 1.3), also during
the Seventies. The reasons why West Germany and its central bank pursue these
objectives can be found in an historical overview (Hetzel, 2002a and Hetzel, 2002b).
To measure the performance in a specified year of the financial stock market I
compute annual mean returns (nominal, real and excess returns) and annual mean
volatility rate in the last 12 months5. Annual real returns are the differences
between nominal returns and annual inflation rates, instead excess returns are
computed as differences between nominal returns and short-term bonds rates. The
volatility rate is calculated as the standard deviation from the annual average
variance of returns in one year.
Figure 1.4 and 1.5 show DAX returns with different reference points from 1950
to 2010. It can be observed that volatility increased over time. From the figure
it is possible to identify all the major financial crisis or periods of recessions,
especially for the excess DAX returns such as: the first oil crisis (1972-1973), the
second oil crisis (1979), the Black Monday (1987), the US savings and loan crisis,
the Japanese asset price bubble and the Swedish financial crisis (1989-1992), the
Internet bubble (2001-2003) and finally the subprime mortgage crisis (2007-2009).
Investing in the financial stock market was a great opportunity6 (see Figure 1.6
and 1.7). One Mark invested in the DAX index in 1950 would have resulted a
nominal value of 206.00 Marks, and a real value of 44.00 Marks. Instead one Mark
invested in short-term bonds with the same time horizon would have resulted in a
nominal value of only 18.50 Marks and a real value of 4.00 Marks.
Figure 1.8 and 1.9 show the different measures of potential experienced macroe-
conomic variables over time: the 5 year annual average returns, inflation rates,
short-term interest rates and volatility rate. Inflation rates from 1948 to 1955 are
based on the consumer prices index provided by the German institute of Statistics7,
5Volatility is computed from 1960.
6Table 1.11 reports data on the path of wealth (POW). The POW measures the growth of a
mark invested in any given asset (stocks and short-term bonds), assuming that all proceeds
are reinvested in the same asset and it has been obtained following the same procedure and
considerations made by Cornell (1999).
7Statistisches Bundesamt. The series is an index of retail prices (Index der Einzelhandelspreise)
and it is available from 1948 to 1990.
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and from 1955 onwards by the OECD.
The short-term interest rates is the average of the observed rates during one year
and it is based on German O.D.R.8 (Official Discount Rate) from 1948 to 1959,
and on the 3-months interests rate published by OECD from 1960. Inflation rates
and short-term interest rates are shown in Figure 1.2, together with the volatility
of the stock market. It is possible to note that short-term rates are usually higher
than the inflation rates. Moreover the measures are correlated because short-term
rates depends on the expected inflation. Only when the realized inflation (observed
only months later) has been lower than the expected inflation rate, the two curves
cross each other. In the last 60 years inflation rate has been quite low and stable
in Germany. Higher inflation rates occurred during the Seventies because of the
oil crisis, and periods of low inflation rates occurred after 1995. If we consider also
the other European countries, inflation rates changed a lot during the considered
periods and across country (Figure 1.9). Before 1960, Austria, France9 and Spain
had short periods of high inflation. Then during the Seventies and the Eighties
many countries were not able to control inflation, in particular Italy and Spain but
also France, and some Northern European countries such as Denmark and Sweden.
In Sweden there was a financial crisis during the 1990 and inflation rate hit 10%.
Only after 1992, with the process of harmonization and later with the adoption
of the Euro we can see low and stable inflation rates among all the considered
European countries.
1.4 Potential experience
The empirical analysis on past participation in the risky market is run considering
a probit regression model:
stocksi =
{
1 y∗1i > 0
0 y∗1i ≤ 0
(1.1)
i ∼ N (0, 1) (1.2)
y∗1i = α+ EXPi + x
′
1iβ1 + x
′
2iβ1 + c
′
iδ1 + ch
′
iδ2 + 1i i = 1, ...n (1.3)
8Data is collected from Sidney and Sylla (1996)
9In 1957 there was a change in the currency, between old and new Francs.
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where y∗1i is the number of stocks that the household i held at least once in the
past, stocksi is the propensity of having ever invested in the financial stock mar-
kets, x1i is as set of financial respondent’s characteristics such as age, gender, years
of education, marital status, numeracy skills, health status (self reported health,
number of limitations - adl and iadl), x2i is a set of household characteristics such
as household size, number of children, household income, real asset value, urban
area, and financial hardship, chi is a set of childhood conditions such as the urban
area at birth, the number of books in the house at age 10, and the self-reported
mathematical ability relatively to the class at age 10. Then, ci includes coun-
try dummies and cohort dummies. A full set of cohort dummies cannot be used
because of collinearity with age and time effects, but two dummies are added to
the regression: one for the prewar cohorts (before 1935) and one for the after-war
cohorts (after 1945). The measure of experienced performance EXPi is an indi-
vidual characteristic common for all individuals born in the same year. According
to Moulton (1990) when macroeconomic variables are used on microdata models,
standard errors should be adjusted using a cluster option. I define clusters as the
interactions between year of birth and country dummies.
Table 1.2 reports the average marginal effects from probit regressions on past par-
ticipation in the risky market. Column (i) and (ii) present results of the models
which consider respectively nominal and real experienced returns when individuals
start saving for retirement. Column (iii) reports results for the probit estimation
which considers excess returns. To test whether individuals are more myopic loss
averse or disappointment averse, the performance is allowed to have a different
effect for positive and negative returns. I find evidence for both loss and disap-
pointment aversion. All the three specifications show that negative experienced
returns10 when individuals are supposed to start saving for retirement affect nega-
tively the propensity of having invested in the market: 1% of average nominal loss
during age 41-45 decreases by 1.156% the propensity of having entered in the mar-
ket, while a 1% average real loss of the market decreases participation by 0.649%,
and 1% of negative excess return by 0.572%. A positive potential experience is
not associated with a higher participation in the financial stock market. When
positive returns occur between age 41 and 45 the decision to invest in risky assets
may depend on other determinants, while negative returns leave a scar and keep
individuals out of the market.
Myopia is assumed because only a 5-years period of experience is considered. To
check if this assumption is plausible, I estimate the previous models considering
the potentially experienced returns from other periods of life: between age 36
and 40, and between age 46 and 50 (see Table 1.3, columns (i) and (ii)). Results
10Negative experienced returns are in absolute value.
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show that stock market performance in the previous and next 5-years period does
not affect past stock holding. This confirms the assumption that there are some
financial impressionable years.
In columns (iii), (iv) and (v) of Table 1.3 I report also results where a dummy
variable for negative returns is added to the main model specifications. I test
which one is the best reference point, so I analyze whether individuals are more
loss or disappoint averse. As previously presented in Section 2, myopic loss aversion
is a special case of disappointment aversion (Fielding and Stracca, 2007) where the
reference point is not a gamble or another investment (i.e. short-term bonds) but
zero. Results show that there is no drift for potentially experienced excess returns
and it seems more likely that individuals are more disappointment averse. This is
not surprising because investors decide to enter or not in the market looking for
trends: investors try to extrapolate from the recent past to the near future. If
stocks provide better returns than short-term bonds, they put their money into
stocks. If short-term bonds provide better returns, they put their money into
bonds and so they do not enter in the market. But this choice is myopic because
also when conditions of the market change, behaviour of the investor is not likely
to change.
In the previous estimations I consider only experienced returns as a measure of
performance with the stock market. Furthermore, the sign of the potentially ex-
perienced returns is negative but not significant, though it can be expected to be
positive. Indeed, there could be other macro economic variables which can reduce
participation: for instance volatility and inflation rate. High volatility or inflation
rates when the returns are higher can reduce the propensity to enter in the market
also when the returns are positive.
The performance of the financial stock markets can be measured also by market
risk, for instance the volatility rate. Market downturns are often associated not
only with a decline in the value of the market prices but also with periods of
greater idiosyncratic risk. Glosten et al. (1993) suggests, accordingly to other pre-
vious studies (i.e. Fama and Schwert, 1977), that it has been observed a negative
correlation between volatility and returns, but this relationship is weak. A nega-
tive effect of periods of downturn in the market on stock market participation may
depend on the high volatility rate and the riskiness of the market. In column (vii)
of Table 1.3, I check whether individuals are more myopic loss averse or myopic
variance averse. The myopia is still assumed because of the 5-year time horizon.
Results do not change: the effect of the volatility rate is not significant, even if the
sign suggest that higher experienced volatility rate when individuals are supposed
to start saving for retirement reduce the willingness to enter in the financial stock
market. Results suggest that individuals are more loss averse than variance averse
as it has been found in an experimental analysis by Duxbury and Summers (2004).
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They observe that when the probability of a loss is greater than 0.5, individuals
perceive higher variance as less risky; instead when the probability of a loss is less
than 0.5, high variance is perceived as higher risk. However, variance aversion is
linked to the frequency of feedback about the stock market performance. Only
individuals who receive or collect enough feedback can be variance averse. In the
SHARE dataset less than 30% of the households spend time on managing savings
at least once every month.
Another macro variable that could have affected stock market participation is
inflation rate. Across European countries there have been periods of high inflation
for many reasons, mainly caused by crisis and imported prices. Inflation can be
thought as an externally controlled policy variable that affects the purchasing
power of money. During the last 60 years, the German central bank has been very
careful about keeping a low inflation, but during the Seventies, inflation rates were
relatively higher than the previous period. This was mainly caused by the increase
in oil prices and not by change in monetary policies.
A general and widespread belief considered common stocks and real estate as a
good hedge against inflation, because stocks represent control over real assets, and
it was supposed to offer a long-run hedge against dramatic changes in the infla-
tionary environment. Fama and Schwert (1977) was the first of many other studies
which suggested that this belief was not true: stocks are not a good hedge against
inflation and a negative correlation between inflation and stock market perfor-
mances occur. Indeed inflation is a great destroyer of financial assets value over
time. It reduces the real dividend yield on stocks, it increases the volatility and
investors’ total return suffers (Fama and Schwert, 1977). Results show that the
average German inflation experienced between age 41 and 45 is positively corre-
lated with past stock holding (Table 1.3, column (vii)): individuals who potentially
experienced higher inflation rate are more likely to have invested in stocks. This
suggests that they could have entered in the market to hedge against inflation.
However it is important to keep into account that household decisions about their
portfolio are historic dependent and that after a period of high inflation there have
been a long period of low inflation rates which could have increased the willingness
to participate in the market later in life.
Finally as additional robustness check, I consider the partner potential experience
because the financial decisions for a couple can be taken together. The results show
that also the partner negative experience has a scarring effect on stock market
participation (Table 1.3, column (viii)).
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1.5 Actual experience
In the previous section I show that there are some impressionable financial years,
at around age 40. In this section I investigate whether experienced returns after
the first investment in stocks or shares can affect portfolio choices. In particular
the effect of actually experienced returns on stock market participation later in
life is checked. In SHARELIFE no information is asked about the first investment
or about other decisions after the first one, so we do not know when and why
individuals exit the market and whether they experienced a good or bad outcome.
A Heckprobit model is estimated because there could be a sample selection bias:
the decision of entering in the risky market and staying inside the market can be
correlated.
The econometric model is defined as following:
y∗2i = α+AfterEXPi + x
′
1iβ1 + x
′
2iβ1 + c
′
iδ1 + ch
′
iδ2 + 2i i = 1, ...n (1.4)
y∗1i = α+ EXPi + x
′
1iβ1 + x
′
2iβ1 + c
′
iδ1 + ch
′
iδ2 + 1i i = 1, ...n (1.5)
laterstocksi =
{
1 y∗2i > 0
0 y∗2i ≤ 0
if stocks = 1 (1.6)
stocksi =
{
1 y∗1i > 0
0 y∗1i ≤ 0
(1.7)
(
1i
2i
)
∼ N
([
0
0
]
,
[
1 ρ
ρ 1
])
(1.8)
where y∗2i is the propensity to continue holding stocks later in life, and AfterEXPi
is the individual experienced performance based on the year of the first investment
in stocks or shares. A set of instruments include the potentially experienced re-
turns, volatility and inflation rate. Differently from the potential experience, the
actual experience is common for financial respondents who entered in the risky
market at the same year. Table 1.4, 1.5, 1.6 report average marginal effects for
respectively nominal, real and excess actually experienced returns.
15
Chapter 1
Myopia is checked using different time horizons of the investment outcome, start-
ing from one year after the first investment to the maximum possible investment
duration11.
Similar effects are found considering the three measures of experienced returns
and these effects are low and significant only within three years after the first
investment: a 10% increase (decrease) in the value of the stock market after one
year has a positive (negative) effect on holding stocks later life by 0.655%. The
estimated models show that the experience in the close years after the first direct
or indirect investment in stocks or shares affect stock market participation later in
life. Evidence for a myopic behaviour is found, but the effect is low because there
could be disposition effects, state dependence due to costs of adjusting portfolio
choices. Then, there could be health or other shocks that can affect more financial
decisions later in life, independently of market performance.
1.6 Conclusion
Using European data from SHARE and information about the German stock mar-
ket, I investigate whether periods of financial crisis can have long-lasting effects
on stock market participation. Investing in the stock market was a great opportu-
nity to get good returns, but many Europeans stayed outside the market. Within
a behavioural finance approach, I suggest that there are financial impressionable
years. Findings support the idea of myopic behaviour and that there are peri-
ods during the life when beliefs about stock market are made: when individuals
start saving for retirement between age 41 and 45 and after the first investment
by an inexperienced investor. The results differentiates from what Malmendier
and Nagel (2011) find using US data from the Survey of Consumer Finances from
1960 to 2007. They consider the total experienced returns from birth to present,
where experienced returns are computed as weighted averages of yearly returns
with an optimal weighting procedure that give more weight to recent years than
the distant past. They show that experienced returns during the life affect beliefs
on risk taking about financial stock markets. In the analysis I give weight only to
some past periods of life which can be also in a distant past.
Myopic loss aversion and disappointment aversion is found for potentially expe-
rienced returns. Individuals who experienced a bad performance of the market
when they started saving for retirement are less willing to enter in the market and
they are probably not entering anymore. For actual experience a myopic behaviour
11Myopic loss aversion is not tested because the performance is a total return measure and after
several years, the stock market usually recover completely.
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is found. The first experience is particularly interesting to study because even if
individuals can have different level of financial literacy, they are all inexperienced.
The effects are significant but relatively small, probably because of dependence
state and disposition effects.
Mean reversion is not considered for potential experience because we look at the
past participation, while for actual experience I consider interview year dummies
to capture differences on the later participation in the market because of the cur-
rent market cycle. In the period from 2004 to 2007 financial stock markets passed
from a bottom level to a top one which should include those investors who invested
in the market when the value was low and exited when it was high. Moreover,
periods of downturns in the market can be related to periods of economic reces-
sion or instability which could have increased the background risks and lowered
the participation in the market. However it is not clear why periods of economic
recessions before or after the impressionable financial years should not affect finan-
cial decisions. The plausible explanation is that individuals are myopic loss averse
and when they make financial decisions they evaluate the opportunity to invest or
continuing to hold stocks or shares in isolation with respect to other risks, making
a narrow framing decision.
Further investigation about the scarring effects of recessions should be considered,
taking into account other aspects like the diversification of portfolios, the possibil-
ity that individuals invested in less risky mutual funds and individual retirement
accounts, the size and duration of their first investment, and the background risks.
Comparisons and predictions for possible effects of the last financial crisis are
difficult because in the past there was more limited and less frequent availability
of information about stock markets and the volatility was lower. If we assume that
the behaviour is similar, we could expect that there will be an important scarring
effect on stock market participation by cohorts who were planning for retirement.
These cohorts could be less prepared for retirement in the next future. Other
results of the paper show that Europeans were not variance averse and that many
Europeans could have decided to invest to hedge against inflation.
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Figure 1.1: Weighted fraction of individuals who ever invested in stocks before
2006-07 and their later participation in the stock market in 2006-07
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Figure 1.2: Comparison between inflation rate, short-term interest rate, and
volatility rate in Germany from 1951 to 2010
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Figure 1.3: Inflation rates in several European countries since 1950. Data from
national institutes of Statistics or from OECD.
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Figure 1.4: Nominal DAX returns since 1951 and volatility rates since 1960
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Figure 1.5: Nominal, real and excess DAX returns since 1951 and volatility rates
since 1960
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Figure 1.6: Path of nominal wealth for stocks, short-term bonds and inflation
23






















































	



	



	



	



	

































































	
	
	 
		
	
Figure 1.7: Path of real Wealth for stocks and short-term bonds
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Figure 1.8: 5-year averages of nominal DAX returns, inflation rate and short-
term interest rate between 1953 and 2008
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Figure 1.9: 5-years averages of the stock market performance between the period
1953 and 2008
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics
Variables Full sample Investors
mean std dev mean std dev
Having ever invested in stocks (1=Yes) 0.5766 (0.4941)
Pot. Experienced excess returns 0.0455 (0.0932)
Pot. neg. experienced excess returns 0.0167 (0.0299)
Volatility since 1960 0.1610 (0.0372)
Inflation rate 0.0319 (0.0146)
Having stocks or shares in 2004-06 0.4100 (0.4919)
Actual experienced nominal returns 0.1006 (0.1881)
- dummy for negative returns 0.3129
Actual experienced real returns 0.0715 (0.1948)
- dummy for negative returns 0.4261
Actual experienced excess returnss 0.0435 (0.1948)
- dummy for negative returns 0.4410
Cohort dummy: year birth ≤ 1935 0.2490 (0.4325) 0.1776 (0.3822)
Cohort dummy: year birth > 1946 0.4098 (0.4918) 0.4765 (0.4995)
Age 66.515 (8.791) 64.925 (8.175)
Years of education 10.268 (3.677) 11.063 (3.479)
Numeracy 2 (2/3 correct answers) 0.5666 (0.4956) 0.6711 (0.4699)
Numeracy 3 (3/3 correct answers) 0.2365 (0.4250) 0.3125 (0.4636)
Verbal fluency score 22.716 (6.879)
Ten words list learning score 5.611 (1.534)
Gender: (1=female) 0.4444 (0.4969) 0.3989 (0.4897)
Household size 2.1066 (0.9518) 2.1095 (0.8925)
Number of children 2.1507 (1.3608) 2.0793 (1.2458)
Marital status: having a partner 0.7288 (0.4446) 0.7627 (0.4255)
Make ends meet: difficult 0.2775 (0.4478) 0.1759 (0.3808)
Make ends meet: very easily 0.3546 (0.4784) 0.4604 (0.4985)
1+ limitations in ADLs 0.0592 (0.2361) 0.0465 (0.2105)
1+ limitations in iADLs 0.0919 (0.2889) 0.0634 (0.2438)
Self Reported Health: Excellent 0.1314 (0.3378) 0.1668 (0.3728)
Self Reported Health: Poor 0.0462 (0.2101) 0.0256 (0.1578)
1+ Chronic Diseases 0.3900 (0.4878) 0.3569 (0.4791)
Household Income (log) 10.173 (0.8021) 10.357 (0.7380)
Real Assets (inverse hyperbolic sine) 10.901 (3.7674) 11.336 (3.1188)
Urban area: Big city 0.1153 (0.3193) 0.1267 (0.3326)
Urban area: Rural area or village 0.2733 (0.4457) 0.2563 (0.4367)
IT 0.1161 (0.3203) 0.0534 (0.2248)
AT 0.0445 (0.2062) 0.0222 (0.1474)
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Variables Full sample Investors
SE 0.1152 (0.3192) 0.1767 (0.3814)
NL 0.1050 (0.3065) 0.0845 (0.2782)
ES 0.0647 (0.2460) 0.0338 (0.1807)
FR 0.1241 (0.3297) 0.1315 (0.3380)
DK 0.1132 (0.3169) 0.1511 (0.3582)
CH 0.0714 (0.2575) 0.0854 (0.2796)
BE 0.1478 (0.3549) 0.1718 (0.3773)
interview year=2007 0.6133 (0.4870) 0.5907 (0.4918)
interview=Wave2 (2006-07) 0.8519 (0.3551) 0.8582 (0.3489)
interview year=2005 0.0317 (0.1752) 0.0368 (0.1882)
Area birth: City 0.2398 (0.4270) 0.2616 (0.4395)
Area birth: Rural area or village 0.4220 (0.4939) 0.3965 (0.4892)
Math skills at age 10: Better 0.3981 (0.4895) 0.4562 (0.4981)
Math skills at age 10: Worse 0.1217 (0.3270) 0.0886 (0.2842)
Num. books at age 10: ≤ 10 0.3862 (0.4869) 0.2806 (0.4493)
Num. books at age 10: ≥ 100 0.1558 (0.3627) 0.2050 (0.4038)
N 10,785 5,360
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Table 1.2: Average marginal effects from a probit estimation for having ever in-
vested in stocks or shares with different measures of potentially experienced
returns
VARIABLES (i) (ii) (iii)
DAX Nominal DAX Real DAX excess returns
Pot. Experienced returns -0.00663 -0.0770 -0.124
(0.0722) (0.0761) (0.0843)
Pot. Neg. Experienced returns -1.156** -0.649** -0.572***
(0.488) (0.261) (0.217)
Cohort dummy: -0.0276 -0.0211 -0.0185
year birth ≤ 1935 (0.0190) (0.0194) (0.0198)
Cohort dummy: -0.00754 -0.0184 -0.0224
year birth > 1946 (0.0198) (0.0208) (0.0211)
Age -0.00345* -0.00417** -0.00459**
(0.00176) (0.00182) (0.00187)
Years education 0.00741*** 0.00743*** 0.00745***
(0.00137) (0.00137) (0.00137)
High numeracy score 0.0613*** 0.0616*** 0.0614***
(0.00907) (0.00908) (0.00907)
Female -0.0793*** -0.0794*** -0.0793***
(0.00945) (0.00945) (0.00944)
Household size -0.0113** -0.0110** -0.0108**
(0.00513) (0.00516) (0.00517)
Number of children -0.0143*** -0.0142*** -0.0142***
(0.00307) (0.00307) (0.00306)
Has partner -0.00728 -0.00765 -0.00789
(0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124)
Make ends meet: difficult -0.0725*** -0.0725*** -0.0725***
(0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110)
Make ends meet: easily 0.0685*** 0.0684*** 0.0682***
(0.00916) (0.00915) (0.00915)
1+ adl limitations 0.0141 0.0137 0.0134
(0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0177)
1+ iadl limitations -0.0146 -0.0135 -0.0134
(0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0153)
Self-reported health: Excellent 0.00802 0.00799 0.00794
(0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0122)
Self-reported health: Poor -0.0803*** -0.0805*** -0.0806***
(0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0216)
Household income (log) 0.0466*** 0.0466*** 0.0466***
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(0.00608) (0.00609) (0.00610)
Real Assets (asinh) 0.0170*** 0.0169*** 0.0169***
(0.00130) (0.00130) (0.00130)
Urban area: Big city 0.0416*** 0.0420*** 0.0420***
(0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0146)
Urban area: Rural area -0.0279*** -0.0281*** -0.0279***
or village (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106)
IT -0.110*** -0.110*** -0.110***
(0.0180) (0.0179) (0.0179)
AT -0.135*** -0.135*** -0.135***
(0.0232) (0.0233) (0.0234)
SE 0.377*** 0.377*** 0.377***
(0.0184) (0.0183) (0.0181)
NL -0.112*** -0.111*** -0.111***
(0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0172)
ES -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.100***
(0.0230) (0.0228) (0.0226)
FR 0.162*** 0.162*** 0.162***
(0.0184) (0.0183) (0.0181)
DK 0.241*** 0.241*** 0.242***
(0.0200) (0.0199) (0.0197)
CH 0.129*** 0.128*** 0.128***
(0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0232)
BE 0.163*** 0.163*** 0.163***
(0.0169) (0.0168) (0.0167)
Area birth: City -0.0101 -0.0101 -0.0102
(0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0116)
Area birth: Rural area -0.00154 -0.00155 -0.00168
or village (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101)
Math skills at age 10: Better 0.0379*** 0.0377*** 0.0378***
(0.00894) (0.00896) (0.00895)
Math skills at age 10: Worse -0.0239* -0.0241* -0.0241*
(0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0136)
Num. books at age 10:≤ 10 -0.0426*** -0.0423*** -0.0424***
(0.00970) (0.00971) (0.00970)
Num. books at age 10:≥100 0.0414*** 0.0412*** 0.0411***
(0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0120)
Observations 10,785 10,785 10,785
loglikelihood -5532 -5531 -5531
N clusters 359 359 359
29
Pseudo R2 0.247 0.247 0.247
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable is the probability to have ever participated in the financial stock
market. Average marginal effects are reported. The potential experience is defined as
the average returns after age 40 (age 41-45). Standard errors are clusterized following
Moulton (1990) where clusters are defined as the interaction between birth year and
country.
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Table 1.3: Average marginal effects for having ever invested in stocks or shares with different measures for potential experience
VARIABLES (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Excess
returns
Age 36-40
Excess
returns
Age 46-50
Nominal
returns
Real
returns
Excess
returns
Excess
returns
and
Volatility
rate
Excess
returns
and
inflation
rate
Excess
returns
and
partner
experience
Pot. experienced -0.000790 0.0662 -0.0757 -0.102 -0.108 -0.137 -0.0315 -0.111
returns (0.0995) (0.0762) (0.0790) (0.0815) (0.0870) (0.0864) (0.0934) (0.0840)
Pot. neg. experienced 0.0701 0.113 -0.129 -0.473 -0.628** -0.603*** -0.651*** -0.521**
returns (0.211) (0.223) (0.566) (0.356) (0.252) (0.223) (0.221) (0.216)
Dummy pot. experienced -
0.0565***
-0.0176 0.00738
returns (<0) (0.0213) (0.0220) (0.0143)
Volatility rate -0.128
(0.160)
Inflation rate 0.994**
(0.455)
Partner pot. -0.0971
experienced returns (0.0676)
Partner pot. neg. -0.453**
experienced returns (0.228)
Observations 10,645 10,589 10,785 10,785 10,785 10,785 10,785 10,785
loglikelihood -5453 -5430 -5528 -5531 -5531 -5531 -5529 -5529
N clusters 364 336 359 359 359 359 359 359
Pseudo R2 0.247 0.248 0.248 0.247 0.247 0.247 0.248 0.248
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable is the probability to have ever participated in the financial stock market. Average marginal effects are reported.
Standard errors are clusterized following Moulton (1990) where clusters are defined as the interaction between birth year and country.
Regressions include the same variables as in the previous estimation (financial respondent and household characteristics, country dummies
and cohort dummies). The number of observations for (i) and (ii) depends on the availability of the potentially experienced returns.
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Table 1.4: Heckman model estimation for holding stocks later in life conditional on having ever invested in stocks with actual
experienced nominal returns and different time horizons
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Actual experience after
1 year
Actual experience after
2 years
Actual experience after
3 years
Actual experience after
5 year
Actual maximum
experience
Variables stocks
later in
life
having
ever
invested
stocks
later in
life
having
ever
invested
stocks
later in
life
having
ever
invested
stocks
later in
life
having ever
invested
stocks
later in
life
having
ever
invested
Actually exp. nominal 0.0655** 0.0732** 0.0745* 0.0672 0.0576
returns (0.0312) (0.0354) (0.0406) (0.0428) (0.0460)
Potentially exp. returns -0.0827 -0.0957 -0.0819 -0.0681 -0.0827
returns (0.103) (0.102) (0.104) (0.105) (0.103)
Potentially. neg. exp. 0.662*** 0.677*** 0.661*** 0.718*** 0.663***
returns (0.226) (0.227) (0.228) (0.233) (0.226)
Volatility rate -0.0160 -0.0477 -0.0202 -0.0178 -0.0155
(0.183) (0.182) (0.184) (0.188) (0.183)
Inflation rate 0.766 0.671 0.766 0.912* 0.767
(0.521) (0.520) (0.521) (0.525) (0.521)
Cohort dummy: -0.00719 -0.0229 -0.00747 -0.0240 -0.00634 -0.0271 -0.00252 -0.0292 -0.00619 -0.0229
year birth ≤ 1935 (0.0269) (0.0215) (0.0271) (0.0217) (0.0269) (0.0219) (0.0281) (0.0222) (0.0269) (0.0215)
Cohort dummy: 0.0439* -0.0298 0.0440* -0.0290 0.0399 -0.0298 0.0422* -0.0335 0.0444* -0.0298
year birth > 1946 (0.0241) (0.0214) (0.0247) (0.0217) (0.0245) (0.0218) (0.0250) (0.0221) (0.0241) (0.0214)
Age -0.00222 -
0.00520***
-0.00232 -
0.00505***
-0.00257 -0.00486** -0.00280 -0.00455** -0.00243 -
0.00520***
(0.00190) (0.00192) (0.00193) (0.00194) (0.00192) (0.00196) (0.00199) (0.00199) (0.00190) (0.00192)
Years education 0.00328* 0.00575*** 0.00325* 0.00589*** 0.00342* 0.00591*** 0.00343* 0.00655*** 0.00336* 0.00575***
(0.00191) (0.00139) (0.00192) (0.00139) (0.00194) (0.00142) (0.00198) (0.00142) (0.00189) (0.00139)
Numeracy score (2/3) 0.00321 0.0436*** -0.00189 0.0438*** -0.00391 0.0454*** 0.000261 0.0440*** 0.00293 0.0436***
(0.0143) (0.0100) (0.0141) (0.0100) (0.0141) (0.00985) (0.0147) (0.00996) (0.0143) (0.01000)
Numeracy score (3/3) 0.00174 0.0211* 0.00284 0.0230** 0.00447 0.0234** 0.00469 0.0230* 0.000677 0.0211*
(0.0150) (0.0116) (0.0149) (0.0116) (0.0148) (0.0116) (0.0150) (0.0118) (0.0150) (0.0116)
Verbal fluency score 0.00292*** 0.00270*** 0.00276*** 0.00272*** 0.00289*** 0.00261*** 0.00281*** 0.00259*** 0.00290*** 0.00270***
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(0.000974) (0.000697) (0.000981) (0.000695) (0.00103) (0.000702) (0.00106) (0.000711) (0.000979) (0.000697)
Ten words list 0.00849** 0.0138*** 0.00922** 0.0138*** 0.00945** 0.0137*** 0.0100** 0.0135*** 0.00858** 0.0138***
learning score (0.00397) (0.00304) (0.00398) (0.00310) (0.00416) (0.00308) (0.00424) (0.00311) (0.00398) (0.00304)
Female -0.0189 -0.0922*** -0.0191 -0.0933*** -0.0159 -0.0943*** -0.0137 -0.0971*** -0.0179 -0.0922***
(0.0129) (0.00983) (0.0129) (0.00995) (0.0129) (0.01000) (0.0133) (0.01000) (0.0129) (0.00983)
Household size -8.91e-05 -0.0102* 0.00100 -0.0112** 0.00463 -0.0125** 0.00317 -0.0125** 0.000154 -0.0102*
(0.00889) (0.00540) (0.00894) (0.00555) (0.00895) (0.00569) (0.00944) (0.00564) (0.00894) (0.00540)
Number of children -0.00772* -0.0148*** -0.00677 -0.0147*** -0.00871* -0.0145*** -0.00792* -0.0139*** -0.00783* -0.0148***
(0.00449) (0.00314) (0.00446) (0.00315) (0.00447) (0.00318) (0.00463) (0.00325) (0.00449) (0.00314)
Has partner 0.0310* -0.00918 0.0262 -0.00733 0.0263 -0.00682 0.0252 -0.00639 0.0303* -0.00918
(0.0182) (0.0126) (0.0186) (0.0128) (0.0188) (0.0129) (0.0188) (0.0133) (0.0181) (0.0126)
Make ends meet: -0.0739*** -0.0635*** -0.0713*** -0.0639*** -0.0687*** -0.0633*** -0.0690*** -0.0630*** -0.0745*** -0.0635***
difficult (0.0159) (0.0116) (0.0163) (0.0117) (0.0160) (0.0117) (0.0166) (0.0119) (0.0159) (0.0116)
Make ends meet: 0.0527*** 0.0637*** 0.0535*** 0.0643*** 0.0561*** 0.0660*** 0.0567*** 0.0671*** 0.0521*** 0.0636***
easily (0.0131) (0.00919) (0.0131) (0.00918) (0.0129) (0.00911) (0.0132) (0.00914) (0.0132) (0.00918)
1+ adl limitations -0.0147 0.00860 -0.0208 0.00771 -0.0169 0.00661 -0.0162 0.0104 -0.0152 0.00859
(0.0314) (0.0192) (0.0316) (0.0194) (0.0317) (0.0195) (0.0324) (0.0201) (0.0314) (0.0192)
1+ iadl limitations -0.0415 -0.0147 -0.0445 -0.0124 -0.0486* -0.0130 -0.0473* -0.0161 -0.0418 -0.0147
(0.0283) (0.0161) (0.0283) (0.0162) (0.0282) (0.0162) (0.0284) (0.0169) (0.0284) (0.0161)
Self-reported health: 0.0303* 0.00612 0.0316* 0.00469 0.0312* 0.00378 0.0277 0.00387 0.0302* 0.00612
Excellent (0.0166) (0.0128) (0.0166) (0.0129) (0.0169) (0.0129) (0.0172) (0.0132) (0.0166) (0.0128)
Self-reported health: -0.0709* -0.0876*** -0.0660* -0.0908*** -0.0633 -0.0889*** -0.0736* -0.0898*** -0.0710* -0.0876***
Poor (0.0383) (0.0232) (0.0391) (0.0232) (0.0392) (0.0234) (0.0392) (0.0232) (0.0384) (0.0232)
1+ Chronic diseases 0.0157 0.00895 0.0174 0.00932 0.0177 0.0109 0.0153 0.0123 0.0146 0.00894
(0.0129) (0.00924) (0.0129) (0.00927) (0.0129) (0.00939) (0.0130) (0.00969) (0.0130) (0.00924)
Household income 0.0641*** 0.0438*** 0.0644*** 0.0431*** 0.0671*** 0.0432*** 0.0677*** 0.0416*** 0.0638*** 0.0437***
(log) (0.0105) (0.00645) (0.0106) (0.00653) (0.0105) (0.00663) (0.0103) (0.00678) (0.0106) (0.00645)
Real Assets 0.0108*** 0.0168*** 0.0115*** 0.0168*** 0.0107*** 0.0171*** 0.0112*** 0.0174*** 0.0108*** 0.0168***
(asinh) (0.00224) (0.00141) (0.00224) (0.00142) (0.00223) (0.00145) (0.00229) (0.00148) (0.00223) (0.00141)
Urban area: Big city 0.0117 0.0427*** 0.0134 0.0418*** 0.0116 0.0417*** 0.0140 0.0411*** 0.0116 0.0427***
(0.0205) (0.0151) (0.0207) (0.0151) (0.0209) (0.0153) (0.0211) (0.0153) (0.0206) (0.0151)
Urban area: Rural -0.0278** -0.0274** -0.0283** -0.0278** -0.0309** -0.0271** -0.0345** -0.0278** -0.0282** -0.0274**
area or village (0.0130) (0.0108) (0.0134) (0.0110) (0.0134) (0.0110) (0.0138) (0.0112) (0.0130) (0.0108)33
IT -0.126*** -0.0895*** -0.131*** -0.0847*** -0.139*** -0.0804*** -0.146*** -0.0727*** -0.127*** -0.0895***
(0.0320) (0.0189) (0.0326) (0.0187) (0.0325) (0.0186) (0.0354) (0.0192) (0.0321) (0.0189)
AT -0.0262 -0.137*** -0.0278 -0.135*** -0.0396 -0.130*** -0.0461 -0.125*** -0.0280 -0.137***
(0.0481) (0.0244) (0.0510) (0.0246) (0.0512) (0.0249) (0.0526) (0.0259) (0.0484) (0.0244)
SE 0.428*** 0.370*** 0.427*** 0.376*** 0.420*** 0.382*** 0.410*** 0.397*** 0.426*** 0.370***
(0.0249) (0.0186) (0.0255) (0.0185) (0.0257) (0.0185) (0.0279) (0.0186) (0.0251) (0.0186)
NL 0.0104 -0.0905*** 0.00729 -0.0868*** 0.00543 -0.0845*** -0.00115 -0.0809*** 0.0115 -0.0905***
(0.0276) (0.0170) (0.0284) (0.0166) (0.0282) (0.0164) (0.0308) (0.0177) (0.0277) (0.0170)
ES -0.0748* -0.0754*** -0.0845** -0.0715*** -0.0891** -0.0721*** -0.102** -0.0669*** -0.0782** -0.0754***
(0.0394) (0.0235) (0.0414) (0.0230) (0.0407) (0.0227) (0.0428) (0.0227) (0.0396) (0.0235)
FR 0.0902*** 0.136*** 0.0902*** 0.143*** 0.0856*** 0.145*** 0.0755*** 0.156*** 0.0850*** 0.136***
(0.0230) (0.0192) (0.0236) (0.0191) (0.0235) (0.0195) (0.0257) (0.0198) (0.0234) (0.0192)
DK 0.291*** 0.229*** 0.288*** 0.232*** 0.275*** 0.235*** 0.265*** 0.248*** 0.287*** 0.229***
(0.0238) (0.0188) (0.0246) (0.0186) (0.0250) (0.0187) (0.0272) (0.0189) (0.0241) (0.0188)
CH 0.140*** 0.133*** 0.138*** 0.135*** 0.134*** 0.137*** 0.126*** 0.146*** 0.137*** 0.133***
(0.0286) (0.0224) (0.0295) (0.0224) (0.0297) (0.0225) (0.0323) (0.0233) (0.0290) (0.0224)
BE 0.124*** 0.158*** 0.121*** 0.162*** 0.112*** 0.167*** 0.107*** 0.178*** 0.121*** 0.158***
(0.0249) (0.0176) (0.0253) (0.0175) (0.0253) (0.0176) (0.0276) (0.0179) (0.0250) (0.0175)
Interview year: 2007 -0.0373** -0.0184 -0.0328** -0.0140 -0.0293* -0.0146 -0.0273* -0.0145 -0.0399** -0.0184
(0.0158) (0.0124) (0.0159) (0.0125) (0.0160) (0.0126) (0.0159) (0.0128) (0.0159) (0.0124)
Interview year: 2006-07 0.0422* 0.0486*** 0.0393 0.0460*** 0.0384 0.0461*** 0.0283 0.0604*** 0.0391 0.0486***
(0.0243) (0.0159) (0.0245) (0.0160) (0.0245) (0.0160) (0.0249) (0.0164) (0.0247) (0.0159)
Interview year: 2005 -0.00728 0.0304 -0.00709 0.0314 -0.00418 0.0319 -0.0155 0.0400 -0.00872 0.0304
(0.0374) (0.0238) (0.0371) (0.0238) (0.0372) (0.0242) (0.0391) (0.0243) (0.0376) (0.0238)
Area birth: City -0.00859 -0.00828 -0.00933 -0.00931 -0.00743 -0.00820 -0.0149 -0.00769 -0.00789 -0.00828
(0.0159) (0.0120) (0.0160) (0.0121) (0.0161) (0.0121) (0.0162) (0.0122) (0.0160) (0.0120)
Area birth: Rural area 0.00459 1.73e-06 0.00639 0.000178 0.0107 -8.01e-05 0.00398 0.000839 0.00529 -5.31e-06
or village (0.0142) (0.0102) (0.0143) (0.0103) (0.0142) (0.0103) (0.0141) (0.0106) (0.0142) (0.0102)
Math skills at age 10: 0.0249** 0.0312*** 0.0273** 0.0304*** 0.0247** 0.0310*** 0.0212* 0.0280*** 0.0250** 0.0312***
Better (0.0120) (0.00923) (0.0121) (0.00934) (0.0122) (0.00938) (0.0124) (0.00961) (0.0120) (0.00923)
Math skills at age 10: -0.0143 -0.0268* -0.0162 -0.0257* -0.0246 -0.0268* -0.0255 -0.0289** -0.0152 -0.0268*
Worse (0.0207) (0.0142) (0.0208) (0.0142) (0.0210) (0.0143) (0.0215) (0.0144) (0.0207) (0.0142)
Num. books at age 10: -0.0213 -0.0357*** -0.0251* -0.0358*** -0.0220 -0.0375*** -0.0156 -0.0391*** -0.0206 -0.0357***
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≤10 (0.0136) (0.00982) (0.0139) (0.00988) (0.0139) (0.00992) (0.0140) (0.00999) (0.0137) (0.00982)
Num. books at age 10: -0.0101 0.0321*** -0.0106 0.0343*** -0.00974 0.0340*** -0.0116 0.0360*** -0.0105 0.0321***
≥100 (0.0150) (0.0123) (0.0150) (0.0124) (0.0153) (0.0125) (0.0158) (0.0126) (0.0150) (0.0122)
ρ -0.215 -0.201 -0.194 -0.147 -0.215
(0.212) (0.207) (0.203) (0.224) (0.209)
Observations 9,895 9,799 9,709 9,513 9,895
loglikelihood -7958 -7844 -7733 -7493 -7960
N clusters 364 363 362 361 364
N uncensored obs. 5360 5264 5174 4978 5360
Wald test sel. instr. 10.52 10.35 10.31 12.25 10.53
p-value 0.0325 0.0350 0.0355 0.0156 0.0324
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.5: Heckman model estimation for holding stocks later in life conditional on having ever invested in stocks with actual
experienced real returns and different time horizon
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Actual experience
after 1 year
Actual experience
after 2 years
Actual experience
after 3 years
Actual experience
after 5 year
Actual maximum
experience
Variables stocks
later in
life
having
ever
invested
stocks
later in
life
having
ever
invested
stocks
later in
life
having
ever
invested
stocks
later in
life
having
ever
invested
stocks
later in
life
having
ever
invested
Actual exp. real 0.0620** 0.0674** 0.0730* 0.0676 0.110
returns (0.0303) (0.0341) (0.0403) (0.0430) (0.0828)
Potentially exp. -0.0827 -0.0958 -0.0819 -0.0681 -0.0828
returns (0.103) (0.102) (0.104) (0.105) (0.103)
Potentially neg. exp. 0.663*** 0.677*** 0.661*** 0.718*** 0.663***
returns (0.226) (0.227) (0.228) (0.233) (0.226)
Volatility rate -0.0159 -0.0475 -0.0201 -0.0178 -0.0158
(0.183) (0.182) (0.184) (0.188) (0.183)
Inflation rate 0.766 0.671 0.766 0.912* 0.766
(0.521) (0.520) (0.521) (0.525) (0.521)
ρ -0.215 -0.202 -0.194 -0.147 -0.214
(0.212) (0.208) (0.203) (0.224) (0.209)
Observations 9,895 9,799 9,709 9,513 9,895
loglikelihood -7958 -7844 -7733 -7493 -7960
N clusters 364 363 362 361 364
N uncensored obs. 5360 5264 5174 4978 5360
Wald test sel. instr. 10.53 10.35 10.31 12.25 10.53
p-value 0.0324 0.0349 0.0355 0.0156 0.0324
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.6: Heckman model estimation for holding stocks later in life conditional on having ever invested in stocks with actual
experienced excess returns and different time horizon
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Actual Experience
after 1 year
Actual Experience
after 2 years
Actual Experience
after 3 years
Actual Experience
after 5 year
Actual Maximum
Experience
Variables stocks
later in
life
having
ever
invested
stocks
later in
life
having
ever
invested
stocks
later in
life
having
ever
invested
stocks
later in
life
having
ever
invested
stocks
later in
life
having
ever
invested
Actual exp. excess 0.0578* 0.0617* 0.0684* 0.0656 0.111
returns (0.0304) (0.0343) (0.0403) (0.0425) (0.133)
Potentially exp. -0.0827 -0.0958 -0.0819 -0.0681 -0.0828
returns (0.103) (0.102) (0.104) (0.105) (0.103)
Potentially neg. exp. 0.663*** 0.677*** 0.662*** 0.718*** 0.663***
returns (0.226) (0.227) (0.228) (0.233) (0.226)
Volatility rate -0.0157 -0.0473 -0.0199 -0.0177 -0.0156
(0.183) (0.182) (0.184) (0.188) (0.183)
Inflation rate 0.766 0.671 0.766 0.912* 0.766
(0.521) (0.520) (0.521) (0.525) (0.521)
ρ -0.217 -0.203 -0.196 -0.148 -0.214
(0.212) (0.207) (0.203) (0.224) (0.210)
Observations 9,895 9,799 9,709 9,513 9,895
loglikelihood -7959 -7844 -7733 -7493 -7960
N clusters 364 363 362 361 364
N uncensored obs. 5360 5264 5174 4978 5360
Wald test sel. instr. 15.14 14.65 13.61 14.49 11.25
p-value 0.0098 0.0120 0.0183 0.0128 0.0467
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
37
Table 1.7: Data on Path of Wealth and Inflation
Year Inflation
path
Stock
POW
Stock
POW
(real)
Short-
term bond
POW
Short-
term bond
POW
(real)
1950 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
1951 1.0919 2.1541 1.9727 1.0600 0.9708
1952 1.0891 1.9798 1.8178 1.1157 1.0243
1953 1.0752 2.4549 2.2832 1.1570 1.0761
1954 1.0334 4.4824 4.3375 1.1942 1.1556
1955 1.0446 4.9307 4.7204 1.2325 1.1799
1956 1.0719 4.5659 4.2596 1.2920 1.2054
1957 1.0944 4.8035 4.3892 1.3480 1.2317
1958 1.1177 7.6948 6.8847 1.3913 1.2448
1959 1.1277 13.8433 12.2758 1.4341 1.2717
1960 1.1450 16.4336 14.3523 1.5051 1.3144
1961 1.1713 18.6392 15.9135 1.5575 1.3297
1962 1.2046 15.0266 12.4746 1.6092 1.3359
1963 1.2403 14.9452 12.0494 1.6714 1.3476
1964 1.2693 17.5346 13.8145 1.7378 1.3691
1965 1.3104 15.1806 11.5842 1.8244 1.3922
1966 1.3567 12.8590 9.4778 1.9418 1.4312
1967 1.3811 13.5125 9.7838 2.0221 1.4641
1968 1.4014 18.6536 13.3105 2.0968 1.4962
1969 1.4282 19.9160 13.9446 2.2147 1.5506
1970 1.4775 17.0164 11.5170 2.4167 1.6356
1971 1.5549 16.4315 10.5673 2.5842 1.6619
1972 1.6402 18.2010 11.0966 2.7249 1.6613
1973 1.7556 16.2193 9.2388 3.0464 1.7353
1974 1.8782 13.4467 7.1593 3.3389 1.7777
1975 1.9892 16.7037 8.3971 3.4993 1.7591
1976 2.0737 17.9875 8.6741 3.6436 1.7570
1977 2.1511 17.7850 8.2677 3.7977 1.7654
1978 2.2096 18.8458 8.5290 3.9341 1.7804
1979 2.2990 17.8548 7.7664 4.1897 1.8224
1980 2.4241 16.7874 6.9253 4.5773 1.8883
1981 2.5778 16.8363 6.5311 5.1150 1.9842
1982 2.7130 17.1179 6.3097 5.5550 2.0476
1983 2.8023 22.8407 8.1507 5.8662 2.0933
1984 2.8697 25.7648 8.9781 6.2068ed 2.1628
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Year Inflation
path
Stock
POW
Stock
POW
(real)
Short-
term bond
POW
Short-
term bond
POW
(real)
1985 2.9290 34.0576 11.6277 6.5344 2.2309
1986 2.9252 47.2960 16.1683 6.8282 2.3343
1987 2.9325 43.7734 14.9268 7.0953 2.4195
1988 2.9699 38.1676 12.8515 7.3937 2.4896
1989 3.0525 48.7984 15.9865 7.9044 2.5895
1990 3.1348 57.1069 18.2171 8.5552 2.7291
1991 3.2603 52.5285 16.1114 9.3225 2.8594
1992 3.4279 54.4444 15.8829 10.1830 2.9707
1993 3.5782 60.1432 16.8082 10.9027 3.0470
1994 3.6770 70.5052 19.1746 11.4695 3.1193
1995 3.7414 71.0945 19.0019 11.9733 3.2002
1996 3.7930 85.3930 22.5134 12.3571 3.2579
1997 3.8660 123.5866 31.9675 12.7556 3.2994
1998 3.9047 166.8465 42.7299 13.1941 3.3790
1999 3.9262 177.8028 45.2868 13.5732 3.4571
2000 3.9820 236.6133 59.4208 14.1517 3.5539
2001 4.0593 186.9433 46.0529 14.7362 3.6302
2002 4.1195 139.1107 33.7692 15.2104 3.6923
2003 4.1624 106.5065 25.5877 15.5543 3.7369
2004 4.2311 132.3923 31.2900 15.8721 3.7513
2005 4.2956 155.5166 36.2039 16.2084 3.7733
2006 4.3643 195.8561 44.8769 16.6929 3.8249
2007 4.4631 248.1476 55.5999 17.3858 3.8955
2008 4.5791 206.5086 45.0983 18.1673 3.9675
2009 4.5963 167.2289 36.3837 18.3830 3.9996
2010 4.6478 205.9346 44.3079 18.5278 3.9864
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2 Occupational Choices and
Informal Caregiving Among Young
Old Europeans
ABSTRACT
In the recent years many European countries have adopted pension reforms to
postpone retirement age. This could lower the informal long-term caregiving po-
tential provided by young old. Using European data from SHARE I investigate
about the effect of occupational choices on informal caregiving, both in probabil-
ity and time, taking into account household formation between a care giver and
a care recipient. Four different types of care recipients are considered: parents,
grandchildren, adult children and other people who live outside the family. The
occupational choices are considered as binary: participating or not in the labour
market. Women who never participated in the labour market are distinguished
from those who worked in the past, because the choice of never entering in the
labour market was made in a distant past and it is more related to family prefer-
ences. Endogeneity of the occupational choices are also checked using the potential
eligibility to pension benefits based on pension reforms.
Results show that there is a positive effect of being not employed on coresiding
with a parent or an adult child and on the informal care provision, especially for
women and for care given to look after grandchildren. The endogeneity problem
is relevant for women as it is considering coresiding as an alternative choice of
providing informal care outside the household. Households with a woman who
never worked provide more care inside the family and the woman is usually the
one who specializes on care provision. A simulation of a pension reform with an
increase of one year in the eligibility age to receive a public pension benefit, based
on the estimated parameters, suggests that demand for formal care may increase a
lot, but less for countries which adopt flexible time working arrangements policies
for young old.
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2.1 Introduction
The recent European financial crisis has raised concerns about the sustainability
of welfare and national pension systems. Austerity policies have been adopted to
reduce public expenses for health care and long-term assistance. Many reforms
have also been introduced across the European countries to decrease pension ex-
penses: increasing the effective retirement age and decreasing current and future
pension benefits, accordingly to the increased life expectancy.
The postponement of retirement age for many Europeans will induce many young
old to work longer, reducing their available time for leisure or other activities like
informal care provision. Informal care has been associated with an improved qual-
ity of life and a decrease in deterioration of mental and physical health for assisted
people (i.e. Leung et al., 2007). Hence, a decrease in informal care provision could
lead to an increase in demand for paid care and a reduction of quality of life for
care receivers.
In this context I want to investigate if occupational choices of young old Euro-
peans affect propensity and time allocated to informal caregiving. Young old are
considered as the individuals aged between 50 and 69.
The association between labour supply and caregiving has been widely investi-
gated especially with US data. The literature focused mainly on care provided
by adult daughters to their parents (Ettner, 1995; 1996; Wolf and Soldo, 1994).
These studies suggest that there is a weak negative correlation between work and
propensity to provide informal care and the time allocated to it, but when one
takes into account simultaneity of the choices, the effect is insignificant or very
small, so that there is weak evidence for an effect of labour supply on informal
care provision.
Other studies based on European data from SHARE find that there is a negative
relation between informal caregiving and labor supply (Crespo, 2006; Bolin et al.,
2008; Crespo and Mira, 2013). Bolin et al. (2008) find a negative correlation
between informal caregiving to parents and labour supply for males and females but
when they check for the endogeneity of informal care, they do not find a significant
effect. Their results are probably affected by the weakness of their instruments.
Crespo (2006) analyzes the differences between Northern and Southern European
countries about provision of intensive informal care (on a daily or weekly basis)
to elderly parents on labour market participation decisions of European women
who are themselves approaching retirement. Finally, Crespo and Mira (2013)
use a time allocation model and focus only on daily and coresidential personal
care. The latter two studies suggest that there is a negative effect, especially for
women from Southern European countries. However they do not consider that
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many women never participated in the labour market. This is a past choice which
can depend on family preferences. Then it is not considered that especially in
Southern Europe many young old individuals coreside with their parents, probably
to provide informal care to them. Ciani (2012) studies the effect of providing
coresidential unpaid adult care on the caregiver probability of being employed using
ECHP data and separating the sample between Northern and Southern European
countries. He finds that once he takes into account the time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity, informal caregiving is not endogenous and that the effect is negative
but small for both groups of countries. But his study does not consider household
formation and changes in household size.
The recent literature has focused also on informal care given to other recipients:
caregiving to adult children also for looking after grandchildren1 or caregiving to
other people outside the family such as friends, neighbors, and other relatives.
Using PSID data Wang and Marcotte (2007) find that grandparents are more
willing to work if they coreside with grandchildren especially when parents do not
live with them. Using preliminary data from SHARE Wave 1 Hank and Buber
(2009) investigate about the country differences in characteristics of grandchildren
and grandparents looking after to them. Albertini and Kohli (2009) and Kalwij
et al. (2012) find using SHARE data that especially for childless individuals or
families who relies less on children, individuals are more willing to give and receive
care from friends, neighbors and other relatives. To my knowledge the literature on
caregiving to grandchildren or to other people has not focused on the simultaneity
of decisions of labour supply and informal caregiving.
As mentioned above, the economic literature which investigates the effect of labour
supply on informal caregiving is based mainly on US data2. Some studies take into
account that the caring decision is confounded with living arrangement (Stern,
1995; Pezzin and Schone, 1999). Labor supply is usually considered as one of
the child decisions that can be jointly determined with informal caregiving or
household formation with an older parent. Stern (1995) estimates the effect of
various parent and child characteristics on the choice of care arrangement of the
parent, considering the potential endogeneity of the employment status and the
geographic distance of the child. She finds that child distance has a smaller and
slightly significant effect, while work status is not significant. Instead, Pezzin and
Schone (1999) analyze the problem of informal care decisions jointly with living
arrangement, labor force participation and cash transfer decisions. They find that
coresidence is an important alternative mode of assistance to elderly persons.
1I refer to this kind of help as caregiving to grandchildren.
2At least at my knowledge there are not other studies which focus on estimating the effect of
occupational choices on informal caregiving considering household formation using European
data.
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As theoretical setting I consider a Nash bargaining game between a care giver
and a care recipient, following the model proposed by Pezzin and Schone (1999)
to discuss the interpretation of the parameters of interest: informal caregiving
to each type of care recipient, inter-generational household formation, labor force
participation and cash transfer decisions of young old individuals.
Simultaneity of decisions is taken into account by instrumenting the occupational
choices with the potential eligibility to pension benefits computed using pension
rules and reforms (as in Angelini et al. (2009)). The paper is related to the studies
of the effect of informal care on labor supply. With respect to previous studies
I am considering the care given to people who live outside the household and I
am treating coresiding as a potential alternative choice for providing informal care
outside the household. The analysis extends also to other types of informal caring
distinguishing by care recipient. Care recipients are divided into four categories:
parents or parents-in-law, grandchildren, adult children and other people (friends,
neighbors, and other relatives). Then, women are distinguished between those
who make an occupational choice (being employed or not) and those who never
participated in the labor force. In the latter case I assume that the decision to
never participate is more related to family choice or task allocation among family
members than labor supply, because for women over 50 this is a past choice that
is difficult to change.
The empirical estimation focuses on the effect of occupational choices on care ar-
rangements decision (including coresiding decision) using European data from the
first two waves of Survey of Health Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE).
To simultaneously estimate the propensity to coreside, provide care and the time
allocated to informal care, I estimate a Heckman model with double sample se-
lection: individuals first decide whether to co-reside with a care recipient, then if
they do not, they decide whether to provide help and if they do, they decide how
much time to allocate to informal care. At the beginning labor participation is
considered independent of the decision of providing care or coresiding, then it is
allowed to be a simultaneous decision. In the empirical estimation I check for sev-
eral individual and household characteristics of the care giver and characteristics
of care recipients when available. The multi equation system is estimated with a
simulated maximum likelihood method as proposed by Roodman (2011).
Results suggest that women have a higher propensity and allocate more time than
men to provide care to parents and look after grandchildren, while they are less
likely to provide care to adult children and other people. Being not employed
increases the probability to co-reside with parents and adult children, and to pro-
vide informal care both in probability and time to all the different types of care
recipients. For men the exogeneity of the labour supply on informal caregiving is
not rejected. For women I find evidence against the exogeneity of labour supply
44
2.2 Data and descriptive analysis
on informal care provision for all the different types of care, even for the care given
to people outside the family. When the endogeneity of the occupational choices
is taken into account, females who are retired or homemakers have around 20%
more of probability to co-reside with their parents and their adult children; ex-
iting the labour force has still a positive effect on caregiving, especially for the
care propensity. The effect is strong for care given to grandchildren: not employed
women who worked in the past provide 17.3% more care and allocate 120.5% more
time than employed women. Little support is found for endogeneity bias of oc-
cupational choices and hours of provided care, except for the time given to look
after grandchildren. There is also evidence that coresiding can be motivated by
providing help to the care recipient. Finally families with a woman who never
worked provide more care inside their own family, and less outside, but when they
do, they provide more time. Among members of these family women are usually
the ones who are requested to provide informal care.
After that for caregiving to parents and grandchildren and assuming the occupa-
tional choices as exogenous, I use the estimated parameters to simulate the effect
of one year increase in the early and statutory eligibility age to receive a pub-
lic pension benefit on the amount of provided informal care for the individuals
potentially affected by this reform. I show that postponing retirement for many
Europeans could lead to a reduction of informal provision or to an increase in
demand for formal care, if we assume that informal and formal care can be substi-
tutes. Countries where flexible working time arrangements are available are more
likely to have a smaller increase in demand for formal care.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 presents data
and descriptive analysis. Section 3 presents the theoretical model and Section 4
the econometric model. Section 5 presents estimation results, Section 6 presents
simulation results, while Section 7 concludes with a short discussion.
2.2 Data and descriptive analysis
The Survey of Health Ageing and Retirement in Europe3 (SHARE) is a European
cross-national panel of individuals aged 50 or older. It collects several informa-
3This chapter uses data from SHARE wave 4 release 1, as of November 30th 2012 or SHARE
wave 1 and 2 release 2.5.0, as of May 24th 2011 or SHARELIFE release 1, as of November 24th
2010. The SHARE data collection has been primarily funded by the European Commission
through the 5th Framework Programme (project QLK6-CT-2001-00360 in the thematic pro-
gramme Quality of Life), through the 6th Framework Programme (projects SHARE-I3, RII-
CT-2006-062193, COMPARE, CIT5- CT-2005-028857, and SHARELIFE, CIT4-CT-2006-
028812) and through the 7th Framework Programme (SHARE-PREP, N° 211909, SHARE-
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tion about individual and family characteristics like care provision, social support,
health conditions, occupational choices, income and financial assets. The sam-
ple consists of 22,464 individuals between age 50 and 69, 10,212 men and 12,252
women, who have been interviewed for the first time during Wave 1 (2004-2005)
or Wave 2 (2006-2007)4 from Northern European countries (Sweden, Denmark
and the Netherlands), Central European countries (Austria, Germany, France,
Belgium and Switzerland), Southern European countries (Italy and Spain), and
Eastern European countries (Czech Republic and Poland)5. I exclude unemployed
and disabled individuals, thus only employed and retired men, and women who
are employed, retired or homemaker are selected.
SHARE is particularly interesting because it provides detailed information about
labour market participation and informal caregiving. In its first two waves informal
care provision is elicited with several questions: first survey respondents are asked
if they have provided informal care outside the household6; then they are asked
which kind of help they have provided among personal care, practical household
help and help with paperwork. Hence, it is possible to distinguish informal care
by type of task7 and by care receiver. After that they are asked to whom the help
has been provided and how often. Informal care is divided into four categories
with respect to the care recipients: parents or parents-in-law, grandchildren, adult
children and other people (friends, neighbors and other relatives). Then for each
type of care one can compute a measure for the number of weekly hours of given
informal care as it was done in Bolin et al. (2008): the reported reference period
is multiplied or divided to get the weekly time spent to caregiving.
Many studies focused mainly on informal care given to parents, but a descriptive
analysis shows that caring to parents is an activity done by less than 20% of the
Europeans aged between 50 and 69, also because just half of them have at least
one parent or parent-in-law still alive (Figure 2.1). At the same time while the
LEAP, N° 227822 and SHARE M4, N° 261982). Additional funding from the U.S. National
Institute on Aging (U01 AG09740-13S2, P01 AG005842, P01 AG08291, P30 AG12815, R21
AG025169, Y1-AG-4553-01, IAG BSR06-11 and OGHA 04-064) and the German Ministry of
Education and Research as well as from various national sources is gratefully acknowledged
(see www.share-project.org for a full list of funding institutions).
4Longitudinal respondents are not considered because the reference period of the question
about care provision change. The reference period is the last 12 months for non-longitudinal
respondents, after the first interview.
5Czech Republic and Poland participated to the survey for the first time with Wave 2 (2006-07).
6For care given inside the household only the personal one is observed and there is no information
about the time spent for that activity.
7In the analysis I do not consider the type of task provided by the care giver. Hassink and
den Berg (2011) argue that it could be important to distinguish between shiftable and non
shiftable task , so between personal care and other tasks. I prefer instead considering a
broader definition of informal care.
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proportion of Europeans with at least a grandchild is almost the same, young old
people are more likely to look after grandchildren, supporting their adult children
(at least 80% of young old Europeans have at least one adult child). Looking at
the distribution of care provision outside the household to elderly parents across
the European countries (Figure 2.2a) it is possible to notice that there are huge
differences: northern European countries have around 40% of young old who report
providing care to their parents, while in Spain and Poland only 15% of them do.
However the differences across countries reduce a lot if we assume that young
old who coreside with their parents or parents-in-law provide some informal care:
around 30% of young old in Central and Southern Europe provide care to their
parents or coreside with them.
For care given to adult children or grandchildren8 coresiding plays an important
role to reduce differences across countries (Figure 2.2b and 2.2c). Another im-
portant type of care, especially for childless individuals, recently studied in the
literature is the care given to people outside the family such as friends, neighbors
and other relatives (Albertini and Kohli, 2009; Kalwij et al., 2012): around 10%
of young old Austrian, Spanish and Polish provide help to other people, while the
proportion is higher for other Central European countries (around 20%) and even
higher for Northern European countries (around 35%) (see Figure 2.3). About
the informal care given to other people and to adult children, already from a de-
scriptive point of view there is a higher proportion of men with respect to women
who provide this type of help (see Table 2.1 and 2.2), whereas women help more
parents and look more after grandchildren. These differences could depend on the
kinds of tasks asked by the care recipients and on allocation preferences among
family members.
Conditional on providing care outside the household, countries where less individ-
uals provide care are the countries where caregiving is more intense. Table 2.3
reports first, second and third quartile of the distribution of hours of informal care
to the different types of care receiver by country and gender. The table shows
that when women provide help they often allocate much more time to informal
care than men. Italy is the country where caregivers provide overall the most
intensive informal care: the median time allocated by Italians is 7 hours per week
for caring to parents, 14 hours to grandchildren, 10 hours to adult children and
almost 2 hours per week to other people. Then there are countries where infor-
mal caregiving is overall intense like Spain, Austria, Czech Republic and Poland,
while Denmark and Sweden are the countries where caregivers provide less inten-
sive help: median time is one hour and half per week for caregiving to parents, 3
8The geographical distance from grandchildren (child of the adult child) is not available and it
is assumed to be the same of the adult children, even if a grandchild could have moved out
or could live with the separated or divorced child-in-law in another household.
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hours to grandchildren, one hour to adult children and around 30 minutes to other
people.
Besides differences in the proportion of individuals providing care, there are also
huge differences in the labour force participation later in life, especially for women.
Austria and Italy are the countries where most men are retired (almost 60%) while
in Sweden and in Switzerland they are only 30% and 25%9 (see Figure 2.4). The
same applies for women (see Figure 2.5). The majority of them are outside the
labor force: only 20% of women are employed in Italy, 23% in Poland and 25% in
Austria. Around 30% and 40% in the other countries excluding the Northern Eu-
ropean countries and Switzerland where participation is higher, respectively 51%
for Swiss women, 56% for Danes and 62% for Swedes. However it is worth noting
that many women in Europe never participated in the labour market: around 30%
in Italy and Spain, and 10% in the Central European countries declared to have
never worked in their life.
Table 2.1 and 2.2 do not provide clear evidence if being not employed can be
associated positively with an increase in probability of informal caregiving. Overall
not employed men and women provide less care to parents than the employed, while
there is no great difference between employed and not employed who provide care
to other care recipients.
From this brief descriptive overview, it seems already important to study the ef-
fect of occupational choices on different types of informal care, considering house-
hold formation with parents, and the postponement of forming a new household
for adult children. About occupational choices, while the great majority of men
worked in the past and they are still working or are retired, women present a more
complicated situation: some of them never participated in the labour market, and
among women who did, they are employed, retired or homemakers. Consider-
ing the simultaneity of labour supply and care arrangement decision for women
who never worked is unnecessary because the decision for being homemaker is a
choice made in a distant past, more related to family preferences and task alloca-
tion among family members where the husband is supposed to support the family
working and earning an income, and the wife specializes on house keeping and
looking after children.
9I am excluding disabled and unemployed so individuals who early retire through disability
pension benefits are excluded.
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2.3 Theoretical setting
As theoretical setting I consider the model by Pezzin and Schone (1999) to an-
alyze the interpretation of the main parameters of interest and present a simple
extension of the model to the case of two care recipients, discussing the necessary
assumptions. Pezzin and Schone (1999) explicitly model intergenerational living
and care arrangements within a Nash bargaining game when there is only one care
giver, g, and one care recipient, r: one daughter and her parent. Each player is
assumed to maximize a linear utility function U i with i = {g, r} defined over a
vector of private goods X i and a public good W r which can be interpreted as
the well-being of the care recipient. The public good W r introduces altruism in
the model, a choice variable which affects both players’ utility. Additional choice
variable for the care giver is leisure, L, while it is assumed that care recipient does
not face a time allocation problem: when the recipient is of working age I am
effectively assuming that she cannot change hours of work. Both utility functions
also depend on a taste parameter θi reflecting giver and recipient preferences for
privacy and independence, so we have
U g (Xg,W r, L; θg) (2.1)
U r (Xr,W r; θr) (2.2)
The production of W r is conditional on the needs of the care recipients10, N r,
assumed to be exogenous, and it requires the receipt of some form of care: formal,
FCr or informal, ICr. The model allows for the possibility of a cash transfer, t,
from the care giver to the recipient to purchase formal care (t > 0).
The care giver and recipient simultaneously determine the equilibrium values of
Xg, Xr, L, t, and the combinations of care (IC and FC) necessary to produce
the equilibrium level of W r. The equilibrium level is found as the solution of a
Cournot-Nash game. The equilibrium for the giver is found maximizing her utility,
deciding individually IC and t and considering the strategy of the receiver (FC)
as given, and is subject to budget and time constraints:
10For care given to parents, the needs are represented by their health conditions.
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U gXg ,IC,t,L (Xg,W r (IC, FC (t) ;N r) , L; θg) (2.3)
s.t. V g + ω (T − L− IC) = Xg + t (2.4)
L+ IC ≤ T (2.5)
IC ≥ 0 (2.6)
L ≥ 0 (2.7)
where V g is the non-labor income of the giver, ω is the wage rate, T − L− IC is
the working time.
The care receiver maximizes his utility function in a similar way, deciding how
much money to spend on formal care (FC) and considering as given IC and t:
U rXr,FC (Xr,W r (IC, FC (t) ;N r) ; θr) (2.8)
s.t. V r + t = Xr + pFCFC (2.9)
FC ≥ 0 (2.10)
where V r is the non-labor income of the receiver, pFC is the price of formal care.
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is determined as the intersection between the best
response functions of the care giver and receiver based on the beliefs on the other
player’s strategy.
Household formation is determined when the utility from living separate for both
care giver and recipient can increase if they decide to live together: a threat point
is determined. The decision to coreside or to live separately is not related only to
the provision of care but also to cash transfers and individual preferences to form
a household.
With this specification one can derive implications that cover all possible cases: a
care giver provides informal care if the marginal rate of substitution of informal
care and cash transfers is greater than the opportunity cost of her time (working
or leisure). The giver will provide more informal care if formal care has less of
an impact on the public good and if her care recipient is less willing or able to
purchase formal care. Corners solutions occur when an individual allocates all her
time to informal care provision, or to work, or to leisure.
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When the care giver can provide help to another care recipient, for instance sup-
porting an adult child by looking after grandchildren, the game becomes compli-
cated: competition between her adult child and her parent can arise to get informal
care by the giver, as long as there is only one care giver11.
It makes sense to assume a care recipient cannot observe the strategy of the other
care recipient, so he decides how much formal care buying in the market based
on his beliefs on IC and t that one giver provides to him. This implies that care
recipients do not strategically compete to receive informal care by one care giver.
I extend the model to keep into consideration this case. Therefore, I consider that
the care giver’s utility function is conditional on two public goods (WR1 andWR2)
where WR1 is the welfare of the first care recipient and WR2 is the welfare of the
other care recipient. With respect to the previous model, the care giver decides
individually the time allocated to informal care (ICR1 and ICR2) for both types
of care recipients and cash transfers (tR1 and tR2), given her beliefs for FCR1 and
FCR2 :
U g
Xg ,ICR1 ,tR1 ,ICR2 ,tR2 ,L
(
Xg,WR1
(
ICR1 , FCR1 (t) ;NR1
)
,WR2
(
ICR2 , FCR2 (t) ;NR2
)
, L; θg
)
(2.11)
s.t.s.t. V g + ω
(
T − L− ICR1 − ICR2
)
= Xg + tR1 + tR2 (2.12)
L+ ICR1 + ICR2 ≤ T (2.13)
ICR1 ≥ 0, ICR2 ≥ 0 (2.14)
L ≥ 0 (2.15)
Implications are similar to the previous model. As internal solution a care giver
allocates her time to work, leisure and informal care to her parent and to her
adult child, when the marginal rate of substitution from leisure or from providing
informal care and cash transfer to a care recipient is equal to the wage rate:
∂Ug
∂WR1
∂WR1
∂ICR1
∂Ug
∂WR1
∂WR1
∂FCR1
∂FCR1
∂tR1
= ω (2.16)
11The literature has focused on problems with more caregivers, usually two adult children, and
one care receiver (one parent). Engers and Stern (2002) analyze the long-term care decisions
in a family decision making problem finding that informal care is provided with a voluntary
decision by each child and it is not likely to be a collective decision. In the model I do not
consider competition on informal care provision by caregivers.
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∂Ug
∂WR2
∂WR2
∂ICR2
∂Ug
∂WR2
∂WR2
∂FCR2
∂FCR2
∂tR2
= ω (2.17)
∂U g
∂L
= ω (2.18)
It is possible to derive the various corner solutions, identifying the cases where a
daughter only allocates her time to work or to leisure or to informal caregiving.
Alternatively we could assume that necessity of help by care recipients arises at
different times. When the need of a care recipient arises a care giver can decide
whether to provide help or not: at low values of N r the care giver always prefers
to allocate her time to work or leisure. The game is between one care giver and
one care receiver as in the original model proposed by Pezzin and Schone.
When the second care recipient asks for help we have two cases. If we assume
that there is no form of commitment on informal care provision, care arrangement
can be renegotiated. When the second care recipient asks for help, the care giver
can simultaneously decide how much time and cash transfer allocate to both care
recipients, as it was presented in the simple extension of the model. Instead,
if there is a commitment on care arrangement, the second recipient becomes a
residual claimant whose needs are met subject to the pre-existing care supply to
the first recipient12. In this case a daughter can decide to provide less or no care
to a needy parent, because she would like to be available to help her adult child
looking after grandchildren in the future.
The idea that at least a weak commitment on care arrangement exists is suggested
also by Stern (1995) and Pezzin and Schone. They argue that in problems of
family arrangements, time and resource allocations are not binding or enforceable,
but proximity can promote coordination of actions and enforce care arrangement.
Before provision of informal care there is no possibility for an agreement between
care giver and recipient. When informal care is provided there could be a commit-
ment at least in the short-term. For instance a care giver who decides to coreside
12Guo and Iyer (2013) examine a multilateral bargaining game in vertical supply relationships
and they show that a supplier prefers a sequential bargaining when the retail price is suffi-
ciently different among retailers. So when the dispersion in retail prices is sufficiently large,
it is optimal for the supplier bargain first with the higher priced retailer, ending up also not
selling at all to the lower priced retailer. Their evidence can fit also in this context where
there is a single care giver and different care receivers and there is a production of a public
good W r.
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with a care recipient loses more bargaining power than a care giver who decides
to provide care to someone outside the family, and this decision is more difficult
to get revised by the care giver.
The presence of other care recipients can explain also why the importance of cash
transfers is low especially when individuals do not coreside: care recipients have
lower beliefs about the financial resources they can get by the giver and at the
same time, a care giver will have lower beliefs about the amount of cash transfer
which will be spent to buy formal care by a care recipient.
2.4 Econometric model
The economic model analyzes jointly occupational choices, informal care, house-
hold formation and financial transfers. From a descriptive overview of the sample
from SHARE dataset some cases can be ruled out because they are infrequent:
intervivos financial transfers do not happen frequently13 and coresiding with peo-
ple outside the family is very rare. Coresiding with grandchildren is also not that
common and it is problematic deciding how to treat cases where a divorced or
separated child has moved back to parents’ house and his or her children are living
with the ex-partner. For this reason coresiding with grandchildren is not consid-
ered and also this case is ruled out. This is also motivated by the fact that the
majority of grandchildren are minors and that the decision to coreside with the
grandparents is more related to the child characteristics and preferences14. The
exclusion of these cases simplifies the empirical analysis. Basically I consider only
informal care, occupational choices and household formation when it is relevant.
Differently from Pezzin and Schone I estimate explicitly the effect of occupational
choices on propensity and time allocated to informal caregiving, considering also
household formation. Occupational choices are treated as a binary choice for
being employed or outside the labor force (retired for men, retired or homemaker
13In SHARE there are few questions about financial transfers above 250 euros (or equivalent sum
in the local currency) received and given in the last year and their motivations. Financial
help for illness or death of some relatives and payments to respect a legal duty happen in
just few cases. If a broader definition is considered including also other situations such as
help for unemployment period and for sustaining primary needs or other reasons which do
not include presents and transfers for buying a house, furniture or other goods, the financial
transfers from and to the parents happen only in 2.7% of the sample and from or to other
people only in 2.4%, with not so many differences across countries.
14For robustness check I consider also grandparents coresiding with their grandchildren, as it
was considered for parents and adult children. Results suggest that the choice of providing
informal care and coresiding with a grandchild are not correlated.
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for women). Women who never worked (nw) are considered separately from those
who worked but exited the labour force. There are no cases in the SHARE sample
of men who have never worked in the past, and almost nobody defines himself
as homemaker. Having never worked is treated separately from being out of the
labor force, because for women over 50 the decision to never participate in the
labor market is related to the past, and I assume it is exogenous. The idea is that
having never worked is a proxy for family importance and household allocation
task among family members: a household with a woman who has never worked
has probably decided in the past that the woman would have cared more about
the family (house keeping and raising children), while the husband would have
worked and sustained financially the needs of the family. I expect that women are
more willing to provide care than men in these households.
First I consider being not employed (nemp) as exogenous, then I consider the
possibility of simultaneous effects with coresiding and the caring decision.
From the theoretical model the decision to coreside with a parent or an adult child
is not related only to provision of informal care: there could be cases where a child
and a parent coreside but no informal care is provided. At the same time in SHARE
there is no information about informal care given inside the household except for
personal care, and time allocated is not asked. The only available information
about time allocated to informal care provision is conditional on providing care
outside the household.
I consider a Heckman model with double sample selection15: first an individual
decides to coreside with a care recipient, then if she does not, she can decide
whether to provide help and how much time caring to a care recipient. In the
general case I have to estimate three equations. Let ln (hcare) be the logarithm
of the number of hours of weekly care given to the type of receiver r, care∗ be the
propensity to provide care to them, nr∗ be the propensity to live not in the same
household, nw is a dummy equals to one when a woman has never worked, nemp
a dummy equal to one when an individual is not employed, but has at least a job
episode in her career. The equation system is:
ln (hcarei,r) = γ1nemp+ γ2nw +X1β1 + ε1 if care = 1 (2.19)
care∗i,r = γ1nemp+ γ2nw +X2β2 + ε2 (2.20)
15The double selection problem is considered only for care given to parents or adult children.
Care given to grandchildren or other people is considered as independent from coresiding.
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nr∗i,r = γ1nemp+ γ2nw +X3β3 + ε3 (2.21)
care =
 10 if care
∗ > 0
if care∗ ≤ 0 (2.22)
nr =
 10 if nr
∗ > 0
if nr∗ ≤ 0 (2.23)
where X1, X2, X3 are a set of covariates and error terms are correlated and nor-
mally distributed:
 ε1ε2
ε3
 ∼ N
0,
 1 ρ12 ρ131 ρ23
1

 (2.24)
For each individual i, we observe only nri and wi = careinri, so caring propensity
is observed only if the care recipient does not live in the same household of the
giver (nr = 1). If ρ23 = 0 the double sample selection problem can be simplified
and it is possible to consider only a single sample selection that is the classical
Tobit II model or Heckman model16.
As a set of covariates for the equations I include several controls: individual char-
acteristics such as gender, years of education, health conditions (having limitations
in ADLs or IADLs, having chronic diseases, physical inactivity), household and
family characteristics such as having a partner, household size and non labor in-
come17, net real assets value, residence area and country dummies. Then for each
type of care, I include care recipient characteristics, based on their availability.
In the extension of the economic model I consider that a care giver can allocate
time to different care recipients. If we assume that there is no commitment in
16This model is appropriate if no assumption on informal care given to care receivers who live
in the same household is made. If it is assumed that individuals who coreside provide help,
then the problem can be treated differently. For instance if coresiding is linked to a higher
propensity to provide care, an ordered probit could be used for the sample selection problem.
17Household size excludes care recipients if they coreside with the respondent, and non labor
income is not included in X3.
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given informal care to each care recipient, the estimated model should consider the
simultaneous decision of providing informal care to different care recipients. The
estimation of the derived simultaneous equations is not an easy task. I prefer to
assume that there is commitment when informal care is provided. Then, informal
care to each type of care recipient can be analyzed separately and it will not be
affect by informal care to other recipients, except for the reduction of available
time to allocate to caregiving. At the same time, I consider that individuals
have preferences about care provision to a type of care recipient and they are
approximated by family characteristics: dummies for having parents, children or
grandchildren and their numbers.
The models are estimated using a set of instruments for the sample selection
equations. They identify only care provision and not the hours of given care and
they consist of two proxies for being an altruistic person: a dummy for participating
in religious organizations and the self-reported probability to leave a bequest; and
two proxies for having the means to provide help: the number of cars per-capita
and a dummy for being financial distress. Except for caring to parents, I also
consider having ever had any siblings as an instrument for the sample selection.
For the sample selection related to not coresiding with a care recipient I consider
the number of rooms of the house that I suppose should affect only the propensity
to live separately and should not have any effect on the propensity to provide care
outside the household18.
If the occupational choices are considered as endogenous, allowing for simultaneity
in the decision, a fourth equation is added:
nemp∗ = X4β4 + Zδ + ν (2.25)
nemp =
 10 if nemp
∗ > 0
if nemp∗ ≤ 0 (2.26)
where Z is a set of instruments for being not employed andX4 is a set of covariates.
18This is based on the assumption that a care giver do not buy or move to a new bigger house
when she decides to coreside with a care recipient. While coresiding is important especially
in Southern European countries, moves are rare (Angelini et al., 2014).
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The distribution of error terms becomes the following:

ε1
ε2
ε3
ν
 ∼ N
0,

1 ρ12 ρ13 ρ14
1 ρ23 ρ24
1 ρ34
1

 (2.27)
As a test for the endogeneity of the occupational choices on care provision a t-
test on the correlation coefficient can be performed following Knapp and Seaks
(1998). It is important to note that in the considered sample, women who never
worked do not face a simultaneous decision by assumption. The endogeneity bias
of the occupational choices is addressed by using policy changes in eligibility rules
for pension benefits19. As a set of instruments I consider the potential eligibility
to pension benefits and its interactions with gender and number of children, to
take into account interrupted careers due to maternity. I consider also the partner
eligibility to pension benefits20 and its interactions with gender and number of
children, and then expectations for a worse standard of living in 5 years. For
employed people, eligibility to pension benefits is computed using the current
rules at the time of interview, while for retired is considered the eligibility at the
retirement year. Figure 2.6 and 2.7 show the proportions of individuals eligible
to a public pension benefit and individuals retired by age and country. Overall
it seems that many Europeans retire as soon as they become eligible, especially
women. In Austria and Belgium early retirement is wide spread among men, while
in Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland and Czech Republic, men are more willing to
wait for the statutory old age to get a full pension benefit.
The empirical estimation of the Heckman model with double sample selection is
possible using different procedures: Tunali (1986) suggests a two-step procedure
where two measures of Inverse Mills Ratio are computed to take into account
the double sample selection problem; instead Roodman (2011) proposes to use a
simulated maximum likelihood method which can be used to estimate multiple
equations where the error terms have a Normal multivariate distribution. The sec-
19The instrument for eligibility to pension benefits is a dummy variable equal to one if the
individual is eligible to a pension benefit. The potential eligibility to pension benefits is com-
puted using information about the statutory old age, early retirement age and the minimum
requirements to receive a pension benefit (see Appendix A). An individual is eligible as soon
as she becomes eligible to a public pension. For employed people the rules and the potential
work experience at the time of the interview are used, while for retired people the year of
retirement is considered.
20The partner eligibility is computed also for non respondent partner, using the available infor-
mation provided by the main respondent.
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ond procedure is preferred because it is more efficient21. The use of the simulated
maximum likelihood procedure is convenient especially when a fourth equation is
added to the problem: it is possible to test for the endogeneity of the employment
status simultaneously on all the three equations22.
2.5 Results
First I present results from estimation of the multi equations system presented
in the previous section about parents or parents-in-law, then about grandchildren
and other people and finally about adult children, that I treat as residual with
respect to other types of informal care. For each model I consider also separately
men and women.
Caregiving to parents or parents-in-law
The sample has 10,918 individuals with at least a parent or parent-in-law alive, and
only 3,046 young old provide care to them (1,300 men and 1,746 women). Table
2.4 presents results from the Heckman model with double sample selection for the
number of hours of informal care provided to parents or parents-in-law. Column (1)
reports the estimation of the equation for the logarithm of the number of hours of
care, column (2) the average marginal effect for the propensity to provide informal
care outside the household, and column (3) reports the average marginal effects
for the first sample selection for not coresiding in the same household, columns 4-6
report estimation for the same equations only for males, and columns 7-9 only for
females. When occupational choices are considered as exogenous, being outside of
the labor force is associated with a 1.5% greater propensity to coreside with parents
or parents-in-law especially for women. Men have a 4.61% higher propensity to
provide care if they are retired and when they do, they provide almost 28% more
time compared to employed males. If they have a partner who never worked, they
are less likely to provide care, on average 12% less in probability, but when they do,
they provide 53% more time. Employed women provide more care in probability
(6.57%) and more time (56.4%) compared to employed men. There is no significant
difference between employed or not employed women in the propensity to provide
care while not employed women provide 38.6% more time compared to employed.
21In previous analysis both methods have been tested with similar results.
22Alternatively, Kim (2006) proposes a solution to estimate a sample selection model with an
endogenous dummy as common regressor in the selection and censored equation. Anyway
the method is applied only for a Heckman model with a single sample selection, which does
not cover our general case.
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Females who never worked provide less care, but when they do they provide 82%
more time than employed women.
In all the three equations we have evidence that there is a double selection problem
(ρ2,3 is significantly different from zero), and that coresiding can be motivated by
providing informal care to parents or parents-in-law (ρ2,3 < 0). Instruments used
for the sample selections are informative and their signs are consistent with a
priori expectations: number of cars per-capita, probability to leave a bequest, and
participation in religious organization are positively correlated with providing care,
while being in financial distress is negatively correlated; having a higher number
of rooms correlates with the propensity to coreside. Other evidence suggests that
coresiding with a parent is independent of gender, and it decreases with marriage
and children as found by Pezzin and Schone. Having children or grandchildren
decreases the propensity to provide care to parents or parents-in-law, supporting
the idea that a care giver has preferences for providing care to a different care
recipient if there is one. Recipient characteristics are consistent with a priori
expectations as well: having an older parent or a parent with poor health increases
the propensity to coreside, to provide care and also the time spent on caregiving,
while parents-in-law characteristics seem not to affect the time spent on caregiving
by men. Instead a woman who has a parent-in-law in poor health conditions
provides almost the same amount of care as if he or she was her parent. The
geographical distance from parents is negatively associated to providing care and
time spent on caregiving. Finally if an individual has both parents alive, there is
a strong reduction on care given, because probably parents are looking after each
other in case of need, relying less on children and more on the partner’s help. This
result is consistent to what it has been found using HRS data by Pezzin et al.
(2009).
When endogeneity bias of occupational choices is addressed using eligibility rules
for pension benefits, women who never worked are excluded from the analysis
because by assumption they are not potentially facing a simultaneous decision.
Results from Table 2.5 show that there is endogeneity bias especially for coresid-
ing in the same family, while there is weak or no evidence for endogeneity bias on
provision of informal care outside the household. Women have a slightly higher
propensity to coreside with parent (1.48%) and current not employed women have
20% higher propensity to coreside with their parents or parents-in-law than em-
ployed women. From the full sample estimation there is a much higher effect of
being not employed on care provision outside the household (+10.4%), but the
time spent even if with a positive sign is not statistically significant. Results also
show that for men the endogeneity bias is less important.
Results can be affected by the validity of the considered instruments. The Hansen
test does not reject the validity of over-identifying restrictions, then the instru-
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ments are exogenous and the relevance of the instruments is investigated running
a first stage probit regression conditioned on the samples of the different equa-
tions. A Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic from the probit estimation is reported,
showing that the instruments are unlikely to be weak23. There is no support for
the endogeneity of the occupational choices on the time allocated to informal care-
giving. If this result is given by the weakness of the instrument, the parameters
estimated from the exogenous case should provide less biased results.
In Table 2.5 at column (4), (8) and (12) results from the estimation of the equation
for being not employed are reported, showing that a dummy when an individual
is eligible to a pension benefit is strongly and positively correlated with being not
employed, both for men and women.
Caregiving to grandchildren
Table 2.6 reports estimation of the model for informal care given to adult chil-
dren for looking after grandchildren. When occupational choices are assumed to
be exogenous for caregiving, results are similar to the previous ones: women are
more likely to provide care both in probability (+12.8%) and time (+40%), as
not employed do (+5.86% in probability and 37.1% more time). Children and
grandchildren characteristics are important for determining the needs of the adult
children and the propensity and time to allocate to caregiving by their parents:
having more employed children increases the amount of provided care, especially
for women by 8.57% in probability and 47% more time. Men are more likely to
look after grandchildren when they are overall older and there is a weak evidence
that they spend more time with grandchildren if they have more male children.
Having parents alive does not affect informal care to grandchildren, whereas hav-
ing adult or minor children does. The caregiver’s family type seems to have a
different impact for each type of care. This suggests that the caregiver may have
different preferences on care provision to a specific recipient. In particular the old
parents are more likely to become residual claimants for the allocation time of
their children.
Then, findings suggest that endogeneity bias of occupational choices is important,
especially for women, both for the propensity to provide care and time spent for
looking after grandchildren: not employed women have a higher propensity to
23In this case the statistics cannot be compared with the critical values proposed by Stock
and Yogo (2005) because the endogenous variable and instruments variables are binary. The
literature so far has not proposed some critical values to identify the relative bias and absolute
bias of IV estimation in presence of a binary endogenous variable. While it is shown that to
assure identification it is sufficient in a bivariate probit model to rest on exclusion restrictions,
that is excluding at least one variable from the structural equation and including it in the
reduced form equation.
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provide care (17.3%) and allocate more time (120.5%) than employed women (see
Table 2.7). Evidence is stronger in contrast to what it is found for caregiving to
parents and the effect of being not employed is much higher.
Caregiving to other people
Caregiving to other people is not provided by most Europeans, but this type of
caregiving is becoming more and more important especially for individuals who rely
less on their own family (parents or children) as suggested by Albertini and Kohli
(2009) and Kalwij et al. (2012). The sample here includes all the 22,464 observa-
tions. Table 2.8 reports results from the models estimated with the occupational
choices considered as exogenous. Results support the idea that caregiving to peo-
ple who live outside the family is important for childless and individuals without
parents alive. With respect to the previous types of care, women provide 3% less
care than men, but when they do, they provide almost 46% more time. Being
not employed is positively associated with caregiving: the not employed provide
2.5% more care than employed. Retired men give 53.5% more time than employed
men. Surprisingly also for care given to people outside the family, I find evi-
dence for endogeneity bias of the employment status on care provision for women
(ρ2,3 = −0.193∗∗) and the average marginal effect is higher: not employed women
provide 9.90% more care than employed ones (see Table 2.9). The effect is found
for all the individuals aged between 50 and 69, and for childless and individuals
without parents alive, the effect might be stronger.
Caregiving to adult children
Caregiving to adult children is considered residual from the previous types of in-
formal caregiving to give a complete overview on informal care by Europeans. It
does not include looking after grandchildren, and it is mostly practical household
help and help on paperwork. Table 2.10 reports estimation from the system of
equations: column (1) reports the estimation from the logarithm of the number
of weekly hours provided care to adult children who live outside the household,
column (2) the propensity to provide care outside the household to at least one
adult child, and column (3) the propensity to coreside with all the adult children.
The subsample is conditioned on having at least one adult children (19,822 obser-
vations). Results suggest that women provide 3% less care to adult children than
men but when they do, they allocate 30% more time. In this case occupational
choices are not associated with a different propensity on providing care to adult
children, but more time is provided by not employed women and most of all by
women who never worked. When the endogeneity bias is not considered, a retired
male is associated with the propensity that at least one adult child lives outside
the household. When the endogeneity bias is considered (Table 2.11), the test
rejects the assumption of exogeneity between occupational choices and coresiding
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with all adult children for both men and women. Conclusions are reversed: being
not employed increases the propensity to coreside with all the adult children by
11.6% for men and 21% for women. Finally also for care given to adult children
there is evidence for a double sample selection problem: a child coresides with a
parent to receive some help.
2.6 Simulation
In the recent years many European countries have introduced pension reforms to
postpone the effective retirement age. Usually these reforms have been applied
gradually with a slow increase in the eligibility age. For instance German gov-
ernment adopted a pension reform in 2007 which started producing effects from
2012: the statutory retirement age was scheduled to increase by one month per
year and birth cohort from age 65 to age 67 (Bonin, 2009). However there are few
exceptions such as the 2011 pension reform in Italy: the statutory eligibility age
for women is scheduled to increase from age 60 to age 66 by 2018 (OECD, 2013).
I use the prediction from the estimated model in the previous section to exam-
ine the effects of one year increase in both early and statutory eligibility age on
the amount of informal care provided by young old Europeans. The computed
amount of unprovided informal care by the individuals affected by the reforms
is transformed in full-time equivalent job (FTE) assuming a full time position as
caregiver24. If we assume that informal care can be perfectly substituted by formal
care, FTE can be interpreted as the potentially demanded jobs to maintain the
same level of offered care.
Simulations focus only on informal care given to parents or children for looking
after grandchildren when the employment status is considered as exogenous. First I
compute the difference in minutes per week of informal care between not employed
and employed man or woman for each country. The considered individual has the
same characteristics i25. The difference between the partial effects of non labour
and labour participation on informal care provision is computed as following:
Ej (4hcarei) ∼= 4Pr (carei)Ej (hcarei|carei)+Ej (Pr (carei))4E (hcarei|carei)
(2.28)
24A full time position is assume of 40 hours per week and 52 weeks per year minus 4 weeks of
regulatory vacation. Contract rules can be different within each country. The same rules are
applied to keep the differences comparable among countries.
25The individual is assumed to have 60 years old with average and median characteristics of the
considered sample.
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where j = {nemp, emp} and it is reported in Table 2.12.
Results show that not employed allocate more time to look after grandchildren
than employed: in the Northern European countries retired men provide around
one hours and 20 minutes more care than employed, while in the other countries,
retired men provide from 3 to 5 hours of more time to look after grandchildren.
Similar results are found for women even if the difference in time is bigger for
most of the country except for Czech Republic, Germany, Italy and Spain. The
difference in minutes per week to caregiving to parents is much lower than the
time spent to look after grandchildren, especially for men: retired men provide
maximum 50 minutes more care in a week than employed ones. Not employed
women provide more care than employed ones: from 47 minutes in a week by
Danish to 2 hours by Belgian and 2 hours and 20 minutes by Italians.
Then using information from SHARE dataset and eligibility to pension benefits
rules, I computed the number of men and women for each country that could be
affected by the increase of one year in the eligibility age (see Table 2.13). These
are the individuals who became eligible to a public pension benefits in the last 12
months and that with this simulated pension reform are not anymore entitled to
receive a pension benefit. The simulation assumes that all the employed continue
working for at least another year and that they are going to provide less care than
what they could have provided if they were not employed, I assume that they do
not reduce working time or leisure.
This simulation exercise shows that one year increase in pension eligibility age can
decrease the received care or increase the demand for formal (paid) care. It can
be both an opportunity to create new jobs positions as caregiver and a cost for
welfare systems. The potential increase in demand for formal care can be avoid
adopting job policy that allow individuals to reduce working time and allocate
more time on care provision.
If we graphically analyze the proportion of FTE over the individuals affected by
the reform and the proportions of individuals who are voluntary part-time work-
ers between age 55 to 6426 (Figure 2.8-2.11), we find that countries with more
voluntary part-time workers are the countries with lower difference in allocated
time between employed and not employed. The negative correlation is particu-
larly strong for men when they provide care to grandchildren. The correlation
can partly depend on the model specification because I do not distinguish between
part-time and full-time workers, but this does not affect the conclusions of the
simulation exercise: a higher labour force participation among young old individ-
26Sources of the data are OECD and Eurostat for year 2004-2005, and 2006-2007 for Czech
Republic and Poland. From the proportion of part-time workers I subtract the proportion of
involuntary part-time workers.
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uals can be achieved by a policy maker without increasing the demand for formal
care or the unsatisfied demand of informal care, if there is enough flexibility in the
working time arrangements. Indeed, an increase of one year in eligibility age could
increase the proportion of part-time young old workers if the national job policies
sustain this possibility.
2.7 Discussion and conclusions
In this chapter I have estimated the effect of occupational choices on informal care-
giving to different types of care recipient in Europe, using a multi equation system
with a simulated maximum likelihood method proposed by Roodman (2011). In
contrast to the previous literature I show the importance of considering the prob-
lem of household formation and care arrangement for care given to parents and
parents-in-law and to adult children. Separating the sample between men and
women, I find support for endogeneity bias of occupational choices, not only for
care given to parents by adult daughters but also for care given to people out-
side the family. Endogeneity bias is addressed using pension reforms as a source
of exogeneity to compute a variable for the potential eligibility to public pension
benefits.
Occupational choices are considered differently for men and women: men can
be employed or retired, while women can be employed or outside the labour force
(retired or homemaker) and having worked in the past, or having never worked. In
the latter case I consider having never worked as a proxy for family importance and
task allocation preferences among family members, because the non participation
in the labour market for women over 50 is a choice made in a distant past, and their
employment status is less likely to change later in life. Results suggest that the
assumption about having never worked is correct: a woman allocates more time to
caregiving, especially she cares more about their own family (parents and children).
Whereas, a man with a partner who never worked is less likely to provide help but
when he does he provides more, independently of his current occupational choice.
I find evidence that being not employed increases the propensity to coreside with
a care recipient, increases the propensity to provide care outside the household
and the allocated time. Stronger support is found especially for women when
the endogeneity bias is taken into account. However there is no clear evidence
for endogeneity bias of labour supply and informal care given to parents when I
check for several observables and coresiding. This may depend on the validity of
the instruments or the definition of informal care. In particular, I do not focus
on intensive caregiving or specific tasks. Using Dutch data from time use diaries
Hassink and den Berg (2011) analyze the patterns of informal care during the
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day. They show that caregivers in the Netherlands usually provide informal care
simultaneously with household activities and that it is important to distinguish
between shiftable and non shiftable activities (usually personal care) especially
when the association with labor supply is considered. But they show also that
employed caregivers usually undertake shiftable activities.
In the analysis I do not consider explicitly the “north-south gradient”. Many stud-
ies on informal caregiving and labour supply divide the sample between northern
and southern European countries because it is argued that there are many dif-
ferences across countries about institutions and family ties (Ciani, 2012; Crespo,
2006; Bolin et al., 2008). Individuals from Southern European countries are as-
sumed to care more about the family, leave closer and provide more help. In
the previous studies which focused only on caregiving to parents, Ciani (2012)
finds almost the same effect for both northern and southern countries; Bolin et al.
(2008) finds that for both men and women there is not statistical difference on the
propensity to work between northern and southern countries. Crespo and Mira
(2013) finds a north-south gradient, considering only intensive daily care, but it
has to be noted that in Northern European countries there are not many intensive
caregivers. With respect to previous studies I prefer to keep into account several
controls27, and decisions such as coresiding with a care recipient and for women
never entering in the job market.
The north-south gradient should be further investigated taking into account the
differences on preferences of household formation, and on how the burden of care
is shared among family members or children. Looking at the SHARE data about
caregiving to parents, it is possible to note that in Northern European countries
there are more children who provide care but for less time. Informal care duty is
shared more among children, while in Central and Southern European countries,
less children provide more care or coreside more often with their parents (see
Figure 2.12). If there is a presence of a main caregiver, she could be the one who
specializes on providing care to parents, leaving the other siblings “free” from the
duties of care provision.
Stern (1995) also suggests that the geographical distance of a care recipient can be
an endogenous characteristic. In my empirical analysis I consider only household
formation as endogenous. A care recipient can act strategically, moving closer
to a care recipient, to increase the willingness to receive help, but there is no
possibility for a binding contract between caregiver and receiver even if individuals
are altruistic and care about each other (Pezzin and Schone, 1999), at least before
informal care is provided. Hence, proximity is not considered correlated to care
27Further robustness check includes the estimation of the previous models dropping a single
country with no different result.
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arrangement decision.
In conclusion my estimates show that the effect of being not employed increases
the propensity to provide care both in probability and in time. With the increase
of the effective retirement age and postponement of eligibility age to receive a
pension benefits, many Europeans will retire later and there could be a lower
informal caregiving potential by young old, especially for women who are usually
the main caregivers. This could increase mostly the demand for personal care and
demand for formal care to institutions and nurseries.
A policy maker could achieve a higher labour participation rate of young old and
a limited increase of demand for formal care introducing policies to allow and
promote flexible working time arrangements for young old workers for informal
care provision.
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Appendix A - Statutory old age, early retirement age
and minimum requirements for eligibility
Information about pension reforms are collected from several sources starting from
the work made by Angelini et al. (2009). Other sources have been Committee
(2007), Schludi (2005), Hirose (2011) and Gruber and Wise (2004).
Austria
Statutory old age: from 1961 to 2007, 65 for men and 60 for women.
Early retirement age: from 1961 to 2000, 60 for men and 55 for women with
at least 35 years of contributions and for individuals receiving an unemployment
pension; from October 2000 to October 2002 increase of the early retirement age
of 2 months every 3 months (effectively adopted only from January 2001); from
October 2002, 61.5 for men and 56.5 for women; women born before 1950 or with
more than 40 years of contributions and men before 1945 or with more than 45
years of contributions are excluded from the reform. From January 2004, early
retirement age increases of 1 month every 3 months for both women and men,
until age 62 for both men and women.
Minimum requirement: At least 15 years of contribution.
Belgium
Statutory old age: from 1961 to 1998, 65 for men and 60 for women; from 1999
to 2003, 65 for men and 61 for women; from 2004 to 2005, 65 for men and 63 for
women; from 2006 to 2007, 65 for men and 64 for women.
Early retirement age: from 1961 to 1966, no retirement age; from 1967 to 1986,
60 for men and 55 for women; from 1987 to 1997, 60 for men and 60 for women;
from 1998 to 2007, 60 both for men and women with year of contributions (20
years in 1998, 24 years in 1999, 26 years in 2000, 28 years in 2001, 30 years in
2002, 32 years in 2003, 34 years in 2004, 35 years from 2005). Individuals with
heavy or night jobs can early retire at age 58. Pre-pensions are possible at least
at age 58 for individuals working in restructured sectors.
Minimum requirement: no minimum period of contribution is required.
Czech Republic
Statutory old age: from 1961 to 1995, 60 for men and 57 for women; from 1996
two months more every year for men and four months more every year for women,
until age 65 is reached both for men and women (age 67 with the pension reform
in 2011).
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Early retirement age: women can early retire from 1 to 5 years earlier based on
the number of they children they had (5 years if they had more than 4 children);
from 1996 it is possible retire 3 years earlier than the statutory old age.
Minimum requirement: At least 15 years of contribution.
Denmark
Statutory old age: from 1961 to 2003, 67 for both men and women; from 2004
to 2007, 65 for both men and women, except for individuals born before 1939.
Early retirement age: from 1961 to 1975, no retirement age; from 1976 to 1978,
60 for both men and women; from 1979 to 2007, 60 with 30 years of contributions.
Pre-early retirement is possible through unemployment periods of at least one year:
from 1992, at age 55.
Minimum requirement: at least 3 years of residence.
France
Statutory old age: from 1961 to 1994, 65 both for men and women; from 1995
to 2007, 60 both for men and women.
Early retirement age: from 1961 to 1994, 60 both for men and women; from
1995 to 2007, no early retirement. From 1961 to 2007, 55 for public transport and
electricity workers; from 2003 to 2007, 40 years of contributions for people who
started working as early as ages 14, 15 or 16.
Minimum requirement: no minimum period of contribution is required.
Germany
Statutory old age: from 1961 to 2007, 65 both for men and women.
Early retirement age: in 1961, no early retirement; from 1962 to 1972, no
early retirement for men and 60 with 15 years of contribution for women; from
1973 to 2007, 63 with 35 years of contributions for men and 60 with 35 years of
contributions for women, long-term unemployed, disabled.
Minimum requirement: At least 5 years of contribution.
Italy
Statutory old age: from 1961 to 1993, 60 for men and 55 for women; in 1994,
61 for men and 56 for women; in 1995, 61.5 for men and 56.5 for women; in 1996,
62 for men and 57 for women; in 1997, 63 for men and 58 for women; in 1998, 63.5
for men and 58.5 for women; in 1999, 64 for men and 59 for women; from 2000
to 2007, 65 for men and 60 for women; from 1961 to 2007, 65 for men and 60 for
women in the public sector.
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Early retirement age: from 1961 to 1964, no early retirement; from 1965 to
1995, independently from the age with 35 years of contributions (25 in the public
sector) both for men and women. Early retirement is possible with 35 years of
contributions at the following age: from 1996 to 1997, 52 for both men and women,
56 for self-employed. in 1998, 53 for the public sector, 54 for the private sector
and 57 for self-employed; in 1999, 55 for the private sector; in 2000, 54 for the
public sector; in 2001, 55 for the public sector, 56 for the private sector, 58 for
self-employed; in 2002, 57 for the private sector; in 2003, 56 for the public sector;
from 2004 to 2007, 57 for both the private and public sector, 58 for self-employed.
Early retirement is possible independently from the age with the following years
of contributions: from 1996 to 2007, 40 years of contributions for self-employed;
from 1996 to 1998, 36 years for the public and private sector; from 1999 to 2003,
37 years of contributions; from 2004 to 2005, 38 years of contributions; from 2006
to 2007, 39 years of contributions; in 2008, 40 years of contributions. From 1999
to 2007, individuals with 57 years old or less who become eligible of a pension,
they can receive a pension only after a period from 6 to 9 months (i.e. if they turn
57 in January they can retire in October).
Minimum requirement: before 1996, at least 20 years of contributions; after
1996, at least 5 years of contributions.
Netherlands
Statutory old age: from 1961 to 2007, 65 for both men and women.
Early retirement age: from 1961 to 1974 no early retirement age; from 1975
to 1994, 60/61 with 10 years of work in a sector or firm both for men and women;
from 1995 to 2007, 62 with 35 years of contributions both for men and women.
Minimum requirement: no minimum period of contribution is required.
Poland
Statutory old age: 65 for men and 60 for women
Early retirement age: before 1999, 60 with 25 years of contributions for men
and 55 with 25 years of contributions for women; from 1999 to 2007, 60 with 35
years of contributions for men and 55 with 30 years of contributions for women,
60 with 25 years of contributions for men born before 1949 and 55 with 25 years of
contributions for women born before 1949; miners can early retire at age 50 with
15 years of contributions; teachers, academic lectures and transport workers can
early retire at age 60 with 25 years of contributions for men and 55 with 20 years
of contributions for women; uniformed services (army, police, prison officers) can
early retire with 15 years of contributions at any age.
Minimum requirement: no minimum period of contribution is required.
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Spain
Statutory old age: from 1961 to 2007, 65 for both men and women.
Early retirement age: from 1961 to 1982, 64 for both men and women; from 1983
to 1993, 60 for both men and women; for 1994 to 2001, 61 for both men and
women; from 2002 to 2007, 61 with 30 years of contributions for both men and
women, 60 with 30 years of contributions for public employees; from 2002 to 2007,
60 with more than 35 years of contributions (2002) and one additional year every
year after 2002, until 40 years of contributions in 2007.
Minimum requirements: At least 15 years of contributions, with at least 2 years
in the last 15 years.
Sweden
Statutory old age: from 1961 to 1994, 67 both for men and women; from 1995 to
2007, 65 both for men and women.
Early retirement age: from 1961 to 1962 no early retirement; from 1963 to 1997,
60 both for men and women; from 1998 to 2007, 61 both for men and women.
Minimum requirements: at least 3 years of residence.
Switzerland
Statutory old age: from 1961 to 1974, 65 for men and 63 for women; from 1975
to 2003, 65 for men and 62 for women; in 2004, 65 for men and 63 for women;
from 2005 to 2007, 65 for men and 64 for women.
Early retirement age: from 1961 to 1990 no retirement age; from 1991 to 1997,
62 for men and 59 for women; from 1998 to 2004, 62 for men and 60 for women;
from 2005 to 2006, 62 for men and 61 for women; in 2007, 63 for men and 62 for
women (it is possible to early retire two years earlier the statutory age).
Minimum requirement: no minimum period of contribution is required.
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Figure 2.1: Weighted proportions of individuals having parents, grandchildren or
adult children, coresiding or providing care to them, by country
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Figure 2.2: Weighted proportions of individuals providing care outside the house-
hold or co-residing with parents, grandchildren and adult children, by country
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Figure 2.3: Informal caregiving by country and by care receiver







	




           
 !" !#$%!"
Figure 2.4: Occupational choices distribution for males, by country
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Figure 2.5: Occupational choices distribution for females, by country
Figure 2.6: Proportion of men potentially eligible to pension benefits and pro-
portion of retired men by age and country
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Figure 2.7: Proportion of women potentially eligible to pension benefits and pro-
portion of retired women by age and country
Figure 2.8: Proportion of FTE for caregiving to parents over proportion of vol-
untary part-time male workers (55-64)
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Figure 2.9: Proportion of FTE for caregiving to grandchildren over proportion
of voluntary part-time male workers (55-64)
Figure 2.10: Proportion of FTE for caregiving to parents over proportion of vol-
untary part-time female workers (55-64)
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Figure 2.11: Proportion of FTE for caregiving to grandchildren over proportion
of voluntary part-time female workers (55-64)
Figure 2.12: Proportions of individuals providing care to parents or parents-in-
law by number of siblings (from 0 to 2) and by country.
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Table 2.1: Proportion of individuals providing informal care outside the household
to parents or grandchildren by gender, occupational choices and country
Country
Care Care
to parents to grandchildren
Male Female Male Female
emp nemp emp nemp nw emp nemp emp nemp nw
SE 0.3758 0.2140 0.4324 0.3588 - 0.4957 0.4701 0.6684 0.6821 -
DK 0.3720 0.3186 0.4732 0.3774 - 0.6358 0.5788 0.7739 0.7699 -
NL 0.3610 0.2890 0.4324 0.5093 0.4578 0.5794 0.6982 0.7664 0.7933 0.6993
AT 0.2151 0.1546 0.2428 0.2567 0.2204 0.5102 0.4850 0.5800 0.4727 0.4402
DE 0.2885 0.2833 0.4027 0.3806 0.0697 0.3951 0.4228 0.5802 0.5286 0.5066
FR 0.2301 0.2022 0.2923 0.2849 0.1247 0.4653 0.5971 0.6159 0.6849 0.6232
CH 0.2403 0.3139 0.3640 0.3103 0.2135 0.4156 0.4987 0.6320 0.5335 0.5668
BE 0.3634 0.3184 0.4153 0.3756 0.3500 0.6226 0.6767 0.7905 0.7062 0.7053
IT 0.2297 0.1505 0.2558 0.3075 0.2182 0.2094 0.4075 0.4858 0.5701 0.4542
ES 0.1418 0.1258 0.1829 0.2432 0.2277 0.3053 0.3789 0.4027 0.5037 0.5537
CZ 0.1773 0.1842 0.3669 0.3484 - 0.4197 0.4414 0.7274 0.6096 -
PL 0.1622 0.0331 0.2901 0.1236 0.2332 0.4943 0.4809 0.6753 0.5950 0.4481
Table 2.2: Proportion of individuals providing informal care outside the household
to adult children or other people by gender, occupational choices and country
Country
Care Care
to adult children to other people
Male Female Male Female
emp nemp emp nemp nw emp nemp emp nemp nw
SE 0.2166 0.2175 0.2012 0.1703 - 0.2691 0.2337 0.2097 0.2109 -
DK 0.3046 0.2181 0.2369 0.2277 - 0.2849 0.3136 0.2313 0.2555 -
NL 0.1917 0.2202 0.1726 0.1590 0.1800 0.3053 0.2982 0.2025 0.2632 0.1298
AT 0.0752 0.1742 0.1031 0.1570 0.1360 0.1534 0.1128 0.1089 0.1282 0.0592
DE 0.1193 0.1520 0.1378 0.1230 0.1972 0.2235 0.2322 0.1529 0.1737 0.2379
FR 0.0926 0.1234 0.0778 0.0939 0.0446 0.1312 0.1717 0.1807 0.1759 0.0932
CH 0.0617 0.1721 0.1059 0.1443 0.2545 0.1969 0.2335 0.1923 0.2489 0.0854
BE 0.2760 0.2386 0.1922 0.1946 0.1877 0.1919 0.2622 0.2055 0.2066 0.1718
IT 0.0465 0.0598 0.0951 0.0885 0.0347 0.1865 0.1457 0.1557 0.2092 0.1164
ES 0.0278 0.0290 0.0630 0.0211 0.0608 0.0718 0.0488 0.1279 0.1111 0.0547
CZ 0.1148 0.1762 0.1124 0.1425 - 0.1738 0.0894 0.1823 0.1563 -
PL 0.0917 0.0416 0.0842 0.1182 0.0000 0.1896 0.1407 0.1098 0.1048 0.0312
81
Table 2.3: First, second and third quartiles of the weighted distribution of care
hours to parents, grandchildren, adult children and other people, by country and
gender
Country Gender
Hours of care Hours of care Hours of care Hours of care
to parents to grandchildren to adult children to other people
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3
SE
M 0.38 1.00 2.00 0.46 2.00 5.52 0.23 0.77 3.00 0.19 0.48 1.38
F 0.46 1.92 4.00 1.30 3.30 6.90 0.38 1.15 3.26 0.12 0.46 2.00
DK
M 0.38 0.92 2.00 0.92 2.76 5.52 0.23 0.94 4.60 0.10 0.48 1.61
F 0.46 1.84 3.68 1.15 3.00 6.44 0.29 0.92 2.76 0.19 1.00 3.00
NL
M 0.29 1.00 2.15 0.76 4.00 9.67 0.48 1.53 6.00 0.19 0.46 1.15
F 1.00 3.00 6.90 1.38 5.37 11.05 0.76 2.00 7.00 0.29 1.15 3.68
AT
M 1.15 4.00 7.00 1.34 6.90 17.3 0.69 2.00 6.90 0.25 0.92 2.00
F 3.00 5.00 14.0 2.30 7.98 19.9 1.00 3.00 10.0 0.46 3.00 10.1
DE
M 0.69 1.84 4.00 0.92 4.00 10.0 0.29 1.15 3.22 0.23 0.58 2.00
F 1.00 3.45 7.98 1.92 5.52 14.0 0.75 2.49 8.00 0.29 1.15 4.00
FR
M 0.38 1.00 3.07 1.38 5.00 17.9 0.19 0.96 3.03 0.19 0.61 2.00
F 0.69 2.50 7.00 2.03 6.90 20.52 0.19 0.96 4.00 0.23 1.00 3.00
CH
M 0.19 0.69 2.30 0.46 2.30 8.00 0.38 5.00 14.0 0.23 0.48 2.00
F 0.61 1.15 3.07 2.11 6.00 12.0 0.46 3.00 7.98 0.12 1.00 4.00
BE
M 0.96 2.00 5.00 1.84 7.00 16.0 0.46 2.30 7.98 0.19 0.88 3.00
F 1.15 4.00 10.0 2.92 8.00 17.2 4.00 4.00 8.98 0.69 2.00 7.00
IT
M 1.15 4.00 14.0 3.00 9.00 29.9 1.00 3.00 9.00 0.12 0.58 2.00
F 3.00 10.3 21.0 5.00 19.9 42.0 7.00 14.0 35.0 0.46 3.00 10.0
ES
M 1.00 6.00 14.0 2.00 5.52 21.0 0.10 0.19 15.0 0.12 0.38 3.00
F 1.84 7.00 21.0 1.84 9.00 35.9 0.38 6.98 15.0 0.38 2.00 7.92
CZ
M 0.58 2.30 7.00 0.96 4.00 10.0 0.58 2.88 6.90 0.19 0.69 2.30
F 1.84 4.60 10.0 3.45 7.67 17.0 0.96 4.00 11.0 0.19 1.00 5.00
PL
M 0.46 1.34 4.60 1.15 4.00 21.0 0.46 3.84 14.0 0.19 0.69 3.45
F 1.15 5.00 14.0 4.00 13.8 37.6 1.15 8.98 16.3 0.19 1.00 7.00
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Table 2.4: Informal caregiving to parents and parents-in-law with employment status considered as exogenous
VARIABLES hcare care nr hcare care nr hcare care nr
Full sample Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Not employed 0.367*** 0.0200* -0.0103* 0.279** 0.0461** -0.00354 0.386*** -0.00242 -0.0151*
(0.0769) (0.0121) (0.00599) (0.132) (0.0187) (0.00862) (0.0929) (0.0161) (0.00789)
Partner never worked 0.294 -0.136*** 0.00455 0.534* -0.120*** 0.00147
(0.280) (0.0236) (0.00987) (0.284) (0.0228) (0.0102)
Female never worked 0.905*** -0.0182 -0.00872 0.821*** -0.0465* -0.0116
(0.163) (0.0246) (0.0109) (0.174) (0.0268) (0.0121)
Female 0.564*** 0.0657*** 0.00517
(0.0575) (0.00848) (0.00361)
Age 0.0343*** -0.00167 8.55e-05 0.0221* -0.00313* 0.000199 0.0496*** -0.00126 -0.000284
(0.00801) (0.00126) (0.000615) (0.0128) (0.00173) (0.000819) (0.00988) (0.00172) (0.000761)
Years of education -0.00643 0.00625*** 0.00194*** -0.00797 0.00641*** 0.00339*** -0.00265 0.00546*** 3.43e-05
(0.00943) (0.00144) (0.000717) (0.0143) (0.00191) (0.000876) (0.0126) (0.00202) (0.000946)
Having a partner 0.123 -0.0548*** 0.107*** 0.0581 -0.0812** 0.180*** 0.217 -0.0505** 0.0723***
(0.111) (0.0202) (0.0129) (0.197) (0.0327) (0.0256) (0.138) (0.0254) (0.0142)
limitations in -0.109 -0.0322* -0.00902 -0.151 -0.0209 -0.0233 -0.105 -0.0496** 0.000978
ADLs or IADLs= 1 (0.118) (0.0172) (0.00851) (0.200) (0.0274) (0.0145) (0.144) (0.0214) (0.0102)
limitations with 0.156** -0.00529 -0.00679 0.200** -0.0150 -0.00549 0.150* 0.00455 -0.0102
daily activities (0.0638) (0.0104) (0.00513) (0.102) (0.0143) (0.00723) (0.0824) (0.0147) (0.00700)
Chronic diseases -0.0139 0.0242** 0.00712 0.0117 0.00449 0.00430 -0.0197 0.0417*** 0.0116*
(0.0637) (0.0105) (0.00475) (0.0998) (0.0142) (0.00672) (0.0822) (0.0151) (0.00657)
Physical inactivity -0.269 -0.153*** 0.0108 0.205 -0.123*** 0.00205 -0.408 -0.175*** 0.0146
(0.265) (0.0200) (0.00850) (0.437) (0.0307) (0.0128) (0.329) (0.0275) (0.0104)
Real assets -0.0116 0.00328* -0.000194 -0.00808 0.00315 -0.000668 -0.0137 0.00375* 0.000430
(0.0118) (0.00168) (0.000789) (0.0195) (0.00251) (0.00114) (0.0134) (0.00222) (0.000901)
urban = Big city 0.00937 -0.0114 0.00714 -0.0822 -0.00373 0.00773 0.0727 -0.0197 0.00525
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VARIABLES hcare care nr hcare care nr hcare care nr
(0.102) (0.0155) (0.00827) (0.151) (0.0204) (0.0102) (0.128) (0.0202) (0.00968)
urban = Village, rural area 0.0264 -0.00310 -0.0233*** -0.0249 0.00549 -0.0223*** 0.0264 -0.00741 -0.0248***
(0.0638) (0.0109) (0.00574) (0.0948) (0.0137) (0.00650) (0.0805) (0.0145) (0.00701)
HH size -0.0284 0.0135** -2.30e-05 -0.00768 0.00871 -0.00369 -0.0317 0.0196** 0.00144
(0.0393) (0.00598) (0.00327) (0.0570) (0.00757) (0.00376) (0.0512) (0.00842) (0.00410)
Non labour income (asin) -0.0180 0.00477*** -4.91e-05 0.00402* -0.0407** 0.00543*
(0.0128) (0.00184) (0.0185) (0.00232) (0.0170) (0.00277)
Parent age 0.00728*** 0.00353*** -0.000354*** 0.00389 0.00305*** -0.000254** 0.00890*** 0.00399*** -0.000512***
(0.00148) (0.000188) (9.00e-05) (0.00243) (0.000234) (0.000103) (0.00202) (0.000273) (0.000132)
Parent health = Poor 0.468*** 0.0816*** -0.0182*** 0.436*** 0.0472*** -0.00902 0.471*** 0.110*** -0.0253***
(0.0632) (0.0111) (0.00549) (0.106) (0.0156) (0.00797) (0.0819) (0.0154) (0.00747)
Parent distance -0.129*** -0.0401*** -0.0871*** -0.0280*** -0.150*** -0.0500***
(0.0170) (0.00215) (0.0297) (0.00312) (0.0218) (0.00299)
Parent-in-law age 3.09e-05 0.00137*** -0.000529*** -0.000136 0.00195*** -0.000655*** -0.000296 0.000895*** -0.000518***
(0.00125) (0.000200) (8.77e-05) (0.00196) (0.000246) (0.000114) (0.00175) (0.000288) (0.000108)
Parent-in-law health 0.257*** 0.0568*** 0.00213 0.0966 0.0381** -0.00333 0.450*** 0.0854*** 0.0105
= Poor (0.0906) (0.0137) (0.00618) (0.127) (0.0169) (0.00814) (0.135) (0.0220) (0.00944)
Parent-in-law distance -0.0436** -0.0239*** -0.0470 -0.0253*** -0.0379 -0.0226***
(0.0213) (0.00289) (0.0304) (0.00351) (0.0320) (0.00461)
Both parents alive -0.253*** -0.0519*** 0.0334*** -0.244** -0.0481*** 0.0329*** -0.256*** -0.0655*** 0.0342***
(0.0702) (0.0112) (0.00524) (0.103) (0.0137) (0.00600) (0.0906) (0.0148) (0.00612)
Has children -0.0427 -0.0328 0.0417*** -0.0893 -0.0411 0.0338** 0.0297 -0.0274 0.0289*
(0.126) (0.0217) (0.0125) (0.187) (0.0284) (0.0147) (0.163) (0.0291) (0.0147)
Number of children -0.00690 -0.0118** 0.00870** -0.0499 -0.0112 0.00956** 0.0228 -0.0130* 0.0103**
(0.0329) (0.00560) (0.00345) (0.0529) (0.00720) (0.00397) (0.0396) (0.00744) (0.00405)
Has grandchildren 0.123 -0.0170 -0.0150** 0.150 -0.0102 -0.0132 0.111 -0.0198 -0.0158**
(0.0866) (0.0135) (0.00702) (0.129) (0.0180) (0.00847) (0.109) (0.0174) (0.00799)
Number of grandchildren -0.0467* -0.00339 0.000891 -0.0285 -0.00838* 0.000832 -0.0556* -0.000268 -7.46e-05
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(0.0240) (0.00337) (0.00181) (0.0370) (0.00481) (0.00223) (0.0301) (0.00430) (0.00216)
Number of siblings -0.0266* -0.00980*** 0.00737*** -0.0207 -0.00675** 0.00457*** -0.0303 -0.0137*** 0.0103***
(0.0147) (0.00243) (0.00139) (0.0223) (0.00320) (0.00175) (0.0203) (0.00351) (0.00207)
Bequest 0.159** 0.112*** 0.0231*** 0.0296 0.111*** 0.0172* 0.225** 0.116*** 0.0287***
(0.0779) (0.0128) (0.00751) (0.130) (0.0169) (0.00972) (0.0960) (0.0177) (0.00966)
SE -1.096*** 0.141*** 0.0574*** -0.765*** 0.142*** 0.0577*** -1.323*** 0.129*** 0.0562***
(0.155) (0.0279) (0.00502) (0.265) (0.0382) (0.00563) (0.187) (0.0345) (0.00681)
DK -0.977*** 0.132*** 0.0584*** -0.622** 0.115*** 0.0521*** -1.250*** 0.139*** 0.0662***
(0.153) (0.0282) (0.00442) (0.259) (0.0369) (0.00613) (0.193) (0.0367) (0.00466)
NL -0.762*** 0.133*** 0.0558*** -0.582** 0.0944*** 0.0508*** -0.870*** 0.162*** 0.0616***
(0.146) (0.0271) (0.00523) (0.257) (0.0354) (0.00605) (0.177) (0.0336) (0.00569)
BE -0.201 0.0661*** 0.0526*** 0.0563 0.0742** 0.0503*** -0.339** 0.0480 0.0540***
(0.137) (0.0253) (0.00560) (0.239) (0.0334) (0.00672) (0.166) (0.0314) (0.00686)
DE -0.376*** 0.0445* 0.0250*** -0.146 0.0441 0.0247*** -0.538*** 0.0376 0.0254***
(0.145) (0.0243) (0.00789) (0.250) (0.0320) (0.00925) (0.177) (0.0307) (0.00924)
FR -0.555*** 0.0366 0.0483*** -0.200 0.0275 0.0477*** -0.777*** 0.0320 0.0494***
(0.154) (0.0250) (0.00589) (0.260) (0.0323) (0.00656) (0.187) (0.0312) (0.00710)
CH -0.988*** 0.0530* 0.0523*** -0.918*** 0.0346 0.0444*** -1.013*** 0.0631* 0.0586***
(0.183) (0.0297) (0.00543) (0.299) (0.0387) (0.00755) (0.227) (0.0380) (0.00563)
AT -0.162 -0.0413 0.0247*** 0.286 -0.0119 0.0202* -0.483** -0.0703** 0.0293***
(0.197) (0.0278) (0.00931) (0.313) (0.0363) (0.0109) (0.235) (0.0349) (0.0100)
ES -0.141 -0.0560* -0.0812*** 0.207 -0.0416 -0.0505*** -0.360 -0.0597 -0.109***
(0.235) (0.0296) (0.0159) (0.407) (0.0361) (0.0157) (0.272) (0.0400) (0.0212)
CZ -0.138 0.0572** 0.00669 0.404 0.0602 0.00178 -0.535** 0.0576 0.0118
(0.187) (0.0291) (0.0120) (0.302) (0.0384) (0.0144) (0.231) (0.0375) (0.0135)
PL -0.150 -0.0228 -0.0996*** 0.130 0.0252 -0.0878*** -0.340 -0.0456 -0.102***
(0.217) (0.0331) (0.0226) (0.337) (0.0469) (0.0267) (0.273) (0.0425) (0.0267)
Wave2 -0.335*** -0.0602*** 0.0162** -0.337*** -0.0509*** 0.0130* -0.314*** -0.0712*** 0.0190**85
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(0.0788) (0.0118) (0.00663) (0.119) (0.0152) (0.00754) (0.100) (0.0160) (0.00828)
Num. of cars per capita 0.0279* 0.0329 0.0272
(0.0156) (0.0212) (0.0214)
Fin. distress = -0.0371* 0.00510 -0.0757*** 0.00688 -0.0183 0.000752
With great difficulty (0.0195) (0.00849) (0.0277) (0.0106) (0.0260) (0.0100)
Leave bequest 0.0393*** 0.00544 0.0292* 0.00732 0.0493*** 0.00503
(0.0122) (0.00618) (0.0160) (0.00768) (0.0168) (0.00779)
Religious organization 0.0632*** -0.0133 0.0634*** -0.0162 0.0664*** -0.0149
(0.0168) (0.00848) (0.0244) (0.0125) (0.0225) (0.0109)
hrooms -0.0168*** -0.0150*** -0.0185***
(0.00168) (0.00201) (0.00194)
Constant -1.073*** -1.028** -0.402
(0.310) (0.510) (0.390)
ρ•2 ρ•3 ρ•2 ρ•3 ρ•2 ρ•3
ρ1• 0.0814 0.0752 -0.0384 0.175 0.109* 0.0324
(0.0508) (0.0865) (0.124) (0.137) (0.0628) (0.139)
ρ2• -0.607** -0.945** -0.604**
(0.247) (0.380) (0.289)
Observations 3046 10258 10918 1300 5106 5422 1746 5152 5496
Ncluster 7836
loglikelihood -12787 -5796 -6906
Selection Inst. Wald test 33.44 442.7 19.19 174.3 20.23 377.3
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Selection Instr. Wald test 134.0 71.48 108.3
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
86
VARIABLES hcare care nr hcare care nr hcare care nr
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.5: Informal care to parents and parents-in-law with employment status considered as endogenous
VARIABLES hcare care nr nemp hcare care nr nemp hcare care nr nemp
All Male Female
Not employed 0.182 0.104** -0.0978* 0.0958 0.0816 0.00578 0.424 0.0738 -0.201***
(0.320) (0.0507) (0.0504) (0.396) (0.0645) (0.0576) (0.381) (0.0891) (0.0559)
Partner never worked 0.289 -0.145*** 0.00205 -0.0188 0.530* -0.126*** 0.00156 0.00140
(0.284) (0.0268) (0.0108) (0.0192) (0.284) (0.0241) (0.0103) (0.0168)
Female 0.589*** 0.0568*** 0.0148** 0.177***
(0.0740) (0.0114) (0.00590) (0.00863)
Age 0.0442** -0.00623** 0.00423* 0.0353*** 0.0316 -0.00510 -0.000358 0.0315*** 0.0480** -0.00536 0.00826*** 0.0401***
(0.0184) (0.00286) (0.00219) (0.00115) (0.0236) (0.00378) (0.00348) (0.00153) (0.0219) (0.00472) (0.00248) (0.00171)
Years of education -0.00738 0.00776*** 0.00132 -0.00995*** -0.00922 0.00717*** 0.00348*** -0.00644*** 0.000299 0.00690*** -0.00249* -0.0137***
(0.0105) (0.00166) (0.000869) (0.00114) (0.0147) (0.00211) (0.00105) (0.00136) (0.0148) (0.00254) (0.00148) (0.00181)
Living with partner 0.129 -0.0619*** 0.115*** 0.0458*** 0.0573 -0.0839** 0.180*** 0.0102 0.241* -0.0492* 0.0836*** 0.0541***
(0.113) (0.0214) (0.0139) (0.0137) (0.198) (0.0348) (0.0256) (0.0196) (0.141) (0.0270) (0.0162) (0.0204)
limitations in ADLs or IADLs= 1 -0.0948 -0.0383** -0.00347 0.0736*** -0.143 -0.0250 -0.0243 0.0707*** -0.114 -0.0521** 0.0128 0.0826***
(0.124) (0.0194) (0.00899) (0.0148) (0.200) (0.0297) (0.0156) (0.0208) (0.155) (0.0234) (0.0121) (0.0217)
limitations with daily activities 0.166** -0.0106 -0.000870 0.0538*** 0.205** -0.0175 -0.00617 0.0544*** 0.150* -0.000545 0.00188 0.0498***
(0.0660) (0.0116) (0.00577) (0.00844) (0.102) (0.0155) (0.00824) (0.0102) (0.0866) (0.0160) (0.00902) (0.0132)
Chronic diseases -0.0166 0.0222* 0.00788 0.0294*** 0.0156 0.00417 0.00411 0.0186* -0.0328 0.0397** 0.0162* 0.0395***
(0.0652) (0.0116) (0.00551) (0.00819) (0.0999) (0.0152) (0.00684) (0.00956) (0.0856) (0.0164) (0.00865) (0.0132)
Physical inactivity -0.289 -0.168*** 0.0191** 0.0643*** 0.221 -0.136*** 0.000975 0.102*** -0.453 -0.171*** 0.0296** 0.0280
(0.279) (0.0241) (0.00933) (0.0199) (0.439) (0.0342) (0.0145) (0.0276) (0.361) (0.0308) (0.0145) (0.0295)
Real assets -0.00891 0.00413** -0.000574 0.000230 -0.00895 0.00348 -0.000612 -0.00336** -0.00976 0.00446* 0.000245 0.00296
(0.0115) (0.00182) (0.000889) (0.00124) (0.0196) (0.00270) (0.00117) (0.00155) (0.0138) (0.00234) (0.00121) (0.00198)
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urban = Big city -0.00446 -0.00878 0.00391 -0.0233* -0.0841 -0.00337 0.00795 -0.0215 0.0691 -0.0136 -0.00412 -0.0235
(0.104) (0.0169) (0.00935) (0.0122) (0.151) (0.0218) (0.0102) (0.0150) (0.132) (0.0212) (0.0136) (0.0187)
urban = Village, rural area 0.0223 -0.00452 -0.0225*** 0.0256*** -0.0226 0.00484 -0.0227*** 0.0217** 0.00496 -0.00987 -0.0247*** 0.0264**
(0.0651) (0.0119) (0.00613) (0.00786) (0.0951) (0.0148) (0.00688) (0.00929) (0.0826) (0.0152) (0.00893) (0.0125)
HH size -0.0255 0.0156** 0.000715 -0.00264 -0.00621 0.00944 -0.00350 -0.0151** -0.0349 0.0213** 0.00601 0.0130*
(0.0403) (0.00653) (0.00350) (0.00473) (0.0572) (0.00808) (0.00388) (0.00603) (0.0536) (0.00907) (0.00552) (0.00766)
Not labour income (asin) -0.0176 0.00465** -0.000371 -0.000711 0.00435* -7.18e-05 -0.0404** 0.00444 -0.00137
(0.0129) (0.00200) (0.00167) (0.0186) (0.00250) (0.00194) (0.0173) (0.00290) (0.00281)
Parent age 0.00768*** 0.00387*** -0.000406*** 0.000118 0.00384 0.00326*** -0.000253** -0.000128 0.00970*** 0.00420*** -0.000681*** 0.000320
(0.00152) (0.000209) (0.000100) (0.000175) (0.00243) (0.000256) (0.000103) (0.000227) (0.00210) (0.000296) (0.000164) (0.000258)
Parent health = Poor 0.480*** 0.0821*** -0.0154*** 0.0236*** 0.438*** 0.0493*** -0.00916 0.0147 0.475*** 0.105*** -0.0208** 0.0244*
(0.0653) (0.0120) (0.00587) (0.00876) (0.106) (0.0165) (0.00807) (0.0114) (0.0851) (0.0162) (0.00901) (0.0133)
Parent distance -0.136*** -0.0426*** -0.00694** -0.0876*** -0.0300*** -0.000244 -0.160*** -0.0507*** -0.0124***
(0.0175) (0.00248) (0.00286) (0.0298) (0.00335) (0.00428) (0.0226) (0.00350) (0.00351)
Parent-in-law age -5.66e-05 0.00152*** -0.000591*** 2.63e-05 -0.000125 0.00207*** -0.000656*** -2.92e-05 -0.000724 0.000908*** -0.000683*** 0.000139
(0.00129) (0.000219) (0.000100) (0.000178) (0.00196) (0.000262) (0.000116) (0.000233) (0.00186) (0.000304) (0.000135) (0.000254)
Parent-in-law health = Poor 0.249*** 0.0564*** 0.00313 0.0128 0.0990 0.0404** -0.00346 0.0114 0.440*** 0.0791*** 0.0160 0.0168
(0.0924) (0.0149) (0.00673) (0.0101) (0.127) (0.0181) (0.00816) (0.0111) (0.141) (0.0230) (0.0117) (0.0179)
Parent-in-law distance -0.0419* -0.0255*** -0.00366 -0.0473 -0.0270*** 0.000949 -0.0312 -0.0218*** -0.00929**
(0.0216) (0.00318) (0.00327) (0.0304) (0.00378) (0.00452) (0.0334) (0.00494) (0.00460)
Both parents alive -0.265*** -0.0571*** 0.0361*** -0.00407 -0.244** -0.0509*** 0.0330*** -0.00373 -0.273*** -0.0666*** 0.0432*** -0.00427
(0.0719) (0.0122) (0.00620) (0.00840) (0.103) (0.0149) (0.00607) (0.0100) (0.0949) (0.0153) (0.00837) (0.0134)
Has children -0.0381 -0.0399* 0.0459*** 0.0282* -0.0719 -0.0451 0.0331** 0.0407** 0.0316 -0.0306 0.0357** 0.0156
(0.129) (0.0234) (0.0138) (0.0163) (0.190) (0.0307) (0.0150) (0.0198) (0.168) (0.0302) (0.0180) (0.0260)
Number of children -0.0150 -0.0119* 0.00870** 0.00588 -0.0540 -0.0115 0.00974** -0.00860 0.0149 -0.0127 0.0130** 0.0187**
(0.0335) (0.00615) (0.00370) (0.00481) (0.0536) (0.00774) (0.00409) (0.00607) (0.0406) (0.00785) (0.00517) (0.00780)
Has grandchildren 0.103 -0.0115 -0.0182** -0.0256*** 0.145 -0.0102 -0.0132 -0.0123 0.0857 -0.0102 -0.0244** -0.0364**
(0.0884) (0.0149) (0.00784) (0.00978) (0.129) (0.0194) (0.00848) (0.0120) (0.112) (0.0187) (0.0101) (0.0149)
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Number of grandchildren -0.0406* -0.00491 0.00178 0.00753*** -0.0252 -0.00937* 0.000745 0.00750** -0.0495 -0.00136 0.000845 0.00754**
(0.0247) (0.00373) (0.00199) (0.00280) (0.0373) (0.00522) (0.00230) (0.00356) (0.0311) (0.00459) (0.00274) (0.00378)
Number of siblings -0.0254* -0.0102*** 0.00698*** -0.00222 -0.0213 -0.00704** 0.00461*** -0.00319 -0.0255 -0.0131*** 0.0110*** -0.000486
(0.0151) (0.00263) (0.00152) (0.00180) (0.0223) (0.00342) (0.00178) (0.00212) (0.0213) (0.00366) (0.00254) (0.00290)
Bequest 0.153* 0.120*** 0.0267*** -0.00357 0.0319 0.119*** 0.0173* -0.00393 0.228** 0.115*** 0.0435*** 0.00308
(0.0796) (0.0141) (0.00821) (0.0102) (0.131) (0.0182) (0.00978) (0.0124) (0.0998) (0.0190) (0.0120) (0.0159)
SE -1.139*** 0.169*** 0.0544*** -0.160*** -0.790*** 0.157*** 0.0585*** -0.124*** -1.326*** 0.157*** 0.0396** -0.208***
(0.176) (0.0300) (0.00682) (0.0150) (0.274) (0.0414) (0.00816) (0.0198) (0.223) (0.0397) (0.0160) (0.0221)
DK -1.016*** 0.155*** 0.0598*** -0.143*** -0.645** 0.128*** 0.0529*** -0.121*** -1.268*** 0.159*** 0.0872*** -0.182***
(0.168) (0.0302) (0.00717) (0.0156) (0.266) (0.0400) (0.00802) (0.0191) (0.216) (0.0394) (0.0145) (0.0234)
NL -0.800*** 0.141*** 0.0581*** -0.00657 -0.593** 0.104*** 0.0514*** -0.0378* -0.925*** 0.161*** 0.0733*** 0.00484
(0.154) (0.0286) (0.00795) (0.0173) (0.260) (0.0381) (0.00715) (0.0201) (0.189) (0.0353) (0.0125) (0.0273)
BE -0.205 0.0724*** 0.0547*** 0.0272 0.0546 0.0808** 0.0506*** 0.0286 -0.345* 0.0513 0.0586*** 0.0160
(0.147) (0.0277) (0.00728) (0.0171) (0.239) (0.0361) (0.00712) (0.0209) (0.182) (0.0338) (0.0115) (0.0261)
DE -0.395*** 0.0586** 0.0206** -0.0171 -0.155 0.0507 0.0255** -0.0450** -0.564*** 0.0493 0.0156 -0.00773
(0.152) (0.0268) (0.00911) (0.0169) (0.250) (0.0347) (0.0107) (0.0195) (0.189) (0.0328) (0.0134) (0.0268)
FR -0.577*** 0.0454* 0.0483*** -0.00861 -0.199 0.0309 0.0478*** 0.0206 -0.802*** 0.0455 0.0436*** -0.0510**
(0.163) (0.0273) (0.00726) (0.0172) (0.261) (0.0351) (0.00674) (0.0235) (0.202) (0.0333) (0.0120) (0.0249)
CH -1.042*** 0.0752** 0.0509*** -0.107*** -0.943*** 0.0440 0.0454*** -0.129*** -1.058*** 0.0876** 0.0636*** -0.103***
(0.194) (0.0326) (0.00794) (0.0180) (0.305) (0.0428) (0.00984) (0.0212) (0.242) (0.0408) (0.0129) (0.0283)
AT -0.164 -0.0473 0.0258** 0.0802*** 0.294 -0.0135 0.0202* 0.0673** -0.539** -0.0779** 0.0365** 0.0690**
(0.208) (0.0314) (0.0107) (0.0225) (0.313) (0.0392) (0.0109) (0.0263) (0.256) (0.0376) (0.0152) (0.0345)
ES -0.119 -0.0602* -0.0880*** -0.0323* 0.186 -0.0428 -0.0493*** -0.0307 -0.397 -0.0792* -0.137*** -0.0540*
(0.272) (0.0354) (0.0184) (0.0190) (0.410) (0.0405) (0.0174) (0.0222) (0.342) (0.0475) (0.0270) (0.0315)
CZ -0.159 0.0711** 0.00118 -0.0536*** 0.381 0.0689* 0.00313 -0.0743*** -0.565** 0.0638 0.00834 -0.0504*
(0.195) (0.0317) (0.0138) (0.0182) (0.307) (0.0413) (0.0163) (0.0209) (0.240) (0.0395) (0.0180) (0.0288)
PL -0.111 -0.0230 -0.0963*** 0.0368* 0.114 0.0274 -0.0871*** 0.0159 -0.351 -0.0611 -0.0880*** 0.0280
(0.226) (0.0370) (0.0226) (0.0219) (0.339) (0.0509) (0.0268) (0.0270) (0.286) (0.0443) (0.0273) (0.0327)89
VARIABLES hcare care nr nemp hcare care nr nemp hcare care nr nemp
Wave2 -0.332*** -0.0612*** 0.0119* -0.0243*** -0.339*** -0.0538*** 0.0132* -0.0187* -0.291*** -0.0661*** 0.00751 -0.0234
(0.0804) (0.0130) (0.00714) (0.00928) (0.119) (0.0163) (0.00776) (0.0112) (0.104) (0.0169) (0.0107) (0.0147)
Num. of cars per capita 0.0342** -0.0637*** 0.0357 -0.00616 0.0308 -0.116***
(0.0172) (0.0153) (0.0226) (0.0244) (0.0240) (0.0195)
Fin. distress = -0.0495** 0.00646 0.0141 -0.0824*** 0.00656 0.0274 -0.0293 0.00173 -0.00209
With great difficulty (0.0220) (0.00912) (0.0148) (0.0302) (0.0108) (0.0201) (0.0282) (0.0132) (0.0221)
Leave bequest 0.0421*** 0.00233 -0.0219** 0.0315* 0.00722 -0.0144 0.0487*** -0.00610 -0.0321**
(0.0134) (0.00679) (0.00928) (0.0171) (0.00769) (0.0107) (0.0178) (0.0102) (0.0148)
Religious organization 0.0735*** -0.0145 -0.00138 0.0675*** -0.0159 -0.00915 0.0765*** -0.0145 0.000555
(0.0182) (0.00939) (0.0131) (0.0258) (0.0126) (0.0165) (0.0240) (0.0134) (0.0203)
hrooms -0.0175*** -0.00421 -0.0150*** -0.00365 -0.0212*** -0.00399
(0.00215) (0.00261) (0.00201) (0.00310) (0.00255) (0.00412)
Eligibility 0.229*** 0.137*** 0.160***
(0.0307) (0.0301) (0.0352)
Eligibility x female -0.0835***
(0.0223)
Eligibility x number of children -0.0163** -0.00750 -0.0447***
(0.00748) (0.00762) (0.0114)
Eligibility x female -0.0163
x number of children (0.0103)
Partner Eligibility 0.0362* 0.0249 0.0674**
(0.0215) (0.0290) (0.0292)
Partner eligibility x female 0.0219
(0.0187)
Partner eligibility x -0.00665 0.00145 -0.0161
number of children (0.00708) (0.0109) (0.0101)
Worse standard of living -0.0490*** -0.0597*** -0.0370**
(0.0111) (0.0132) (0.0168)
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VARIABLES hcare care nr nemp hcare care nr nemp hcare care nr nemp
Constant -1.000*** -0.924 -0.519
(0.378) (0.573) (0.504)
ρ•2 ρ•3 ρ•4 ρ•2 ρ•3 ρ•4 ρ•2 ρ•3 ρ•4
ρ1• 0.0875 0.0378 0.0780 -0.0367 0.180 0.0769 0.121* 0.0162 -0.0169
(0.0548) (0.0967) (0.126) (0.123) (0.139) (0.149) (0.0666) (0.157) (0.152)
ρ2• -0.677*** -0.148 -0.914** -0.0655 -0.546* -0.138
(0.248) (0.0917) (0.424) (0.120) (0.296) (0.163)
ρ3• 0.489** -0.0621 1.001***
(0.221) (0.382) (0.250)
Observations 2952 9846 10453 10453 1300 5106 5422 5422 1652 4740 5031 5031
Ncluster 7658
loglikelihood -16250 -7417 -8667
Selection Instrument Wald test 37.03 441.1 19.39 176.7 21.38 399.2
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000658 0 0.000 0.000
Hansen test 26.26 12.81 14.19
p-value 0.197 0.383 0.289
Emp Instr. Informativity test 71.51 184.9 200.6 26.53 75.07 85.44 12.20 35.83 36.92
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0321 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.6: Care to grandchildren with employment status considered as exogenous
VARIABLES hcare care hcare care hcare care
All Male Female
Not employed 0.371*** 0.0586*** 0.216* 0.0514*** 0.307*** 0.0468***
(0.0535) (0.0123) (0.112) (0.0191) (0.0616) (0.0153)
Partner never worked 0.0631 -0.0610** 0.285* -0.0724***
91
VARIABLES hcare care hcare care hcare care
(0.124) (0.0239) (0.153) (0.0251)
Female never worked 0.198** -0.0293 0.132 -0.0404*
(0.101) (0.0216) (0.104) (0.0232)
Female 0.399*** 0.128***
(0.0425) (0.00835)
Age -0.00789 -0.00143 -0.00894 0.000356 -0.00807 -0.00239
(0.00577) (0.00128) (0.0121) (0.00201) (0.00635) (0.00151)
Years of education 0.000567 0.00523*** -0.0374*** 0.00716*** 0.00820 0.00295
(0.00657) (0.00143) (0.0123) (0.00205) (0.00760) (0.00180)
Living with partner -0.00890 0.0277 0.168 0.180*** -0.247** -0.0262
(0.116) (0.0240) (0.277) (0.0376) (0.125) (0.0273)
limitations in ADLs or IADLs= 1 -0.129** -0.0140 -0.243 0.00158 -0.0370 -0.0103
(0.0653) (0.0139) (0.156) (0.0247) (0.0726) (0.0161)
limitations with daily activities -0.0399 -0.0183* 0.0399 -0.00997 -0.0721 -0.0248**
(0.0438) (0.00979) (0.0888) (0.0153) (0.0526) (0.0123)
Chronic diseases 0.0344 0.0310*** -0.0656 0.0522*** -0.00163 0.0177
(0.0422) (0.00943) (0.0861) (0.0145) (0.0502) (0.0119)
Physical inactivity -0.0149 -0.180*** 0.608*** -0.219*** -0.0318 -0.169***
(0.107) (0.0192) (0.221) (0.0302) (0.128) (0.0240)
Real assets -0.00544 0.00248 -0.0235* 0.00521** -0.00487 0.00153
(0.00649) (0.00166) (0.0142) (0.00255) (0.00683) (0.00181)
urban = Big city 0.104 0.0170 0.296** -0.0198 0.0237 0.0385**
(0.0753) (0.0168) (0.141) (0.0246) (0.0826) (0.0186)
urban = Village, rural area -0.0246 -0.0329*** 0.171** -0.0450*** -0.0428 -0.0187
(0.0482) (0.0108) (0.0867) (0.0148) (0.0522) (0.0122)
HH size 0.213** 0.0210 -0.0344 0.0301 0.303*** 0.0117
(0.0961) (0.0197) (0.179) (0.0267) (0.105) (0.0232)
Not labour income (asin) -0.00391 0.000891 -0.00785 -0.00302 0.00487 0.00391
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VARIABLES hcare care hcare care hcare care
(0.00897) (0.00183) (0.0154) (0.00253) (0.0117) (0.00248)
Employed children 0.470*** 0.0820*** 0.167 0.0551** 0.471*** 0.0857***
(0.0863) (0.0175) (0.156) (0.0250) (0.0919) (0.0199)
Number of grandchildren 0.0407*** 0.00815*** 0.0101 0.00693* 0.0375*** 0.00679**
(0.0127) (0.00262) (0.0242) (0.00393) (0.0132) (0.00293)
Granchildren age -0.0263*** -0.0225*** 0.0442*** -0.0183*** -0.0264*** -0.0236***
(0.00736) (0.00111) (0.0127) (0.00171) (0.00744) (0.00121)
Grandchildren distance -0.156*** -0.0442*** 5.63e-06 -0.0366*** -0.169*** -0.0458***
(0.0122) (0.00200) (0.0217) (0.00294) (0.0121) (0.00224)
Ratio male children -0.184*** -0.0627*** 0.156 -0.0606*** -0.283*** -0.0643***
(0.0656) (0.0147) (0.117) (0.0201) (0.0696) (0.0164)
Parents alive -0.0266 -0.00458 0.0255 -0.0118 -0.0195 0.00381
(0.0485) (0.0109) (0.0863) (0.0147) (0.0526) (0.0126)
Number of adult children -0.101*** -0.00891* -0.0366 -0.0148* -0.0847*** 0.000497
(0.0274) (0.00515) (0.0479) (0.00762) (0.0305) (0.00587)
Number of minor children -0.0785 -0.0989*** 0.443** -0.107*** -0.139 -0.0860***
(0.129) (0.0249) (0.226) (0.0344) (0.137) (0.0309)
SE -0.995*** 0.0899*** -1.471*** 0.140*** -1.061*** 0.0617**
(0.114) (0.0226) (0.227) (0.0325) (0.119) (0.0261)
DK -0.936*** 0.139*** -1.469*** 0.191*** -1.116*** 0.101***
(0.118) (0.0230) (0.229) (0.0321) (0.122) (0.0267)
NL -0.833*** 0.153*** -1.456*** 0.201*** -0.900*** 0.121***
(0.112) (0.0215) (0.218) (0.0307) (0.113) (0.0246)
BE -0.158 0.113*** -0.681*** 0.179*** -0.263** 0.0680***
(0.108) (0.0211) (0.215) (0.0298) (0.109) (0.0245)
DE -0.521*** 0.0144 -0.690*** 0.0624* -0.639*** -0.0258
(0.116) (0.0243) (0.227) (0.0352) (0.124) (0.0285)
FR -0.139 0.0565** -0.470** 0.109*** -0.238** 0.013093
VARIABLES hcare care hcare care hcare care
(0.114) (0.0224) (0.228) (0.0329) (0.115) (0.0257)
CH -0.470*** 0.0674** -0.925*** 0.137*** -0.561*** 0.0174
(0.150) (0.0305) (0.293) (0.0437) (0.156) (0.0351)
AT -0.342*** 0.0257 -0.502** 0.0962*** -0.531*** -0.0294
(0.130) (0.0266) (0.251) (0.0373) (0.137) (0.0314)
ES -0.240 -0.103*** -0.105 -0.0467 -0.246 -0.134***
(0.146) (0.0262) (0.270) (0.0395) (0.162) (0.0307)
CZ -0.378*** -0.0122 -0.314 0.00236 -0.422*** -0.00504
(0.129) (0.0271) (0.254) (0.0399) (0.134) (0.0307)
PL -0.222 0.0356 -0.664** 0.103** -0.195 0.00735
(0.142) (0.0272) (0.274) (0.0401) (0.148) (0.0316)
w2 -0.000798 0.00625 -0.0484 -0.000374 0.00881 0.00637
(0.0589) (0.0131) (0.108) (0.0182) (0.0635) (0.0149)
Num. of cars per capita 0.0282* 0.0338 0.0463**
(0.0169) (0.0213) (0.0190)
Leave bequest 0.0312** 0.00710 0.0356**
(0.0122) (0.0142) (0.0145)
Fin. distress = With great difficulty -0.0360** -0.00183 -0.0417**
(0.0183) (0.0233) (0.0202)
Religious organization 0.0476*** 0.0350* 0.0359**
(0.0156) (0.0192) (0.0179)
Ever had siblings 0.0400*** 0.0289 0.0440**
(0.0148) (0.0181) (0.0195)
Constant 0.280 1.507*** 0.813***
(0.184) (0.383) (0.196)
ρ•2 ρ•2 ρ•2
ρ1• -0.0529 -1.477*** -0.0146
(0.0593) (0.0948) (0.0482)
94
VARIABLES hcare care hcare care hcare care
Observations 6820 11538 2533 4755 4287 6783
Ncluster 8301
loglikelihood -19503 -7726 -11639
Instrument Wald test - SEL I eq 30.37 7.919 26.46
p-value 0.000 0.161 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.7: Care to grandchildren with employment status considered as endogenous
VARIABLES hcare care nemp hcare care nemp hcare care nemp
All Male Female
Not employed 0.954* 0.163*** 0.122 0.116* 1.205** 0.173***
(0.523) (0.0365) (0.483) (0.0611) (0.515) (0.0442)
Partner never worked 0.0819 -0.0571** -0.0137 0.280* -0.0708*** 0.00353
(0.126) (0.0238) (0.0191) (0.153) (0.0250) (0.0186)
Female 0.332*** 0.117*** 0.160***
(0.0720) (0.00961) (0.0105)
Age -0.0394 -0.00725*** 0.0402*** -0.00326 -0.00362 0.0386*** -0.0532* -0.00876*** 0.0424***
(0.0294) (0.00228) (0.00118) (0.0315) (0.00412) (0.00177) (0.0277) (0.00255) (0.00146)
Years of education 0.00389 0.00564*** -0.00819*** -0.0382*** 0.00764*** -0.00715*** 0.0142 0.00307 -0.00866***
(0.00832) (0.00147) (0.00106) (0.0129) (0.00207) (0.00144) (0.00944) (0.00189) (0.00146)
Living with partner -0.0338 0.0442* 0.0398** 0.171 0.176*** 0.0251 -0.308** 0.00217 0.0343
(0.128) (0.0242) (0.0181) (0.277) (0.0376) (0.0273) (0.138) (0.0289) (0.0258)
limitations in -0.171** -0.0176 0.0535*** -0.241 -0.000855 0.0435** -0.0904 -0.0140 0.0618***
ADLs or IADLs= 1 (0.0727) (0.0145) (0.0124) (0.158) (0.0248) (0.0208) (0.0802) (0.0172) (0.0156)
limitations with -0.0643 -0.0204** 0.0506*** 0.0449 -0.0135 0.0623*** -0.105* -0.0251* 0.0405***
daily activities (0.0524) (0.0101) (0.00771) (0.0928) (0.0156) (0.0108) (0.0610) (0.0129) (0.0105)
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VARIABLES hcare care nemp hcare care nemp hcare care nemp
Chronic diseases 0.00533 0.0261*** 0.0479*** -0.0619 0.0493*** 0.0422*** -0.0526 0.00914 0.0506***
(0.0525) (0.00984) (0.00737) (0.0880) (0.0148) (0.0103) (0.0612) (0.0127) (0.00994)
Physical inactivity 0.0272 -0.188*** 0.0578*** 0.615*** -0.222*** 0.0862*** 0.0427 -0.173*** 0.0446**
(0.116) (0.0207) (0.0167) (0.224) (0.0301) (0.0260) (0.136) (0.0272) (0.0221)
Real assets 0.000480 0.00357** -0.00293** -0.0242* 0.00560** -0.00636*** 0.00229 0.00284 -0.000839
(0.00739) (0.00170) (0.00122) (0.0146) (0.00257) (0.00197) (0.00765) (0.00186) (0.00148)
urban = Big city 0.137* 0.0210 -0.00833 0.295** -0.0201 -0.00603 0.0816 0.0503*** -0.0153
(0.0765) (0.0171) (0.0120) (0.142) (0.0245) (0.0166) (0.0866) (0.0193) (0.0161)
urban = Village, rural area -0.0184 -0.0347*** 0.00964 0.172** -0.0461*** 0.0170 -0.0252 -0.0194 -0.000643
(0.0498) (0.0109) (0.00743) (0.0875) (0.0147) (0.0105) (0.0550) (0.0126) (0.00994)
HH size 0.221** 0.0119 -0.0124 -0.0340 0.0303 -0.0114 0.329*** -0.00949 -0.00472
(0.104) (0.0193) (0.0129) (0.179) (0.0264) (0.0179) (0.116) (0.0239) (0.0205)
Not labour income (asin) -0.00488 -0.000567 0.00260* -0.00801 -0.00294 9.59e-05 0.00142 0.00125 0.00461**
(0.00923) (0.00187) (0.00150) (0.0154) (0.00253) (0.00188) (0.0128) (0.00267) (0.00227)
Employed children 0.446*** 0.0793*** 0.000756 0.170 0.0522** 0.0322* 0.448*** 0.0825*** -0.0264
(0.0898) (0.0179) (0.0128) (0.157) (0.0251) (0.0181) (0.0990) (0.0209) (0.0172)
Number of grandchildren 0.0348** 0.00670** 0.00878*** 0.0112 0.00624 0.00987*** 0.0289* 0.00489 0.00779***
(0.0143) (0.00272) (0.00194) (0.0245) (0.00397) (0.00280) (0.0150) (0.00311) (0.00253)
Granchildren age -0.0276*** -0.0226*** 0.00151 0.0440*** -0.0182*** 0.000514 -0.0285*** -0.0240*** 0.00234*
(0.00826) (0.00115) (0.000939) (0.0128) (0.00170) (0.00129) (0.00857) (0.00128) (0.00123)
Grandchildren distance -0.155*** -0.0436*** 0.00204 8.66e-05 -0.0366*** 0.00424** -0.166*** -0.0452*** 7.94e-05
(0.0140) (0.00206) (0.00152) (0.0218) (0.00293) (0.00212) (0.0141) (0.00240) (0.00200)
Ratio male children -0.170** -0.0630*** -0.00328 0.157 -0.0595*** 0.000948 -0.271*** -0.0662*** -0.00640
(0.0676) (0.0149) (0.0101) (0.117) (0.0200) (0.0140) (0.0737) (0.0169) (0.0133)
Parents alive -0.0307 -0.00645 -0.0124* 0.0234 -0.0100 -0.0129 -0.0275 0.000550 -0.0106
(0.0510) (0.0111) (0.00731) (0.0872) (0.0148) (0.00999) (0.0564) (0.0131) (0.00978)
Number of adult children -0.0945*** -0.00826 0.00431 -0.0384 -0.0135* -0.00227 -0.0765** 0.00204 0.00965
(0.0295) (0.00528) (0.00516) (0.0486) (0.00769) (0.00736) (0.0332) (0.00616) (0.00717)
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VARIABLES hcare care nemp hcare care nemp hcare care nemp
Number of minor children -0.109 -0.0907*** 0.0230 0.438* -0.106*** -0.00351 -0.230 -0.0696** 0.0504**
(0.136) (0.0247) (0.0163) (0.226) (0.0341) (0.0222) (0.149) (0.0315) (0.0251)
SE -0.828*** 0.120*** -0.214*** -1.491*** 0.150*** -0.136*** -0.754*** 0.0872*** -0.283***
(0.187) (0.0236) (0.0205) (0.242) (0.0331) (0.0274) (0.222) (0.0297) (0.0281)
DK -0.810*** 0.161*** -0.173*** -1.488*** 0.200*** -0.140*** -0.904*** 0.113*** -0.206***
(0.169) (0.0233) (0.0216) (0.245) (0.0325) (0.0285) (0.188) (0.0290) (0.0297)
NL -0.825*** 0.161*** 0.00592 -1.462*** 0.202*** 0.0226 -0.894*** 0.114*** -0.0198
(0.123) (0.0219) (0.0201) (0.219) (0.0305) (0.0255) (0.127) (0.0277) (0.0290)
BE -0.150 0.117*** -0.000578 -0.684*** 0.179*** 0.0396* -0.246* 0.0513* -0.0418
(0.118) (0.0221) (0.0193) (0.215) (0.0296) (0.0236) (0.127) (0.0285) (0.0277)
DE -0.460*** 0.0340 -0.0429** -0.699*** 0.0667* -0.0227 -0.535*** -0.0154 -0.0711**
(0.131) (0.0250) (0.0209) (0.230) (0.0352) (0.0266) (0.148) (0.0316) (0.0294)
FR -0.121 0.0644*** -0.0113 -0.470** 0.106*** 0.0697*** -0.156 0.0110 -0.0777***
(0.122) (0.0232) (0.0192) (0.229) (0.0328) (0.0232) (0.140) (0.0291) (0.0273)
CH -0.355* 0.0940*** -0.163*** -0.946*** 0.150*** -0.164*** -0.402** 0.0305 -0.174***
(0.195) (0.0308) (0.0279) (0.314) (0.0444) (0.0373) (0.203) (0.0375) (0.0358)
AT -0.390*** 0.0258 0.0941*** -0.496* 0.0902** 0.124*** -0.603*** -0.0468 0.0643**
(0.146) (0.0279) (0.0207) (0.255) (0.0377) (0.0263) (0.153) (0.0357) (0.0291)
ES -0.224 -0.111*** -0.0644*** -0.116 -0.0413 -0.0425 -0.188 -0.184*** -0.0923**
(0.172) (0.0294) (0.0247) (0.271) (0.0397) (0.0296) (0.219) (0.0406) (0.0384)
CZ -0.358*** -0.00118 -0.0107 -0.323 0.00746 -0.0472 -0.449*** -0.0148 0.00814
(0.136) (0.0277) (0.0210) (0.256) (0.0398) (0.0290) (0.144) (0.0333) (0.0279)
PL -0.280* 0.0322 0.109*** -0.665** 0.101** 0.0916*** -0.317* -0.0192 0.109***
(0.156) (0.0281) (0.0206) (0.275) (0.0400) (0.0299) (0.169) (0.0350) (0.0269)
w2 0.0383 0.00931 -0.0293*** -0.0501 0.000725 -0.0200 0.0827 0.0117 -0.0362***
(0.0626) (0.0134) (0.00918) (0.108) (0.0182) (0.0126) (0.0699) (0.0158) (0.0123)
Num. of cars per capita 0.0306* -0.0352*** 0.0343 -0.0115 0.0499** -0.0534***
(0.0173) (0.0121) (0.0214) (0.0186) (0.0198) (0.0153)97
VARIABLES hcare care nemp hcare care nemp hcare care nemp
Leave bequest 0.0258** -0.0162* 0.00794 -0.0189 0.0258* -0.0106
(0.0125) (0.00896) (0.0143) (0.0127) (0.0154) (0.0119)
Fin. distress = -0.0335* 0.0281** -0.00142 0.00785 -0.0387* 0.0383**
With great difficulty (0.0191) (0.0141) (0.0232) (0.0215) (0.0218) (0.0173)
Religious organization 0.0527*** -0.00190 0.0354* -0.0197 0.0424** 0.00817
(0.0162) (0.0126) (0.0192) (0.0180) (0.0191) (0.0169)
Ever had siblings 0.0446*** -0.0148 0.0283 -0.0132 0.0539*** -0.0169
(0.0152) (0.0113) (0.0182) (0.0155) (0.0205) (0.0154)
Eligibility 0.192*** 0.179*** 0.0533**
(0.0294) (0.0386) (0.0263)
Eligibility x female -0.0987***
(0.0213)
Eligibility x number of child -0.0237*** -0.0230*** -0.0302***
(0.00656) (0.00843) (0.00817)
Eligibility x female -0.00596
x number of children (0.00762)
Partner eligibility 0.0272 0.0156 0.0509**
(0.0202) (0.0269) (0.0258)
Partner eligibility x female 0.0204
(0.0153)
Partner eligibility x -0.00613 0.00772 -0.0140*
number of children (0.00608) (0.00940) (0.00804)
Worse standard of living -0.0612*** -0.0569*** -0.0635***
(0.0100) (0.0150) (0.0136)
Constant -0.105 1.573*** 0.126
(0.401) (0.487) (0.462)
ρ•2 ρ•3 ρ•2 ρ•3 ρ•2 ρ•3
ρ1• -0.0547 -0.248 -1.467*** 0.0268 -0.00591 -0.404*
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VARIABLES hcare care nemp hcare care nemp hcare care nemp
(0.0816) (0.217) (0.0976) (0.134) (0.0749) (0.232)
ρ2• -0.201*** -0.116 -0.250***
(0.0701) (0.107) (0.0897)
Observations 6407 10743 10743 2533 4755 4755 3874 5988 5988
Ncluster 7925
loglikelihood -22087 -9335 -12553
Inst. Wald test - SEL I eq 30.30 7.971 24.81
p-value 0.000 0.158 0.000
Hansen test 47.96 10.89 9.530
p-value 0.000 0.366 0.483
Emp Instr. Informativity test 83.11 176.7 39.09 69.44 27.08 50.62
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.8: Care to friends, neighbours, other relatives with employment status as exogenous
VARIABLES hcare care hcare care hcare care
All Male Female
Not employed 0.402*** 0.0233*** 0.535*** 0.0255** 0.264** 0.0248***
(0.0849) (0.00696) (0.122) (0.0112) (0.118) (0.00893)
Partner never worked -0.326 -0.0296** -0.124 -0.0231
(0.207) (0.0127) (0.212) (0.0147)
Female never worked 0.387* -0.0128 0.0383 -0.0213
(0.205) (0.0138) (0.222) (0.0139)
Female 0.457*** -0.0286***
(0.0631) (0.00506)
Age 0.00446 -0.00150** -0.00467 -0.00207* 0.0179 -0.00123
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VARIABLES hcare care hcare care hcare care
(0.00793) (0.000667) (0.0112) (0.00106) (0.0112) (0.000846)
Years of education -0.0256*** 0.00287*** -0.0182 0.00261** -0.0360** 0.00330***
(0.00987) (0.000776) (0.0124) (0.00114) (0.0153) (0.00102)
Living with partner -0.0666 -0.0650*** 0.0146 -0.0755*** -0.109 -0.0620***
(0.105) (0.00933) (0.145) (0.0162) (0.152) (0.0114)
limitations in ADLs or IADLs= 1 -0.328*** 0.00301 -0.169 -0.00898 -0.402*** 0.00455
(0.109) (0.00894) (0.192) (0.0154) (0.136) (0.0109)
limitations with daily activities 0.0421 0.00878 -0.0450 0.00307 0.115 0.0149*
(0.0659) (0.00587) (0.0917) (0.00902) (0.0943) (0.00771)
Chronic diseases 0.101 0.00459 0.0616 0.00580 0.114 0.00469
(0.0655) (0.00575) (0.0876) (0.00880) (0.0961) (0.00764)
Physical inactivity -0.207 -0.106*** 0.209 -0.130*** -0.406 -0.0931***
(0.295) (0.00846) (0.495) (0.0128) (0.377) (0.0103)
Real assets -0.0102 -0.00124 -0.0121 -0.00273** -0.00251 -8.81e-05
(0.00897) (0.000864) (0.0125) (0.00137) (0.0130) (0.00110)
urban = Big city -0.0128 -0.00861 0.115 -0.00679 -0.0924 -0.0129
(0.104) (0.00841) (0.144) (0.0128) (0.149) (0.0104)
urban = Village, rural area 0.0412 -0.0134** 0.00351 -0.00625 0.0459 -0.0176**
(0.0654) (0.00597) (0.0853) (0.00856) (0.0967) (0.00748)
HH size -0.0526 0.0138*** -0.133*** 0.0171*** 0.0364 0.00986**
(0.0384) (0.00328) (0.0506) (0.00478) (0.0547) (0.00429)
Not labour income (asin) -0.00903 5.43e-05 -0.0121 -0.000906 -0.00975 0.00112
(0.0123) (0.00101) (0.0159) (0.00141) (0.0185) (0.00143)
Parent alive -0.0300 -0.0364*** 0.0156 -0.0404*** -0.0151 -0.0315***
(0.0711) (0.00599) (0.0910) (0.00869) (0.103) (0.00747)
Has children -0.0599 -0.0372*** -0.242 -0.0120 0.113 -0.0536***
(0.119) (0.0121) (0.162) (0.0166) (0.180) (0.0159)
Number of children 0.0805** -0.0107*** 0.157*** -0.0135*** -0.000636 -0.00835**
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VARIABLES hcare care hcare care hcare care
(0.0339) (0.00340) (0.0460) (0.00478) (0.0484) (0.00411)
Has grandchildren 0.0789 -0.0228*** 0.0605 -0.0226** 0.0977 -0.0236**
(0.0850) (0.00754) (0.113) (0.0109) (0.120) (0.00954)
Number of grandchildren -0.00847 -0.000781 -0.0195 0.000296 -0.00452 -0.00190
(0.0180) (0.00171) (0.0232) (0.00258) (0.0248) (0.00209)
SE -1.027*** 0.0455*** -0.535*** 0.0664*** -1.457*** 0.0281
(0.157) (0.0143) (0.205) (0.0213) (0.216) (0.0175)
DK -0.763*** 0.0670*** -0.411* 0.0892*** -1.071*** 0.0456**
(0.167) (0.0157) (0.212) (0.0228) (0.234) (0.0196)
NL -0.533*** 0.0817*** -0.406** 0.114*** -0.628*** 0.0485***
(0.155) (0.0149) (0.200) (0.0221) (0.210) (0.0175)
BE -0.141 0.0340** 0.0460 0.0505*** -0.235 0.0183
(0.151) (0.0133) (0.201) (0.0193) (0.208) (0.0160)
DE -0.447*** 0.0102 -0.141 0.0455** -0.668*** -0.0189
(0.151) (0.0130) (0.198) (0.0200) (0.215) (0.0148)
FR -0.454*** -0.0153 -0.107 -0.0231 -0.808*** -0.00898
(0.160) (0.0119) (0.220) (0.0171) (0.212) (0.0151)
CH -0.572*** 0.0180 -0.0967 0.0124 -0.927*** 0.0208
(0.179) (0.0156) (0.245) (0.0231) (0.242) (0.0199)
AT -0.0319 -0.0577*** 0.242 -0.0468** -0.273 -0.0667***
(0.204) (0.0119) (0.263) (0.0193) (0.294) (0.0135)
ES -0.0929 -0.0877*** 0.245 -0.114*** -0.373 -0.0672***
(0.261) (0.00993) (0.367) (0.0137) (0.349) (0.0133)
CZ -0.474*** -0.0103 0.0529 -0.00197 -0.882*** -0.0127
(0.182) (0.0144) (0.236) (0.0215) (0.258) (0.0176)
PL -0.432** -0.0336** -0.104 -0.00213 -0.783** -0.0503***
(0.214) (0.0143) (0.282) (0.0235) (0.318) (0.0162)
Wave2 -0.122 -0.0230*** -0.0139 -0.0254*** -0.210* -0.0255***
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VARIABLES hcare care hcare care hcare care
(0.0778) (0.00660) (0.101) (0.00964) (0.121) (0.00843)
Num. of cars per capita 0.0209** 0.0169 0.0204*
(0.00884) (0.0134) (0.0113)
Fin. distress = With great difficulty -0.00323 -0.0191 0.00800
(0.0104) (0.0156) (0.0132)
Leave bequest 0.0345*** 0.0339*** 0.0335***
(0.00685) (0.0100) (0.00897)
Religious organization 0.0839*** 0.0979*** 0.0760***
(0.0104) (0.0165) (0.0130)
Ever siblings 0.0266*** 0.0355*** 0.0193*
(0.00778) (0.0114) (0.0105)
Constant -1.318*** -1.426*** -0.808
(0.361) (0.400) (0.600)
ρ1• -0.125 -0.243** 0.0108
(0.131) (0.122) (0.214)
Observations 3797 22464 1885 10212 1912 12252
Ncluster 16495
loglikelihood -17177 -8242 -8876
Selection Instruments Wald test 121.4 68.05 65.36
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.9: Care to friends, neighbours, other relatives with employment status as endogenous
VARIABLES hcare care nemp hcare care nemp hcare care nemp
All Male Female
Not employed 0.331 0.0725*** 0.390 0.0575* 0.122 0.0990***
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VARIABLES hcare care nemp hcare care nemp hcare care nemp
(0.226) (0.0229) (0.303) (0.0341) (0.414) (0.0314)
Partner never worked -0.315 -0.0291** -0.0225* -0.125 -0.0226 -0.00478
(0.207) (0.0132) (0.0134) (0.212) (0.0148) (0.0125)
Female 0.465*** -0.0349*** 0.167***
(0.0688) (0.00573) (0.00675)
Age 0.00854 -0.00430*** 0.0359*** 0.00343 -0.00386* 0.0338*** 0.0249 -0.00542*** 0.0392***
(0.0138) (0.00134) (0.000777) (0.0189) (0.00208) (0.00110) (0.0239) (0.00183) (0.00108)
Years of education -0.0248** 0.00330*** -0.00919*** -0.0193 0.00284** -0.00605*** -0.0309* 0.00401*** -0.0120***
(0.0101) (0.000837) (0.000731) (0.0125) (0.00116) (0.000935) (0.0166) (0.00117) (0.00108)
Living with partner -0.0854 -0.0661*** 0.0247*** 0.0144 -0.0758*** 0.0105 -0.198 -0.0624*** 0.0343***
(0.106) (0.00977) (0.00880) (0.146) (0.0161) (0.0125) (0.156) (0.0121) (0.0125)
limitations in -0.307*** 0.00246 0.0649*** -0.158 -0.0108 0.0583*** -0.375*** 0.00839 0.0704***
ADLs or IADLs= 1 (0.113) (0.00936) (0.00938) (0.194) (0.0154) (0.0144) (0.142) (0.0118) (0.0127)
limitations with 0.0435 0.00766 0.0493*** -0.0380 0.00165 0.0521*** 0.133 0.0131 0.0464***
daily activities (0.0681) (0.00619) (0.00564) (0.0931) (0.00908) (0.00749) (0.0983) (0.00828) (0.00817)
Chronic diseases 0.106 0.00255 0.0341*** 0.0674 0.00467 0.0303*** 0.147 -0.000578 0.0363***
(0.0662) (0.00602) (0.00545) (0.0882) (0.00885) (0.00719) (0.0972) (0.00814) (0.00793)
Physical inactivity -0.226 -0.114*** 0.0563*** 0.217 -0.131*** 0.0694*** -0.559 -0.102*** 0.0438***
(0.311) (0.00865) (0.0125) (0.497) (0.0128) (0.0179) (0.403) (0.0111) (0.0170)
Real assets -0.0127 -0.00106 -0.00147* -0.0130 -0.00259* -0.00356*** -0.00853 -0.000180 -0.000162
(0.00905) (0.000899) (0.000843) (0.0126) (0.00138) (0.00121) (0.0131) (0.00115) (0.00118)
urban = Big city 0.00467 -0.00968 -0.0185** 0.112 -0.00637 -0.0197* -0.0837 -0.0146 -0.0208*
(0.106) (0.00874) (0.00808) (0.145) (0.0128) (0.0106) (0.152) (0.0110) (0.0115)
urban = Village, rural area 0.0421 -0.0152** 0.0116** 0.00507 -0.00673 0.0144** 0.0669 -0.0217*** 0.00639
(0.0662) (0.00617) (0.00542) (0.0854) (0.00857) (0.00701) (0.0992) (0.00789) (0.00776)
HH size -0.0594 0.0134*** -0.00479 -0.134*** 0.0174*** -0.0174*** 0.0342 0.00818* 0.00838*
(0.0394) (0.00343) (0.00328) (0.0506) (0.00478) (0.00424) (0.0592) (0.00460) (0.00499)
Not labour income (asin) -0.00706 -0.000410 0.00154 -0.0120 -0.000928 0.00155 -0.00300 0.000359 0.000735
103
VARIABLES hcare care nemp hcare care nemp hcare care nemp
(0.0124) (0.00104) (0.000980) (0.0159) (0.00141) (0.00119) (0.0187) (0.00152) (0.00158)
Parent alive -0.0243 -0.0367*** -0.0105** 0.0128 -0.0397*** -0.0104 -0.0485 -0.0342*** -0.00893
(0.0717) (0.00621) (0.00534) (0.0911) (0.00873) (0.00682) (0.107) (0.00791) (0.00765)
Has children -0.0551 -0.0393*** 0.00163 -0.240 -0.0124 0.00894 0.0917 -0.0629*** 0.00490
(0.120) (0.0126) (0.0107) (0.162) (0.0166) (0.0139) (0.186) (0.0170) (0.0157)
Number of children 0.0900*** -0.0103*** 0.00516 0.156*** -0.0131*** -0.00756* 0.0241 -0.00815* 0.0159***
(0.0341) (0.00357) (0.00334) (0.0463) (0.00480) (0.00447) (0.0496) (0.00444) (0.00508)
Has grandchildren 0.0902 -0.0239*** -0.0132* 0.0584 -0.0223** -0.00358 0.0993 -0.0261*** -0.0222**
(0.0860) (0.00782) (0.00678) (0.113) (0.0109) (0.00887) (0.124) (0.0101) (0.00951)
Number of grandchildren -0.0145 -0.00108 0.00783*** -0.0177 -5.51e-05 0.00789*** -0.0123 -0.00180 0.00805***
(0.0183) (0.00179) (0.00171) (0.0238) (0.00261) (0.00236) (0.0256) (0.00225) (0.00226)
SE -1.072*** 0.0597*** -0.193*** -0.565*** 0.0742*** -0.157*** -1.612*** 0.0489** -0.233***
(0.170) (0.0163) (0.0117) (0.216) (0.0228) (0.0156) (0.259) (0.0216) (0.0165)
DK -0.810*** 0.0788*** -0.161*** -0.436** 0.0959*** -0.149*** -1.223*** 0.0627*** -0.183***
(0.177) (0.0171) (0.0127) (0.220) (0.0238) (0.0163) (0.262) (0.0224) (0.0180)
NL -0.557*** 0.0869*** -0.00841 -0.419** 0.118*** -0.0365** -0.686*** 0.0526*** 0.00137
(0.161) (0.0156) (0.0124) (0.204) (0.0224) (0.0158) (0.223) (0.0190) (0.0179)
BE -0.158 0.0352** 0.00787 0.0442 0.0513*** 0.0191 -0.365* 0.0181 -0.0138
(0.155) (0.0139) (0.0121) (0.203) (0.0193) (0.0152) (0.220) (0.0176) (0.0176)
DE -0.459*** 0.0142 -0.0335*** -0.154 0.0488** -0.0468*** -0.807*** -0.0172 -0.0347*
(0.157) (0.0139) (0.0122) (0.202) (0.0203) (0.0154) (0.229) (0.0163) (0.0179)
FR -0.481*** -0.0130 -0.0274** -0.112 -0.0223 0.0117 -0.865*** -0.00429 -0.0659***
(0.166) (0.0126) (0.0117) (0.222) (0.0171) (0.0150) (0.230) (0.0168) (0.0171)
CH -0.625*** 0.0298* -0.126*** -0.128 0.0196 -0.154*** -1.071*** 0.0350 -0.117***
(0.188) (0.0172) (0.0150) (0.255) (0.0245) (0.0191) (0.265) (0.0225) (0.0211)
AT -0.0566 -0.0604*** 0.0790*** 0.249 -0.0481** 0.0692*** -0.374 -0.0718*** 0.0745***
(0.209) (0.0126) (0.0144) (0.265) (0.0192) (0.0185) (0.307) (0.0148) (0.0204)
ES -0.182 -0.0900*** -0.0462*** 0.227 -0.112*** -0.0468*** -0.649 -0.0657*** -0.0563**
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VARIABLES hcare care nemp hcare care nemp hcare care nemp
(0.290) (0.0111) (0.0143) (0.370) (0.0140) (0.0171) (0.414) (0.0165) (0.0228)
CZ -0.503*** -0.00927 -0.0175 0.0369 0.00120 -0.0599*** -0.996*** -0.0221 0.00653
(0.185) (0.0149) (0.0131) (0.238) (0.0219) (0.0173) (0.264) (0.0182) (0.0187)
PL -0.467** -0.0359** 0.0830*** -0.101 -0.00197 0.0561*** -0.934*** -0.0608*** 0.0877***
(0.217) (0.0148) (0.0146) (0.283) (0.0234) (0.0201) (0.326) (0.0169) (0.0201)
Wave2 -0.121 -0.0211*** -0.0257*** -0.0165 -0.0249*** -0.0201** -0.204* -0.0163* -0.0308***
(0.0787) (0.00689) (0.00637) (0.101) (0.00965) (0.00824) (0.119) (0.00907) (0.00925)
Num. of cars per capita 0.0225** -0.0392*** 0.0174 -0.0140 0.0262** -0.0607***
(0.00918) (0.00860) (0.0134) (0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0120)
Fin. distress = -0.00718 0.0331*** -0.0200 0.0362*** -0.000522 0.0314**
With great difficulty (0.0110) (0.00978) (0.0156) (0.0137) (0.0147) (0.0139)
Leave bequest 0.0368*** -0.0178*** 0.0345*** -0.0170** 0.0384*** -0.0180*
(0.00713) (0.00635) (0.0101) (0.00827) (0.00957) (0.00930)
Religious organization 0.0877*** 0.00589 0.0976*** 0.000999 0.0804*** 0.00987
(0.0109) (0.00906) (0.0165) (0.0122) (0.0137) (0.0128)
Ever siblings 0.0275*** -0.00650 0.0355*** -0.00942 0.0206* -0.00567
(0.00808) (0.00773) (0.0113) (0.00999) (0.0111) (0.0112)
Eligibility 0.198*** 0.122*** 0.0913***
(0.0186) (0.0205) (0.0192)
Eligibility x female -0.101***
(0.0128)
Eligibility x number -0.0151*** -0.00440 -0.0323***
of children (0.00448) (0.00517) (0.00595)
Eligibility x female x -0.00789
number of children (0.00549)
Partner eligibility 0.0475*** 0.0276 0.0720***
(0.0136) (0.0177) (0.0180)
Partner eligibility x female 0.0112
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VARIABLES hcare care nemp hcare care nemp hcare care nemp
(0.0114)
Partner eligibility x -0.00784* 0.00288 -0.0172***
number of children (0.00443) (0.00668) (0.00609)
Worse standard of living -0.0473*** -0.0470*** -0.0484***
(0.00758) (0.00998) (0.0109)
Constant -1.236*** -1.328*** -0.684
(0.394) (0.442) (0.728)
ρ•2 ρ•3 ρ•2 ρ•3 ρ•2 ρ•3
ρ1• -0.137 0.0266 -0.242** 0.0540 -0.00621 0.0537
(0.130) (0.0740) (0.122) (0.104) (0.229) (0.133)
ρ2• -0.120** -0.0794 -0.193**
(0.0557) (0.0792) (0.0829)
Observations 3685 21216 21216 1885 10212 10212 1800 11004 11004
Ncluster 15913
loglikelihood -24375 -11509 -12707
Selection Instr. Wald test 122.9 68.59 66.67
p-value 0.000 0 0
Hansen test 17.49 14.42 8.077
p-value 0.355 0.108 0.526
Emp. Instr. Informativity test 87.70 349.7 23.08 128.4 26.28 76.68
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.10: Care to adult children with employment status considered as exogenous
VARIABLES hcare care nr hcare care nr hcare care nr
All Male Female
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VARIABLES hcare care nr hcare care nr hcare care nr
Not employed 0.240** 0.0106 0.00935* 0.154 0.0120 0.0231*** 0.265* 0.00977 -0.00125
(0.103) (0.00763) (0.00522) (0.154) (0.0123) (0.00855) (0.137) (0.00961) (0.00643)
Partner never worked -0.314 -0.00973 -0.00492 -0.214 -0.00528 0.000364
(0.253) (0.0161) (0.00929) (0.264) (0.0184) (0.00998)
Never worked 0.446** 0.00437 0.00228 0.434* -0.00162 -0.00759
(0.212) (0.0163) (0.00924) (0.230) (0.0161) (0.00985)
Female 0.295*** -0.0298*** 0.00322
(0.0908) (0.00548) (0.00325)
Age 0.0188 -0.00315*** 0.00424*** 0.0360* -0.00327*** 0.00448*** 0.00719 -0.00305*** 0.00407***
(0.0121) (0.000796) (0.000556) (0.0187) (0.00123) (0.000829) (0.0145) (0.000965) (0.000654)
Years of education -0.0199 0.00201** 0.00269*** -0.0442** 0.00253* 0.00361*** 0.00194 0.00164 0.00176**
(0.0130) (0.000900) (0.000637) (0.0197) (0.00135) (0.000875) (0.0176) (0.00115) (0.000780)
Living with partner 0.0556 -0.0178* -0.00435 -0.0227 0.00807 -0.0553*** 0.106 -0.0307*** 0.0163**
(0.122) (0.00987) (0.00646) (0.201) (0.0168) (0.0108) (0.156) (0.0119) (0.00732)
limitations in -0.279** 0.0217** -0.00490 -0.403* 0.0236 -0.00764 -0.244 0.0225* -0.00293
ADLs or IADLs= 1 (0.135) (0.0102) (0.00765) (0.243) (0.0182) (0.0134) (0.161) (0.0120) (0.00859)
limitations with -0.0451 0.00169 -0.000475 -0.0800 0.00518 -0.000304 -0.0142 -0.000621 -0.00153
daily activities (0.0800) (0.00644) (0.00448) (0.113) (0.0101) (0.00693) (0.110) (0.00819) (0.00557)
Chronic diseases -0.0769 0.0131** 0.00349 -0.202* 0.0162* 0.00615 0.0572 0.0109 0.00169
(0.0808) (0.00643) (0.00430) (0.119) (0.00980) (0.00679) (0.111) (0.00822) (0.00564)
Physical inactivity -0.494 -0.0763*** -0.0107 -0.395 -0.108*** -0.00416 -0.621* -0.0579*** -0.0155
(0.335) (0.0105) (0.00917) (0.738) (0.0159) (0.0141) (0.350) (0.0132) (0.0106)
Real assets 0.00206 -0.00112 -7.09e-06 0.0173 -0.000729 -0.000208 -0.00471 -0.00122 -0.000214
(0.0121) (0.00107) (0.000822) (0.0180) (0.00168) (0.00122) (0.0160) (0.00119) (0.000899)
urban = Big city -0.0934 -0.0175* 0.00139 0.000696 -0.0117 0.00220 -0.141 -0.0212* 0.00237
(0.140) (0.00990) (0.00714) (0.189) (0.0151) (0.00948) (0.184) (0.0112) (0.00757)
urban = Village, rural area 0.111 -0.00805 -0.00971* 0.173 -0.00314 -0.00457 0.0207 -0.0124 -0.0141**
(0.0849) (0.00674) (0.00519) (0.117) (0.00948) (0.00659) (0.107) (0.00792) (0.00567)
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VARIABLES hcare care nr hcare care nr hcare care nr
Not labour income (asin) -0.0181 0.00177 -0.0152 0.000230 -0.0191 0.00294*
(0.0166) (0.00118) (0.0222) (0.00166) (0.0237) (0.00163)
Number of adult children -0.0789 -0.00697* 0.0543*** -0.0778 -0.00388 0.0600*** -0.0804 -0.00886** 0.0496***
(0.0537) (0.00357) (0.00323) (0.0650) (0.00503) (0.00432) (0.0699) (0.00429) (0.00350)
Number of minor children -0.0532 -0.0169 -0.00789 0.0468 -0.0176 -0.00397 -0.297 -0.0144 -0.0136*
(0.148) (0.0108) (0.00491) (0.168) (0.0127) (0.00571) (0.272) (0.0164) (0.00702)
Employed children -0.231 -0.00966 0.112*** -0.355** 0.0143 0.122*** -0.149 -0.0270** 0.104***
(0.149) (0.0109) (0.00533) (0.181) (0.0152) (0.00680) (0.186) (0.0130) (0.00586)
Children distance -0.0425* -0.00693*** -0.0371 -0.00961*** -0.0465* -0.00483***
(0.0238) (0.00143) (0.0432) (0.00205) (0.0258) (0.00166)
Parent alive -0.0419 -0.00385 0.00381 -0.0856 -0.00517 0.00649 -0.00837 -0.00309 0.00326
(0.0871) (0.00682) (0.00507) (0.121) (0.00935) (0.00673) (0.112) (0.00820) (0.00553)
Has grandchildren 0.282 0.0172 0.159*** -0.0450 0.00357 0.165*** 0.597*** 0.0286** 0.154***
(0.176) (0.0107) (0.0102) (0.194) (0.0150) (0.0127) (0.209) (0.0131) (0.0114)
Number of grandchildren 0.000936 0.00530*** 0.00156 -0.0125 0.00846*** -0.00179 0.0141 0.00321 0.00370
(0.0270) (0.00177) (0.00308) (0.0423) (0.00262) (0.00431) (0.0325) (0.00201) (0.00316)
SE -1.820*** 0.0996*** 0.120*** -1.394** 0.156*** 0.134*** -2.047*** 0.0686*** 0.109***
(0.324) (0.0220) (0.00400) (0.618) (0.0346) (0.00534) (0.309) (0.0244) (0.00440)
DK -1.800*** 0.138*** 0.119*** -1.124 0.211*** 0.133*** -2.290*** 0.0944*** 0.108***
(0.352) (0.0246) (0.00405) (0.717) (0.0379) (0.00526) (0.328) (0.0275) (0.00439)
NL -1.462*** 0.0816*** 0.0987*** -0.918 0.143*** 0.109*** -1.804*** 0.0453** 0.0912***
(0.288) (0.0208) (0.00511) (0.571) (0.0331) (0.00664) (0.283) (0.0224) (0.00538)
BE -1.037*** 0.0986*** 0.0718*** -0.558 0.148*** 0.0773*** -1.270*** 0.0694*** 0.0681***
(0.295) (0.0204) (0.00594) (0.572) (0.0316) (0.00791) (0.279) (0.0224) (0.00626)
DE -1.419*** 0.0366* 0.0913*** -0.996** 0.0764** 0.0975*** -1.635*** 0.0163 0.0861***
(0.267) (0.0194) (0.00556) (0.461) (0.0312) (0.00728) (0.286) (0.0213) (0.00583)
FR -1.800*** -0.0233 0.0880*** -1.421*** 0.00965 0.101*** -1.943*** -0.0397** 0.0774***
(0.301) (0.0160) (0.00526) (0.441) (0.0271) (0.00662) (0.362) (0.0172) (0.00581)
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VARIABLES hcare care nr hcare care nr hcare care nr
CH -1.481*** 0.0113 0.0913*** -0.744 0.0191 0.100*** -1.851*** 0.00939 0.0847***
(0.319) (0.0217) (0.00571) (0.520) (0.0341) (0.00765) (0.354) (0.0247) (0.00592)
AT -1.204*** 0.0404* 0.0691*** -0.669 0.0695** 0.0829*** -1.521*** 0.0262 0.0594***
(0.278) (0.0212) (0.00758) (0.488) (0.0344) (0.00967) (0.291) (0.0236) (0.00845)
ES 0.0516 -0.0967*** 0.0136 0.525 -0.125*** 0.0221** -0.256 -0.0795*** 0.00603
(0.698) (0.0133) (0.00861) (1.432) (0.0195) (0.0110) (0.708) (0.0155) (0.00943)
CZ -0.841*** 0.0490** 0.0209** -0.190 0.0927*** 0.0325*** -1.222*** 0.0280 0.0135
(0.283) (0.0214) (0.00991) (0.532) (0.0345) (0.0126) (0.309) (0.0234) (0.0110)
PL -0.593* -0.00488 -0.0490*** -0.0904 0.00502 -0.0389** -0.931** -0.00895 -0.0547***
(0.331) (0.0195) (0.0139) (0.538) (0.0322) (0.0178) (0.403) (0.0220) (0.0152)
Wave2 -0.257** -0.000972 -0.00124 -0.275* -0.0127 -0.000217 -0.235* 0.00669 -0.00206
(0.106) (0.00789) (0.00560) (0.147) (0.0112) (0.00728) (0.140) (0.00951) (0.00623)
Num. of cars per capita 0.0264** 0.00324 0.0436***
(0.0103) (0.0160) (0.0118)
Fin. distress = -0.00927 -0.00367 -0.0153 -0.00761 -0.00994 -0.000226
With great difficulty (0.0139) (0.00824) (0.0238) (0.0116) (0.0146) (0.00840)
Religious organization 0.0289*** 0.00340 0.0377*** -0.00247 0.0214** 0.00747
(0.00800) (0.00552) (0.0122) (0.00774) (0.00957) (0.00654)
Leave bequest 0.0259** -0.0164** 0.0348* -0.0124 0.0180 -0.0188**
(0.0111) (0.00816) (0.0186) (0.0120) (0.0127) (0.00931)
Ever had siblings 0.0253*** -0.0121** 0.0332** -0.0109 0.0201* -0.0127*
(0.00922) (0.00593) (0.0157) (0.00907) (0.0114) (0.00756)
Number of rooms -0.0126*** -0.0135*** -0.0113***
(0.00162) (0.00216) (0.00179)
Constant 0.629 0.871 0.426
(0.984) (1.933) (0.838)
ρ•2 ρ•3 ρ•2 ρ•3 ρ•2 ρ•3
ρ1• -0.0863 -0.155 -0.129 -0.299 -0.0208 -0.0873
109
VARIABLES hcare care nr hcare care nr hcare care nr
(0.312) (0.225) (0.577) (0.346) (0.241) (0.210)
ρ2• -0.515*** -0.509*** -0.483***
(0.0955) (0.131) (0.134)
Observations 2366 17425 19822 1139 7640 8821 1227 9785 11001
Ncluster 14300
loglikelihood -15562 -7273
Selection Instr. Wald test 35.52 91.35 21.80 63.20 24.80 64.02
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.11: Care to adult children with employmnet status considered asa endogenous
VARIABLES hcare care nr nemp hcare care nr nemp hcare care nr nemp
All Male Female
Not employed 0.124 0.0460* -0.184*** -0.106 0.00338 -0.116** 0.219 0.0707 -0.210***
(0.291) (0.0273) (0.0137) (0.382) (0.0411) (0.0501) (0.365) (0.0449) (0.0114)
Partner never worked -0.310 -0.00993 -0.0112 -0.0271* -0.246 -0.00606 -0.00148 -0.00839
(0.257) (0.0165) (0.01000) (0.0141) (0.268) (0.0182) (0.0102) (0.0132)
Female 0.323*** -0.0342*** 0.0265*** 0.174***
(0.100) (0.00668) (0.00379) (0.00733)
Age 0.0297 -0.00503*** 0.0148*** 0.0383*** 0.0521* -0.00260 0.0119*** 0.0357*** 0.0160 -0.00625** 0.0160*** 0.0409***
(0.0204) (0.00170) (0.000988) (0.000819) (0.0280) (0.00268) (0.00276) (0.00127) (0.0244) (0.00265) (0.000993) (0.00110)
Years of education -0.0187 0.00274*** 0.000444 -0.00699*** -0.0455** 0.00250* 0.00258*** -0.00474*** 0.00723 0.00307** -0.00181** -0.00940***
(0.0138) (0.000956) (0.000683) (0.000818) (0.0198) (0.00136) (0.000959) (0.00109) (0.0195) (0.00135) (0.000888) (0.00119)
Living with partner 0.0364 -0.0172* 0.00635 0.0241** -0.0128 0.00687 -0.0551*** -0.00932 0.0942 -0.0312** 0.0337*** 0.0439***
(0.125) (0.0103) (0.00726) (0.00948) (0.200) (0.0167) (0.0111) (0.0159) (0.167) (0.0132) (0.00849) (0.0125)
limitations in -0.296** 0.0187* 0.00811 0.0569*** -0.384 0.0236 -0.00150 0.0539*** -0.285* 0.0176 0.0137 0.0598***
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VARIABLES hcare care nr nemp hcare care nr nemp hcare care nr nemp
ADLs or IADLs= 1 (0.140) (0.0106) (0.00784) (0.00999) (0.243) (0.0182) (0.0136) (0.0157) (0.172) (0.0129) (0.00929) (0.0131)
limitations with -0.0317 0.00127 0.0101** 0.0467*** -0.0679 0.00561 0.00620 0.0509*** 0.00887 -0.00163 0.0118* 0.0446***
daily activities (0.0816) (0.00674) (0.00476) (0.00607) (0.114) (0.0102) (0.00739) (0.00827) (0.113) (0.00899) (0.00627) (0.00858)
Chronic diseases -0.0727 0.0127* 0.0135*** 0.0385*** -0.191 0.0165* 0.0125* 0.0349*** 0.0707 0.00980 0.0134** 0.0402***
(0.0821) (0.00674) (0.00458) (0.00587) (0.120) (0.00989) (0.00719) (0.00777) (0.116) (0.00900) (0.00624) (0.00837)
Physical inactivity -0.464 -0.0862*** 0.00337 0.0475*** -0.408 -0.107*** 0.00740 0.0652*** -0.592 -0.0711*** -0.00419 0.0306*
(0.377) (0.0107) (0.00974) (0.0131) (0.736) (0.0157) (0.0144) (0.0189) (0.422) (0.0141) (0.0124) (0.0178)
Real assets 0.00179 -0.000920 -0.000617 -0.000634 0.0163 -0.000727 -0.000796 -0.00304** -0.00529 -0.00113 -0.000514 0.000420
(0.0122) (0.00109) (0.000881) (0.000947) (0.0180) (0.00167) (0.00126) (0.00137) (0.0165) (0.00124) (0.000993) (0.00134)
urban = Big city -0.0942 -0.0160 0.000209 -0.0209** -0.00643 -0.0119 0.00180 -0.0163 -0.140 -0.0184 0.000196 -0.0253**
(0.140) (0.0102) (0.00755) (0.00881) (0.190) (0.0149) (0.00957) (0.0117) (0.191) (0.0122) (0.00865) (0.0122)
urban = Village, rural area 0.117 -0.00770 -0.00704 0.0123** 0.182 -0.00284 -0.00144 0.0178** 0.0309 -0.0117 -0.0146** 0.00452
(0.0861) (0.00691) (0.00548) (0.00587) (0.119) (0.00943) (0.00681) (0.00761) (0.110) (0.00847) (0.00639) (0.00832)
Not labour income (asin) -0.0195 0.00143 0.00197* -0.0173 0.000155 0.000925 -0.0226 0.00230 0.00251
(0.0166) (0.00122) (0.00103) (0.0222) (0.00165) (0.00132) (0.0240) (0.00177) (0.00155)
Number of adult children -0.0692 -0.00614* 0.0534*** 0.00782** -0.0790 -0.00308 0.0583*** -0.00822 -0.0731 -0.00936** 0.0499*** 0.0215***
(0.0520) (0.00365) (0.00335) (0.00390) (0.0640) (0.00498) (0.00438) (0.00548) (0.0707) (0.00471) (0.00384) (0.00551)
Number of minor children -0.0619 -0.0185* -0.00281 0.0225*** 0.0342 -0.0188 -0.00277 -0.0109 -0.319 -0.0182 0.00506 0.0629***
(0.147) (0.0110) (0.00511) (0.00722) (0.168) (0.0126) (0.00580) (0.0105) (0.275) (0.0175) (0.00785) (0.0127)
Employed children -0.206 -0.00852 0.119*** 0.0288*** -0.332* 0.0183 0.124*** 0.0292*** -0.153 -0.0311** 0.113*** 0.0262**
(0.146) (0.0113) (0.00574) (0.00819) (0.183) (0.0152) (0.00702) (0.0111) (0.194) (0.0146) (0.00685) (0.0115)
Children distance -0.0438* -0.00698*** -0.0138*** -0.0422 -0.00978*** -0.00641 -0.0452* -0.00430** -0.0181***
(0.0243) (0.00153) (0.00169) (0.0435) (0.00208) (0.00391) (0.0272) (0.00199) (0.00189)
Parent alive -0.0290 -0.00553 -0.00221 -0.00614 -0.0902 -0.00518 0.00246 -0.00548 0.0192 -0.00616 -0.00318 -0.00535
(0.0894) (0.00698) (0.00534) (0.00572) (0.121) (0.00928) (0.00696) (0.00732) (0.117) (0.00874) (0.00623) (0.00804)
Has grandchildren 0.339** 0.0210** 0.160*** -0.00506 -0.0398 0.00799 0.167*** -0.000842 0.650*** 0.0329** 0.150*** -0.0116
(0.164) (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.00740) (0.194) (0.0146) (0.0132) (0.00957) (0.197) (0.0134) (0.0124) (0.0103)
Number of grandchildren 0.00217 0.00562*** 0.00177 0.00850*** -0.00911 0.00826*** 0.000391 0.00959*** 0.0160 0.00388* 0.00222 0.00804***
111
VARIABLES hcare care nr nemp hcare care nr nemp hcare care nr nemp
(0.0275) (0.00184) (0.00303) (0.00182) (0.0415) (0.00263) (0.00438) (0.00252) (0.0344) (0.00219) (0.00332) (0.00245)
SE -1.817*** 0.108*** 0.115*** -0.168*** -1.477** 0.157*** 0.129*** -0.128*** -2.126*** 0.0730*** 0.0995*** -0.215***
(0.333) (0.0233) (0.00624) (0.0134) (0.642) (0.0356) (0.00637) (0.0194) (0.330) (0.0278) (0.00892) (0.0189)
DK -1.795*** 0.145*** 0.121*** -0.138*** -1.197 0.212*** 0.132*** -0.122*** -2.371*** 0.0934*** 0.107*** -0.164***
(0.359) (0.0255) (0.00664) (0.0145) (0.735) (0.0386) (0.00642) (0.0194) (0.346) (0.0294) (0.00934) (0.0205)
NL -1.430*** 0.0823*** 0.0939*** 0.00789 -0.976* 0.143*** 0.104*** -0.00568 -1.836*** 0.0333 0.0855*** 0.00635
(0.295) (0.0217) (0.00659) (0.0134) (0.584) (0.0331) (0.00745) (0.0170) (0.295) (0.0237) (0.00796) (0.0195)
BE -1.020*** 0.0932*** 0.0666*** 0.0204 -0.598 0.147*** 0.0742*** 0.0406** -1.318*** 0.0492** 0.0616*** -0.00666
(0.302) (0.0213) (0.00716) (0.0130) (0.579) (0.0315) (0.00840) (0.0164) (0.298) (0.0240) (0.00895) (0.0191)
DE -1.401*** 0.0331* 0.0842*** -0.0184 -1.058** 0.0767** 0.0905*** -0.0217 -1.693*** 0.000758 0.0793*** -0.0278
(0.278) (0.0200) (0.00700) (0.0134) (0.477) (0.0313) (0.00842) (0.0174) (0.299) (0.0219) (0.00820) (0.0192)
FR -1.782*** -0.0244 0.0838*** 0.0184 -1.484*** 0.0114 0.101*** 0.0621*** -1.977*** -0.0475*** 0.0633*** -0.0250
(0.314) (0.0167) (0.00661) (0.0133) (0.461) (0.0270) (0.00711) (0.0187) (0.384) (0.0182) (0.00871) (0.0190)
CH -1.531*** 0.0135 0.0786*** -0.104*** -0.875 0.0174 0.0893*** -0.135*** -2.001*** 0.00407 0.0724*** -0.0983***
(0.330) (0.0229) (0.00841) (0.0169) (0.548) (0.0348) (0.0102) (0.0221) (0.359) (0.0262) (0.00980) (0.0236)
AT -1.193*** 0.0322 0.0816*** 0.0949*** -0.681 0.0717** 0.0877*** 0.0964*** -1.625*** 0.00261 0.0765*** 0.0819***
(0.293) (0.0221) (0.00826) (0.0157) (0.497) (0.0345) (0.0100) (0.0205) (0.316) (0.0250) (0.0100) (0.0220)
ES -0.387 -0.104*** -0.0103 -0.0574*** 0.401 -0.125*** 0.00538 -0.0521*** -0.907 -0.0863*** -0.0196 -0.0692***
(0.858) (0.0134) (0.0108) (0.0155) (1.483) (0.0189) (0.0137) (0.0188) (0.980) (0.0187) (0.0146) (0.0247)
CZ -0.825*** 0.0448** 0.00904 -0.0199 -0.260 0.0910*** 0.0177 -0.0543*** -1.272*** 0.0104 0.0101 -0.00149
(0.292) (0.0218) (0.0112) (0.0141) (0.543) (0.0345) (0.0150) (0.0187) (0.324) (0.0237) (0.0129) (0.0200)
PL -0.588* -0.0117 -0.0358*** 0.0704*** -0.156 0.00290 -0.0435** 0.0557*** -0.973** -0.0277 -0.0246 0.0692***
(0.344) (0.0198) (0.0138) (0.0154) (0.540) (0.0317) (0.0181) (0.0215) (0.427) (0.0221) (0.0154) (0.0211)
Wave2 -0.284*** 0.000725 -0.00656 -0.0243*** -0.281* -0.0128 -0.00226 -0.0263*** -0.282* 0.0110 -0.00970 -0.0238**
(0.107) (0.00819) (0.00610) (0.00691) (0.147) (0.0111) (0.00749) (0.00894) (0.147) (0.0103) (0.00732) (0.00985)
Num. of cars per capita 0.0285*** -0.0851*** 0.000944 -0.0358** 0.0523*** -0.118***
(0.0108) (0.00946) (0.0159) (0.0172) (0.0137) (0.0118)
Fin. distress = -0.00396 -0.00235 0.0237** -0.0156 -0.00496 0.0202 -0.00102 0.000939 0.0254*
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VARIABLES hcare care nr nemp hcare care nr nemp hcare care nr nemp
With great difficulty (0.0147) (0.00875) (0.0102) (0.0236) (0.0117) (0.0144) (0.0166) (0.00985) (0.0141)
Leave bequest 0.0293*** -0.000255 -0.0127* 0.0372*** -0.00460 -0.0122 0.0218** 0.00252 -0.0127
(0.00834) (0.00587) (0.00698) (0.0120) (0.00787) (0.00910) (0.0104) (0.00737) (0.0100)
Religious organization 0.0279** -0.0126 0.0112 0.0353* -0.0121 0.00593 0.0211 -0.0119 0.0119
(0.0117) (0.00869) (0.00970) (0.0182) (0.0120) (0.0135) (0.0138) (0.0105) (0.0135)
Ever had siblings 0.0296*** -0.0114* -0.00604 0.0324** -0.0104 -0.00638 0.0289** -0.0117 -0.0107
(0.00946) (0.00647) (0.00849) (0.0157) (0.00913) (0.0112) (0.0121) (0.00876) (0.0121)
Number of rooms -0.0140*** -0.00473** -0.0148*** -0.00668*** -0.0126*** -0.00209
(0.00170) (0.00190) (0.00219) (0.00252) (0.00201) (0.00263)
Eligibility 0.176*** 0.137*** 0.0553***
(0.0214) (0.0277) (0.0202)
Eligibility x female -0.102***
(0.0154)
Eligibility x number -0.0114** -0.00952 -0.0201***
of children (0.00545) (0.00666) (0.00708)
Eligibility x female x -0.00681
number of children (0.00655)
Partner eligibility 0.0243* -0.0137 0.0639***
(0.0147) (0.0201) (0.0189)
Partner eligibility x female 0.0144
(0.0116)
Partner eligibility x -0.00311 0.0172** -0.0179***
number of children (0.00509) (0.00827) (0.00667)
Worse standard of living -0.0500*** -0.0544*** -0.0460***
(0.00784) (0.0106) (0.0110)
Constant 0.662 1.016 0.593
(1.008) (1.964) (1.048)
ρ•2 ρ•3 ρ•4 ρ•2 ρ•3 ρ•4 ρ•2 ρ•3 ρ•4
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VARIABLES hcare care nr nemp hcare care nr nemp hcare care nr nemp
ρ1• -0.118 -0.0647 0.0326 -0.107 -0.281 0.101 -0.0831 -0.0298 -0.00191
(0.304) (0.186) (0.101) (0.571) (0.312) (0.132) (0.298) (0.180) (0.129)
ρ2• -0.425*** -0.0997 -0.415*** 0.0265 -0.421*** -0.181
(0.0905) (0.0744) (0.132) (0.107) (0.144) (0.131)
ρ3• 1.127*** 0.690*** 1.437***
(0.104) (0.268) (0.116)
Observations 2286 16420 18668 18668 1139 7640 8821 8821 1147 8780 9847 9847
Ncluster 13758
loglikelihood -21725 -10092 -11449
Wald_test instruments
p-value
Selection Instr. Wald test 36.92 97.86 21.73 75.20 27.48 65.71
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen test 59.38 40.53 23.88
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.0672
Instr. Informativity Test F 36.48 291.0 326.8 17.60 107.0 124.8 5.659 60.77 55.32
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.341 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.12: Difference in allocated time to informal care between not employed
and employed for grandchildren and parents
Male Female
Minutes/week
looking after
grandchildren
Minutes/week
caring for parents
Minutes/week
looking after
grandchildren
Minutes/week
caring for parents
AT 211.22 49.68 177.46 85.41
DE 171.97 31.64 156.87 91.93
SE 79.80 20.40 109.69 49.54
NL 83.89 22.49 134.21 78.68
ES 276.33 34.63 207.80 90.49
IT 322.56 32.02 301.06 139.20
FR 221.65 29.15 240.86 71.54
DK 82.73 20.35 106.05 47.57
CH 140.40 12.73 173.36 53.09
BE 188.44 44.03 243.07 121.63
CZ 218.92 40.34 205.71 68.39
PL 177.69 27.86 262.82 65.17
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Table 2.13: Impact of the simulated pension reform
Male Female
Estimated
individuals
affected by
the reform
Number of
FTE to
look after
grandchil-
dren
Number of
FTE to
care for
parents
Estimated
individuals
affected by
the reform
Number of
FTE to
look after
grandchil-
dren
Number of
FTE to
care for
parents
AT 68,955 6,620 1,557 60,940 4,915 2,365
DE 810,654 63,368 11,661 725,378 51,723 30,311
SE 52,627 1,909 488 66,568 3,319 1,499
NL 116,112 4,427 1,187 35,238 2,149 1,260
ES 243,660 30,605 3,836 39,748 3,754 1,635
IT 272,383 39,937 3,964 196,970 26,955 12,462
FR 197,759 19,924 2,620 173,033 18,944 5,626
DK 22,540 847 208 24,801 1,195 536
CH 29,360 1,873 169 33,259 2,620 802
BE 92,417 7,916 1,849 55,895 6,175 3,090
CZ 39,144 3,895 717 73,831 6,903 2,295
PL 212,728 17,181 2,694 122,675 14,655 3,634
Table 2.14: Descriptive statistics of dependent, independent and instrumental
variables
Variable name Description Mean S.D.
Care to other people dummy (=1) if informal care is provided to other
people
0.1684 0.3742
Hcare to other people Logaritm of hours of care provided to other people -0.2304 1.8206
Not employed dummy (=1) if an individual is not employed
(retired or homemaker)
0.4788 0.4996
Never worked dummy (=1) if a woman has never worked 0.0561 0.2301
Partner never worked dummy (=1) if a man has a wife who never worked 0.0413 0.1989
Female dummy (=1) if gender is female 0.5451 0.4980
Age Age - 60 years (interval: [-10,9]) -0.7793 5.6715
Years of education Years of education 11.070 3.9448
Living with partner dummy (=1) if an individual lives with the partner 0.8251 0.3799
HH size Househould size - 1 1.3756 1.0483
Not labour income
(asin)
Asin trasformation of not labour income 9.2809 2.9345
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Variable name Description Mean S.D.
Care to other people dummy (=1) if informal care is provided to other
people
0.1684 0.3742
Hcare to other people Logaritm of hours of care provided to other people -0.2304 1.8206
Real assets Asin trasformation of held real assets by the
household
10.839 3.6270
urban = Big city dummy (=1) if living in a big city 0.1243 0.3300
urban = Village, rural
area
dummy (=1) if living in a village or a rural area 0.5209 0.4996
limitations in ADLs =
1
dummy (=1) if having limitations in ADLs or in
IADLs
0.1059 0.3077
limitations with daily
activities
dummy (=1) if having limitations with daily
activities
0.3472 0.4961
Chronic diseases dummy (=1) if having chronic diseases 0.3465 0.4759
Physical inactivity dummy (=1) if an individual is physical inactive 0.0593 0.2362
Parent alive dummy (=1) if having at least a parent or
parent-in-law alive
0.5070 0.5000
Having children dummy (=1) if having at least a children 0.9057 0.2922
Number of children Number of children 2.1619 1.3131
Having grandchildren dummy (=1) if having at least a grandchildren 0.5788 0.4938
Number of
grandchildren
Number of grandchildren 1.9143 2.5270
Num. of cars per capita Numbers of cars per capita. The measure is
corrected for individuals living in the household with
less than 18 years old (chlidren and grandchildren).
0.5117 0.3340
Fin. distress = With
great difficulty
dummy (=1) if households have great difficulty to
make ends meet.
0.0831 0.2760
Leave bequest Chance of leaving inheritance more than 50.000
Euros [0,1]
0.5969 0.4216
Religious organization dummy (=1) if partecipating in a religious
organization in the free time.
0.0842 0.2777
Ever had siblings dummy (=1) if having had any siblings 0.8927 0.3095
Number of rooms Number of rooms 4.2158 1.6089
Eligibility dummy (=1) if eligible for a pension 0.4486 0.4974
Eligibility x female dummy (=1) if eligible for a pension, interacted by
gender
0.2321 0.4222
Eligibility x number of
children
dummy (=1) if eligible for a pension, interacted by
number of children
0.9856 1.4166
Worse standard of
living
Chance of standard of living will be worse [0,1] 0.4079 0.3166
Partner eligibility dummy (=1) if partner is eligible for a pension 0.3288 0.4698
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Variable name Description Mean S.D.
Care to other people dummy (=1) if informal care is provided to other
people
0.1684 0.3742
Hcare to other people Logaritm of hours of care provided to other people -0.2304 1.8206
Partner eligibility x
female
dummy (=1) if partner is eligible for a pension
interacted by the gender
0.1083 0.3107
SE Sweden 0.1008 0.3011
DK Denmark 0.0783 0.2687
NL The Netherland 0.1024 0.3032
BE Belgium 0.0996 0.2995
DE Germany 0.1068 0.3089
FR France 0.0984 0.2979
CH Switzerland 0.0466 0.2107
AT Austria 0.0549 0.2279
ES Spain 0.0725 0.2593
CZ Czech Republic 0.0790 0.2697
PL Poland 0.0549 0.2279
Wave 2006-2007 dummy (=1) if the interview was in 2006-07 0.3454 0.4755
Conditional on having a parent or parent-in-law alive
Not coresiding Not coresiding in the same household 0.9424 0.2329
Care to parents dummy (=1) if informal care is provided to parents 0.2800 0.4490
Hcare to parents Logaritm of hours of care provided to parents 0.6614 1.7139
Parent age Age of the oldest parent alive (when the parent is
dead, it is equal to zero)
61.814 36.353
Parent health = Poor dummy (=1) if parent with the worst health has
poor health conditions. Information mainly reported
by the respondents.
0.2834 0.4506
Parent distance Index of geographical distance from the parent alive.
It is assumed that when both parents are alive and
live outside the household, they live together or at
the same distance. The distance is computed as the
log natural of the mean distance between the two
brackets, for instance if parents live at a distance of
less than 1Km, ln(0.5) is computed.
2.0965 2.2152
Parent-in-law age Age of the oldest parent-in-law alive 40.583 41.229
Parent-in-law health =
Poor
dummy (=1) if parent-in-law with the worst health
has poor health conditions.
0.1907 0.3929
Parent-in-law distance Index of geographical distance from the
parent-in-alive.
1.3975 2.0347
Number of siblings Number of siblings alive 2.3944 2.044
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Variable name Description Mean S.D.
Care to other people dummy (=1) if informal care is provided to other
people
0.1684 0.3742
Hcare to other people Logaritm of hours of care provided to other people -0.2304 1.8206
Bequest Chance of receiveing inheritance [0,1] 0.3268 0.3863
Conditional on having at least a grandchild
Care to grandchildren dummy (=1) if informal care is provided to
grandchildren
0.5926 0.4914
Hcare to grandchildren Logaritm of hours of care provided to grandchildren 1.5183 1.6762
Number of
grandchildren
Number of grandchildren 2.2980 2.4970
Granchildren age Mean age of youngest grandchidren. This is a proxy
since only data about the youngest child of a child is
available. The question is asked only for four
children.
6.2847 4.8462
Grandchildren distance Index of geographical distance from the closest
grandchildren
4.5873 2.5993
Ratio male children Ratio of male children 0.4966 0.3342
Conditional on having at least an adult child
Not coresiding Not coresiding in the same household 0.8793 0.3258
Care to adult children dummy (=1) if informal care is provided to adult
children
0.1361 0.3429
Hcare to adult children Logaritm of hours of care provided to adult children 0.4828 1.8209
Number of adult
children
Number of children aged over 18 years old 1.3130 1.1325
Number of minor
children
Number of minor children 0.0902 0.3591
Employed children Ratio of children who are employed. This is a proxy
variables because the question is asked only to a
maximum of 4 children.
0.7357 0.3527
Children distance Index of geographical distance from children 3.2434 2.4101
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3 Estimating the Intertemporal
Elasticity of Substitution on
error-ridden micro data1
3.1 Introduction
The Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution (IES) is a preference parameter that
is of interest to macroeconomists and policy makers, as it represents the willingness
of consumers to respond to predictable changes in the real interest rate. Estimates
of the IES on aggregate data are typically low and often imprecise (see Hall (1988),
for one of the main examples on this); micro-based estimates are instead higher,
typically in the .6-.8 range. In most cases, the literature uses US or UK data. In
this chapter, I estimate the IES from the Euler equation for non-durable consump-
tion using Italian microdata. The consumption data are based on recall questions
and are drawn from the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) from
1991 to 2012. I present estimates from both the log-linearized version of the Euler
equation and the non-linear version, taking into account the presence of measure-
ment error. In particular, I apply two GMM estimators proposed by Alan et al.
(2009) which assume the presence of classical measurement error in the logarithm
of consumption: the first estimator is more efficient if the assumption that the
measurement error is log-normally distributed holds, the second is more robust
but less efficient because no assumption on the error term is made. Given that
a descriptive investigation of the data reveals that recall consumption data from
SHIW are severely affected by heaping and rounding, I argue that measurement
error is likely to be non-classical and apply an imputation technique proposed by
Heitjan and Rubin (1990), following Battistin et al. (2003), to model the coars-
ening process and to impute true consumption expenditures. I further propose a
more flexible technique and an extension to take into account panel information
about the coarsening process, assuming that individuals are more likely to keep
coarsening at the same multiples of consumption. I find strong evidence that the
measurement error cannot be considered coarsened at random and depends on
1The chapter is based on a joint work with Guglielmo Weber (University of Padova).
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the true, unobserved consumption. When estimating the non-linear Euler equa-
tion with reported consumption data, the standard GMM estimator (that ignores
measurement error) and the first estimator proposed by Alan et al. (2009) that
assumes log-normal classical measurement error produce implausible estimates of
the IES (sometimes these estimates are even negative – but most often they are
significantly larger than one). More importantly, the overidentifying restrictions
test typically rejects the null. When I instead use multiple imputations of non-
durable consumption and apply the first Alan et al. (2009) estimator I find precise
estimates in line with the recent micro-based literature (in the 0.5-0.8 range), and
the overidentifying restrictions are not rejected at least if I focus on a sample of
couples. The second estimator proposed by Alan et al. (2009) should be robust to
distributional assumptions of the (classical) measurement error process. However,
by taking one more first difference, it forces the econometrician either to cut the
sample size, or to reduce the instruments set. I chose to cut the instrument set and
keep the same sample size, but this comes at the cost of running out of overidenti-
fying restrictions. Parameter estimates using this method turn out to be similar to
the ones based on the previous method, but less precise and do not change change
much when I use reported or imputed consumption. A final remark is in order: the
log linear approximation of the Euler equation produces estimates of the IES that
are quite close to those obtained by the second, robust GMM method proposed
by Alan et al. (2009), in line with what the Authors report for their US data, and
this holds (pairwise) for both reported and imputed consumption.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the Euler
equation and the estimators used in the empirical analysis. Section 3 presents the
data and a descriptive overview of heaping and rounding in the recall consumption
data from SHIW. Section 4 presents the multiple imputation technique applied to
the data to deal with the problem of heaping and rounding. Then, in Section 5
I present estimation of the IES and in Section 6 I report some robustness checks
using different measures of consumption and a simple matching technique from
diary consumption data. Section 7 concludes with a short discussion.
3.2 Euler Equation
As stressed in Attanasio and Weber (2010), in a life cycle model under uncertainty
household consumption is a complicated function of income, wealth, demograph-
ics, and their stochastic properties. However some preference parameters can be
identified by estimating the first order conditions of the intertemporal optimization
problem.
I consider a standard life cycle model where the individual consumes a single good,
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has time-separable preferences, and holds long and possibly short positions on a
single asset. The first order condition from this problem is
U
′ (Ct) = βEt
[
(1 +Rt+1)U
′ (Ct+1)
]
(3.1)
where Ct is consumption at time t, U
′ (Ct) is the marginal utility of consumption,
β is the discount factor, Rt+1 is the real interest rate. The functional form is:
U (Ct) =
C1−γt
1− γ (3.2)
where γ is the relative risk aversion, 1
γ
is the Inter-temporal Elasticity of Substi-
tution (IES) and γ+12 is the coefficient of relative prudence.
If we substitute (2) in (1), we can rewrite the equation such that we get the
following Euler equation:
Et
[(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ
(1 +Rt+1) β
]
= 1 (3.3)
where the innovation in marginal discount utility is such that Et [t+1] = 1:
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ
(1 +Rt+1) β = t+1 (3.4)
An equation similar to (3) was first tested by Hall (1978) and can be used to
estimate β and γ using a nonlinear GMM method (EGMM). Hansen and Single-
ton (1982) proposed a log-linearized version of the Euler equation to avoid the
difficulties of non linearity from the previous equation. They consider:
∆lnCt+1 = αt+1 +
1
γ
ln (1 +Rt+1) + et+1 (3.5)
where ∆lnCt+1 is the difference between lnCt+1 and lnCt, and αt+1 depends on
the two preference parameters β and γ and on the conditional second moment of
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expected utility in equation (3). While the log linearized equation (AGMM) is
supposed to be more robust to classical measurement error, it does not identify β
and the time variability in αt+1 may cause difficulties in finding valid instruments.
Starting from the standard GMM estimator and assuming a classical measurement
error in lnCt+1 and lnCt, Alan et al. (2009) propose two GMM estimators to deal
with this problem. They consider that reported consumption is multiplied by a
measurement error which is assumed stationary and independent of “everything”
(cot = c∗tηt):
(
cot+1
cot
)−γ
(1 + rt+1) β = t+1
(
ηt+1
ηt
)−γ
(3.6)
The assumption of stationary independence gives the following result:
Et
t+1
(
ηt+1
ηt
)−γ = Et (t+1)Et
(ηt+1
ηt
)−γ (3.7)
= 1 · Et
(ηt+1
ηt
)−γ = κ (3.8)
If reported consumption data is affected by classical measurement error, stan-
dard non-linear GMM estimation (4) would yield inconsistent estimates Amemiya
(1985). If the measurement error is constant ηt = η then κ = 1.
For their first estimator Alan et al. (2009) assume that the measurement error is
log-normal logηt ∼ N (µ, ν):
κ = E
(ηt+1
ηt
)−γ = exp {γ2ν} (3.9)
and they derive the first GMM estimator (GMM-K) where:
u1t+1 =
(
cot+1
cot
)−γ
(1 + rt+1) β − κ (3.10)
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u1t+2 =
(
cot+2
cot
)−γ
(1 + rt+1) (1 + rt+2) β2 − κ (3.11)
To identify the three parameters of the model β, γ, ν, a constant and a single
instrument (a suitably lagged value of the interest rate) is enough to deliver four
orthogonality conditions (thus generating one overidentified restriction). If κ = 1
the assumption of log-normal distribution is not likely to hold and the estimator
is inefficient and can be consistently estimated using the EGMM estimator.
The second estimator (GMM-D) is obtained differencing equations (10) and (11):
ζt+2 =
(cot+1
cot
)−γ
(1 + rt+1) β
−
(cot+2
cot
)−γ
(1 + rt+1) (1 + rt+2) β2
 (3.12)
where Et [ζt+2] = 0 and ζt+2 is uncorrelated with consumption information at time
t − 1 and other information dated t. The GMM-D estimator does not make any
assumption on the error distribution and is more robust even if less efficient. It is
just identified unless lags are used as instruments.
However when consumption data are affected by non classical measurement error,
and in particular they are affected by heaping and rounding, ηt is not independent
of reported consumption. The previous estimators will not provide consistent
estimates of the IES and the discount factor. In section 4 I will suggest a technique
to treat heaped and rounded data.
3.3 Data
The data is drawn from the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW)
run by the Bank of Italy. SHIW is an Italian survey of a representative sample
of the Italian population which contains detailed information about income and
work activities, real and financial wealth and household characteristics. Since 1987
SHIW has added a longitudinal sample whose size increased over time. It contains
also a few questions about expenditure of food, non-durable goods and services
and durable goods. The survey is run every two years, with the only exception
after 1995, when the subsequent wave was run in 1998. The questions related to
expenditures on food and non-durable goods and services are retrospective: there
are mainly two single questions about food and non-durable consumption in a
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typical month of the previous year. This kind of questions is typically characterized
by recall errors. I consider only waves when food and non durable consumption
are elicited with a similar question to avoid reporting differences due to question
wording differences. Non-durable consumption is considered from 1991 to 2012
(11 waves)2 and food consumption is considered from 1991 to 20103.
Then, I consider the corresponding information about consumption collected by the
Italian Institute for Statistics (ISTAT): the Survey of Family Budgets (SFB). SFB
is diary-survey that collects detailed information on expenditure. In particular I
would like to compare information on food and non-durable consumption between
SFB and SHIW and analyze the differences in the amount of reported consumption
between the two data sources. Before comparing consumption data, it is necessary
to make the two surveys comparable and I follow the procedure in Battistin et al.
(2003). While the two surveys are both random samples of the Italian population,
there are differences in sampling techniques and response rates. The differences
are taken into account computing weights for SFB survey using a propensity score
technique Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) with a set of common variables between
the two datasets4.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 report a descriptive overview of the main variables used in the
analysis for the different waves of SFB and SHIW. They include family character-
istics like the region of residence, the number of adults and children by age class,
homeownership and household head characteristics like age, gender, employment
status and education. The averages show that there are small differences across the
SFB and SHIW surveys: SHIW seems to oversample older and larger families. The
weighting procedure for the SFB data on consumption should make the amounts
comparable. If we graphically analyze the distribution of the reported consump-
tion data (Figure 3.1 and 3.2) it is possible to note that there are peaks at round
values in SHIW non durable consumption data, suggesting that the respondents
are likely to round off the true consumption at specific values and heaping seems
to increase with the amount of reported consumption5. Instead for consumption
2In 1987 and 1989 waves the yearly non durable consumption is computed as the sum between
the annualized food consumption in a typical month and the yearly expenditure without food
consumption. In 2012 the question is asked only for a subsample of household heads born
in odd years, while the remaining household heads are asked a set of questions for different
type of expenditures.
3Food expenditure was not asked in 1987. In 1991 and 1993 the question does not explicitly ask
to report for food outside home, but from a comparison between SHIW and SFB, individuals
seems to include it on their consumption expenditure. While in 2012 the expenditure for food
outside the household is asked separately, so it is not considered in the analysis.
4Propensity scores for waves from 1987 to 2012 are reported in Table D.1 in the Appendix.
5The same rounding on the distribution can be found on food consumption data. See Figure
A.1 in Appendix.
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data collected using diary survey, the distribution of consumption is smooth and
it is less affected by the problem of heaping and rounding. If we assume that
true consumption is well represented by diary data collected in SFB, the recall
data collected in SHIW appears severely affected by heaping and rounding and
this error is likely to be non classical. The rounding problem is evident both with
amounts reported in Italian Liras (before 2002) and in Euros (after 2002). Since
we are considering the rounding mechanism, I assume that there is rounding also
in the exchange rate to make the amounts comparable before and after Euro adop-
tion. Indeed also looking at the data it seems that individuals consider a rounded
exchange rate of 1 Euro = 2,000 Italian Liras6. Figure 3.3 reports the proportions
of amounts of non-durable consumption rounded at different multiples before and
after the Euro adoption. The multiples are 100, 500 and 1,000 thousand of Italian
Liras before 2002 and 50, 100 and 500 Euro after 2002. Basically I consider four
categories for the rounding process from those values of consumption which are
not considered as rounded to those which are more likely to be affected by severe
rounding mechanism. The figures show that over time households are more likely
to round amounts at bigger multiples and that the proportion of recall consump-
tion expenditure which is not affected by a rounding problem7 falls from around
10% to around 2%. Figures seem also to suggest that with the Euro adoption,
the rounding could have become more severe: while the proportion of reported
amounts at multiples of 1,000 thousand of Italian Liras and 500 Euro stays almost
the same in the period from 2000 to 2012, households are less likely to report
amounts at 100 thousand of Italian Liras or 50 Euro, but they prefer to round at
multiples of 100 Euro.
The same feature is observed for food consumption data (Figure 3.4), even if the
coarsening process is less severe than the rounding for non durable consumption
because of the lower expenditure in food. The possible correlation between the
size of the rounding mechanism and the value of reported amount of consumption
supports the idea that the measurement error is non-classical and it should be
treated if we want to consistently estimate the Euler equation.
3.4 Multiple imputation technique for heaped and
rounded data
Heitjan and Rubin (1990) propose a multiple imputation procedure to make in-
ference when data is affected by heaping and rounding. The method has been
6The nominal exchange rate is 1 Euro = 1.936,27 Italian Liras.
7The rounding is at multiples of less than 100,000 Italian Liras (50 Euro).
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previously applied to SHIW consumption data of the 1995 wave by Battistin et al.
(2003). The idea is that the rounding process is not random and it depends on the
unknown true value of a given variable. If it was random, the measurement error
could be classical and the GMM estimators proposed by Alan et al. (2009) would
be appropriate. In the previous section I showed that recall consumption data is
affected by heaping and rounding on certain multiples of Lira, before 2002, and on
certain multiples of Euro, after 2002. Basically we observe w, the logarithm of the
heaped value of consumption, while the true value w∗ ∼ f (w∗, θ) is unobserved
where θ is an unknown parameter. I depart from Battistin et al. (2003) and con-
sider a more general and flexible procedure to apply the same method on all the
consumption data from different years and with different currency.
I assume that the coarseness of W can be summarized by a continuous random
variable G∗. The conditional distribution of W given W ∗ and G∗ is degenerate:
f (w|w∗, g∗, z) =
 10 if w = w (w
∗, g∗)
if w 6= w (w∗, g∗) (3.13)
where Z is an exogenous set of observables, mainly household characteristics. Bat-
tistin et al. (2003) consider only three types of rounding where the true value of
consumption lies on a fixed central interval with respect to the reported amount.
I prefer to relax this assumption and instead of modeling more rounding mecha-
nisms, I adapt the size of the interval where the true amount of consumption is.
Basically I consider three multiples where the bigger multiple is linked to a more
severe rounding. I define RL and RE two sets of round-off at different multiples
depending on the currency: the first is 100, 500, 1000 thousand Italian Liras for the
period before 2002, the second is 50, 100 and 500 Euro for the period after 2002.
The maximum difference between reported and true consumption is assumed to
be proportional to the true unknown consumption data. For each currency, the
multiples are respectively R1, R2, R3 and they are such that:
exp (w) ∈ R1 ⇒ |exp (w∗)− exp (w) | ≤ 0.10 · exp (w∗) (3.14)
exp (w) ∈ R2 ⇒ |exp (w∗)− exp (w) | ≤ 0.15 · exp (w∗) (3.15)
exp (w) ∈ R3 ⇒ |exp (w∗)− exp (w) | ≤ 0.20 · exp (w∗) (3.16)
where the heaped value of consumption is within an interval of the true value of
consumption which becomes wider at higher values of true consumption and when
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preferences for rounding are for bigger multiples. Hence, if two individuals have the
same preferences to report amount at a specific multiple, the heaping and rounding
correction will be lower (higher) for lower (higher) amounts of consumption. For
instance with this flexible procedure it is possible to correct heaping and rounding
also when the household head thought about consumption in weekly terms and
reported monthly consumption by multiplying by four without modeling a specific
rounding mechanism8.
Then, I define H (w) as the inverse image of w, such that the set of couples
(W ∗, G∗) are consistent with the value w. G∗ is not directly observed but it can
be inferred by the coarsened value w. The posterior distribution of θ is
f (θ|w, z) =
ˆ
f (θ|w∗, z) f (w∗|w, z) dw (3.17)
The imputation scheme needs f (w∗|w, z) to be implemented or alternatively the
joint posterior distribution (g∗, w∗): f (g∗, w∗|w, z), which is used to take draws of
w∗.
The joint posterior distribution can be written as:
f (g∗, w∗|w, z, ψ, ξ) ∝ f (w∗|z, ψ) f (g∗|w∗, z, ξ) f (w|g∗, w, z, ξ) (3.18)
where ψ : f (w∗, z|ψ) and ξ : f (g∗, w|w∗, z, ξ). Since the values of true consump-
tion w∗i and heaping type g∗i determine together the observed heaped amount of
consumption w, I have that:
f (w|g∗, w∗, z, ξ) =
n∏
i=1
δ (g∗i , w∗i , wi) (3.19)
where
δ (g∗i , w∗i , wi) =
 10 if (g
∗
i , w
∗
i ) ∈ H (wi)
otherwise
(3.20)
8See for instance peaks at 800 and 1,200 Euro or thousands of Italian Lira on SHIW reported
consumption in the first column of Figure 3.1 and 3.2.
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Consequently, the distributions that need specification to multiply impute true
consumption w∗ are first f (w∗|z, ψ) and f (g∗|w∗, z, ξ), and second the prior dis-
tribution for ψ and ξ.
Rubin (1987) defines three tasks to create multiple imputations: the modeling
task, which specifies a model to predict missing values, the estimation task, which
defines the posterior distribution, and the imputation task, which draws missing
values given estimated parameters and observed values.
MODELING TASK
In rounded-data problems, g is known or observed, and f (g∗|w∗, z, ξ) is implicitly
considered to be free of w∗ with ξ a priori independent of ψ. When there is
uncertainty about g∗, the situation is more realistic as argued by Heitjan and
Rubin (1990). The model used to predict true consumption is the class of normal
linear regression models:
w∗i |zi, ψ ∼ N
(
β0 + β1zi, σ2
)
(3.21)
where the independence across units given parameters is assumed. The model for
the heaping type is considered independent of the covariates z, too, and I assume
that it is a function of the true consumption:
g∗i |w∗i , zi, ξ ∼ N
(
η0 + η1w∗i , τ 2
)
(3.22)
where ξ = (η0, η1, log (τ)). In my case the model for the heaping type is an ordered
three-category probit regression on true consumption.
The resulting model specification given observed z and unknown model parameters
Φ (β0, β1, log (σ) , η0, η1log (τ)) is a bivariate normal distribution for the unobserved
(g∗i , w∗i ):
(
g∗i
w∗i
|Φ
)
∼ N
([
η0 + η1β0 + η1β1zi
β0 + β1zi
]
,
[
τ 2 + η21σ2 η1σ2
η1σ
2 σ2
])
(3.23)
ESTIMATION TASK
130
3.4 Multiple imputation technique for heaped and rounded data
The bivariate normal distribution f (g∗i , w∗i |Φ) is unobserved. To impute the true
value of consumption and the heaping preferences, it is necessary first to estimate
the parameters Φ. The posterior distribution is:
f (Φ|w, z) ∝
n∏
i=1
ˆ
H(wi)
f (g∗i , w∗i |Φ) dg∗i dw∗i (3.24)
The posterior distribution is approximated using standard large-sample normal
approximation with mean equal to the posterior mode Φˆ and variance-covariance
equal to the negative inverse of the second derivative of the log posterior. Basically,
in the estimation task, Φˆ is obtained from the maximization of the log-likelihood of
a bivariate normal distribution where the logarithm of reported consumption value
is regressed on household characteristics and the observed heaping preferences are
regressed on the estimated true log consumption and on a set of instruments which
are supposed to affect the heaping type and not the value of consumption. Results
of these estimation procedures are reported in Table 3.6 for waves from 1993 to
20129. In all waves it is possible to observe that the rounding process is not random
and is more relevant for high values of consumption.
In the equation for the heaping type a set of instruments are added to avoid iden-
tification by functional form Rubin (1987). The instruments for the heaping type
are the payment methods used by the respondents and information provided by
the interviewer like the duration of the interview and the respondent’s understand-
ing of the questions. It is remarkable that in 2002 and 200410 household heads
who had a better ability to report amounts in Euros have a higher propensity to
round at bigger multiples. This confirms the results from the graphical analysis
of the coarsening process which showed that over time rounding became more
widespread.
IMPUTATION TASK
The imputation task is the final step to jointly multiple impute the true value of
consumption and the heaping preferences. Given both a drawn value of Φ from the
estimation task and the fixed observed (w, z), (g∗i , w∗i ) are independent confined
bivariate normals. I draw (g∗i , w∗i ) from the bivariate normal distribution (24)
and if δ (g∗i , w∗i , wi) = 1 I consider w∗i as a good imputed value for wi, otherwise
another set of (g∗i , w∗i ) is drawn until it satisfies the constraint defined in (14) -
9The table reports only Φˆ for non durable consumption with the panel imputation technique.
The cross section estimations do not differ much and they are reported in Table B.1 of
Appendix section, as estimations for food consumption which are reported in Table A.1 and
A.2 respectively for the panel and cross section method.
10In the following waves the interviewer was not asked anymore about the ability of the respon-
dent to report amounts in Euros.
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(16).11The imputation task is repeated m = 100 times, so we will have 100 sets of
true consumption values and heaping preferences for each wave.
3.4.1 Recursive multiple imputation technique
In the existing literature on heaping and rounding, only a cross section dataset was
considered. In this case we are interested in the consumption of panel households.
Therefore I use the additional information from the previous interview to predict
the heaping type during the current interview. I consider that a household head
has preferences about the type of coarsening and is more likely to round at the
same multiples across different waves. In particular I consider the imputed type
of heaping in the previous wave:
g∗i,t−1 =
 gIMPi,t−10 if t ≥ t0 + 1if t = t0 (3.25)
where gIMP is the true imputed rounding, t stays for the current wave and t0 is
the first wave when the household participated at the survey. Then, I consider a
different version of equation (22) such that:
g∗i,t|w∗i,t, zi,t, ξt, g∗t−1 ∼ N
(
η0,t + η1,tw∗i,t + ρtg∗t−1, τ 2t
)
(3.26)
The coarsening process depends on the current level of consumption and on the
previous type of coarsening. The coarsening process in the previous wave can be
of four different types: no coarsening, coarsening at multiples of 50, coarsening
at multiples of 100, and coarsening at multiples of 500 Euro12. According to this
assumption, the bivariate normal distribution (23) will change as well.
11The process is repeated maximum 1,000 times. In most cases less than 0.5% of the imputed
values do not satisfy the constraint. The flexible intervals make the imputation task only
slightly faster. In the degenerate case where the intervals are unconstrained, the first draw
is a good imputed value, and the imputation task would give values of consumption as if
consumption was missing.
12Before 2002, the multiples are respectively of 100, 500, 1000 thousand of Italian Liras. In
2002 the change of the currency affects also the preferences of rounding at a specific multiple.
I decide to consider also in this case the previous imputed type of heaping, because the
coarsening is comparable for amount of 50 and 500 Euro with a rounded exchange rate of
1 Euro equals to 2,000 Italian Liras. Instead the rounding at 500,000 Italian Liras (which
corresponds to 250 Euro) is not that common after the Euro adoption and household heads
seem to prefer rounding at multiples of 100 Euro.
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In Table 3.6 I show that the imputed type of heaping at the previous wave is useful
to predict the type of rounding at the current wave13. In particular a preference
of rounding at bigger multiples is related to a higher propensity to round at the
bigger multiples also in the current wave. This supports the idea that individuals
are more likely to round at same multiples. This is important especially when the
amount of consumption is stable across time.
3.4.2 Analysis of imputations
To validate the imputed values of consumption, I provide a graphical and descrip-
tive overview of the multiple imputations and a comparison with the recall data
from SHIW and diary data from SFB. In the third column of Figure 3.1 and 3.2,
I report the average of the distributions from 100 implicates of the recursively
imputed non durable consumption for each wave. The multiple imputation tech-
nique is particularly effective to treat the problem of heaping and rounding, even
if the distribution is not as smooth as the one using SFB data. In particular if
we analyze the cumulative distribution functions of the reported non durable con-
sumption from SHIW and the imputed one (Figure 3.3), it is possible to note that
the procedure solves the problems of heaping in the distribution.
As it was previously found by Battistin et al. (2003) using 1995 data from SHIW
and SFB, there is under reporting for non durable consumption in SHIW. The
under reporting is a common problem for all the SHIW waves that I consider,
both for food14 and non durable consumption (see Table 3.4 and 5), even if for
food consumption the under reporting is much lower.
Using a more flexible procedure in the imputation technique, I am able to partly
reduce the under reporting problem, without using any information from SFB
dataset. In Section 6 I am going to use a simple matching technique, as robustness
check, to multiply impute non durable consumption from SFB to SHIW dataset
with a set of common variables. The simple matched non durable consumption is
not affected by the problem of heaping and rounding and also of under-reporting,
but with this procedure the differences in consumption between waves are mainly
related to changes in household characteristics.
13The heaping type is not significant in the 1993 wave. However this can be explained by the
small size of the panel sample in the older waves.
14Only in 1995 SHIW and SFB distributions for food consumption are very similar.
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3.5 Estimation of IES
For the empirical estimation of the IES and the discount factor I consider four
different estimators: the log-linear Euler equation estimator (AGMM), the non-
linear GMM estimator (EGMM) and the two GMM estimators proposed by Alan
et al. (2009) which take into account the classical measurement error assuming that
it has a log-normal distribution (GMM-K) or without assuming any distribution
(GMM-D). These estimators are applied to different non-durable consumption
data: the reported value of consumption from SHIW, the multiple imputations of
the true non-durable consumption obtained using both the panel and cross section
methods. The main sample consists of 7,069 households that are observed at least
for three consecutive waves and at most 11 waves with household heads aged 25
to 80 (20,995 observations).
Before applying the various estimators it is necessary to adjust them to consider
that the period between each wave is of two years with the exception between 1995
and 1998 when the elapsed period is three years. So we change equation (3) to the
following one:
Et
[(
Ct+pi
Ct
)−γ
(1 +Rt+1) (1 +Rt+2) (1 +Rt+3)d1995,t β(2+d1995,t)exp
(
4x′t+piθ
)]
= 1
(3.27)
where pi is the years passed from a wave to the previous one and d1995,t is a dummy
variable which is equal to one when time t is 1995, x is a set of demographic
variables and θ a vector of additional parameters to estimate. The demographic
variables are useful to capture the differences in the marginal utility of consump-
tion, and they are the number of adults, the number of children and the number
of earners inside the household. According to this definition of the Euler equation,
the log-linear version and the GMM estimators proposed by Alan et al. (2009) can
be straightforwardly derived. I also assume that the households face a common
real interest rate series based on the Italian 1-year Treasury bill rates (BOT) net
of inflation15.
Estimations of the Euler equations are reported in Table 3.6 for three measures of
consumption (reported, panel and cross imputed non durable consumption) and
the four estimators. In the columns I report the IES,1/γ, the discount factor,
β, and the parameters for the demographic changes between waves which are all
considered endogenous. As instruments I consider a convenient lagged measure for
15The series of the real interest rate is yearly aggregated following Hall (1988).
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the real interest rate and the number of adults, children and earners at previous
waves. The number of the observations is lower only for the log-linear estimator
(14,233) because it requires more lagged instruments.
Results show that when the heaped and rounded non-durable consumption is used
the estimated IES is greater than 1 for the nonlinear GMM estimator and GMM-
K. Instead the log-linear and the robust estimator proposed by Alan et al. (2009)
(GMM-D) give an estimation of the IES between 0.7 and 0.8. However the over-
identifying restrictions16 are strongly rejected17. When the panel imputed data
from consumption are used, I estimate the Euler equations for each single implicate
independently18 and combine estimates adjusting the standard errors according to
Rubin (1987). The estimated IES is in the 0.7-0.9 range, but the estimates are
slightly more imprecise because of the variability of the multiple imputations. Also
in these cases the tests of over-identifying restrictions are highly rejected but the
size of the rejection is much lower. The use of panel or cross imputed non durable
consumption provides similar results. At the same time the recursive imputation
technique helps to improve the estimation of the rounding preference especially for
long-panel households.
The rejection of the over-identifying restrictions can be motivated by problems
with the choice of the instruments and their weakness, or by the failure of the
assumption that the Euler equations hold every period for some households. I test
both cases: first considering only a subsample of couples who should be less likely
to be liquidity constrained and then considering the Euler equation without the
number of earners as an endogenous demographic variable.
In Table 3.7 estimations only for couple households are replicated. When the re-
ported consumption data are used results are similar. Instead multiple imputations
of non-durable consumption provide estimates of the IES in the 0.55-0.72 range for
the different estimators and in particular the test of over-identifying restrictions
for the GMM-K is not rejected. These results suggest that for households with
single members the Euler equation does not hold across time. But the implausible
16The reported test is a geometric average of all the computed tests. For AGMM and EGMM
estimators the test has three degrees of freedom, while for GMM-K they are only two.
17Except for the GMM-D estimator because it is just identified. To test over-identifying re-
strictions also for the GMM-D it is necessary to use more lagged instruments at the cost of
losing observations. I prefer to keep the nonlinear GMM estimators comparable applying the
estimation to the same sample.
18I exclude estimations of the Euler equations when the estimation did not converge or produced
an implausible estimate. An implausible estimate is defined as the case when the ratio
between the maximum and minimum eigenvalue is over 200,000. This is a high value chosen
to prevent the selection of only the best results because of the variability in the multiple
imputation technique or by the weakness of the instruments. The maximum number of
considered estimations is 100 and it is reported in column m.
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estimates of the IES are mainly caused by the non classical measurement error.
When the multiple imputation technique is applied, the measures of non-durable
consumption are “cleaned” from the heaping and rounding but they are still af-
fected by classical measurement error, so the GMM-K estimator is appropriate
to efficiently estimate the IES. At the same time AGMM and GMM-D estima-
tors are robust and provide plausible estimates of the IES also when the reported
consumption data are considered.
In addition to the IES, I show estimates of the discount factors and other de-
mographic parameters. When the GMM-K and GMM-D estimators are used the
estimated discount rate lies in the 0.025-0.026 range and it is precisely estimated
for different measures of consumption, while EGMM provides more imprecise es-
timates with higher values of discount rate: more than 4% using the reported
expenditures, or more than 9% when using the multiple imputations. The number
of adults, children and earners are positively associated with consumption growth,
with imprecise estimates when GMM-D is used.
Finally I report estimates where the number of earners is excluded from the set
of endogenous variables (see Table 3.8). The exclusion does not seem to affect
estimations.
3.6 Robustness checks
In this section I estimate the Euler equations using the previous four estimators
and alternative measures of the consumption data: food consumption and another
definition of non-durable consumption which includes rents and non-monetary
transfers. Then I consider another technique to multiply impute non-durable con-
sumption and solve the problem of under-reporting. The method is based on a
simple matching technique from the SFB data.
Food consumption is often considered as a proxy for total non-durable consump-
tion. The necessary assumption to use food instead of non-durable consumption
to estimate the IES is that the utility from food and other consumption goods
is separable. We make this assumption too. As I showed in Section 3 also food
consumption data from SHIW are affected by heaping and rounding, hence also
in this case the multiple imputation technique should be applied. I estimate the
Euler equation using the reported food consumption and multiple panel imputed
data (see Table 3.9). Results show that the EGMM and GMM-K estimators do not
provide reliable estimates of the IES which takes even negative values, also when
the panel imputed food expenditures are used or when only couple households are
analyzed. While the GMM-D estimator is more robust, the estimated IES has a
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value slightly greater than 1. Instead the discount factor is well estimated in all
three estimators, but less precisely for EGMM. The poor estimation of the IES
using food consumption is not a new result: Attanasio and Weber (1995) find it
using US data from the Consumer Expenditure (CEX) survey. In particular they
show that food is a necessity and preferences are non-separable between food and
other non-durable consumption.
Attanasio and Weber (1995) include also a definition of non-durable consumption.
The various components they have considered are: food at home and away from
home, and other non-durable goods and services excluding housing, health and
education expenditure. In SHIW dataset non-durable consumption is asked in
a single question and it explicitly asks to excludes durables and rents. If we
define a different measure of non-durable consumption such that we include also
rents and non-monetary transfers, we add to the heaped and rounded data other
expenditures19. The Euler equations are estimated using reported amounts and
the four GMM estimators. Results are reported in Table 3.10 and they show
that the problem of heaping and rounding is less important for estimating the
IES. The size of the over-identifying restrictions test is smaller with respect to the
same estimations on non-durable consumption without rents and non monetary
transfers. The difference with respect to the previous results can be explained by
the role of rents and house prices or also by the reduction of the size of non-classical
measurement errors because of the sum of several variables.
All the previous measures of consumption do not consider the problem of under
reporting of SHIW consumption data with respect to the SFB data. I consider
another measure of consumption based on multiple imputations of true consump-
tion using a simple matching technique from SFB data. The method consists of
modeling non-durable consumption over several covariates on SFB data (validated
data) and the estimates are used to multiply impute true non-durable consump-
tion in SHIW (unvalidated data). This procedure has been applied in Battistin
et al. (2003) and it is related to previous techniques (i.e. Lee and Sepanski (1995);
Brownstone and Valletta (1996)) that use validated data to obtain a reliable es-
timate of the unvalidated data or its measurement error. Basically the procedure
considers jointly the data from SFB and SHIW and a common set of covariates.
Then, the common set of variables are regressed on the consumption expenditure
from SFB (see Table C.1) and some predictions are made on the consumption data
from SHIW. After that a set of 100 imputed values are generated starting from
the predictions made with the simple matching technique.
Estimations of the Euler equations are reported in Table 3.11 also for the subsample
19These expenditures could be also affected by problems of heaping and rounding, but we assume
they do not.
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of couples: the estimated IES for AGMM and GMM-D are over 1, and the GMM-
K does not perform well mainly because the assumption of log-normal distribution
of the classical measurement error does not hold; instead the standard non-linear
GMM estimator (EGMM) gives an estimated IES in the 0.5-0.6 range without a
rejection of the over-identifying restrictions, but the estimated discount factor is
under estimated.
This method allows to solve the problem of under reporting in SHIW consumption
data and is not affected by heaping and rounding, but it does not use any infor-
mation from the reported amount of consumption. Hence, the change between
waves of the non-durable consumption is mainly driven by changes in individual
and household characteristics.
3.7 Conclusions
In this chapter I have estimated the Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution (IES)
using Italian microdata. Consumption data from SHIW are severely heaped and
rounded at specific multiples of thousand of Italian Liras before 2002 or Euros after
2002. I show that coarsening mechanism is positively correlated with the true
unobserved non-durable consumption and that coarsening increased after Euro
adoption. Estimating the Euler equation with nonlinear GMM model provides
inconsistent estimates when the consumption data are affected by non-classical
measurement error Amemiya (1985).
I have presented a multiple imputation technique to model and treat the problem
of heaping and rounding. Then I have extended the technique to keep into account
the panel feature of the data, suggesting a recursive technique where the imputed
rounding at the previous wave is used to improve prediction of the current type of
rounding.
To estimate the IES I consider the log-linearized version of the Euler equation,
the standard nonlinear version and two GMM estimators proposed by Alan et al.
(2009) that consider only a classical measurement error. When recall consump-
tion data are used, the nonlinear GMM estimator and the efficient estimator of
Alan et al. (2009) (GMM-K) which assumes log-normal distribution of the classi-
cal measurement error produce implausible estimates that are related to the size
of the measurement error and lead to rejection of the over-identifying restrictions.
When the heaping and rounding in the consumption data are treated, the mul-
tiple imputation produce estimates in the 0.5-0.8 range and the over-identifying
restrictions are not rejected at least for the GMM-K estimator and when I focus
on a sample of couples. Instead the AGMM and the robust estimator of Alan
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et al. (2009) (GMM-D) which does not make any assumption on distribution of
the measurement error are more robust but less efficient. Remarkably, estimates
do not change much when the reported and multiple imputations are used.
I suggest that it is important to treat the non-classical measurement error with
a multiple imputation method. The method is flexible and it is not necessary to
model explicitly all the possible rounding preferences. Then, results show that
the imputed true expenditures are still affected by classical measurement error
that is likely to have a log-normal distribution, so the first estimator proposed
by Alan et al. (2009) jointly with the imputation technique is the best method to
estimate consistently the IES. This method provides also plausible estimates of the
discount rate in the 0.025-0.026 range. For the estimation of the IES considering
the recursive method does not seem to improve results, but this could be effective
especially for long panel data, and especially in the last waves of SHIW because
the panel sample is greater.
A limitation of the multiple imputation procedure is that the “cleaning” of the
data from heaping and rounding depends on the importance of rounding in the
data. From SHIW consumption it can be shown that long panel households are
more likely to report the same amount of consumption for several consecutive
waves, especially after Euro adoption. In some cases the variation in consumption
growth is mostly noise and the technique may fail to solve the problem of heaping
and rounding for the lack of changes in reported consumption.
Using food consumption as an alternative measure of non-durable consumption
which is less affected by under-reporting produces implausible estimates of the
IES (sometimes even negative). Then, imputing non-durable consumption from a
validated data source like SFB with a simple matching technique provide a solution
to the problem of under reporting and heaping. Plausible estimates of the IES are
given by the nonlinear GMM estimator. Anyway this method does not use any
information about the reported consumption of the household and consumption
growth is mainly caused by changes in individual and family characteristics.
Further extensions of the multiple imputations technique could be developed and
tested. It could be possible to consider a full panel technique but at the cost
of assuming that rounding preferences are constant over time. Or a Sequential
Regression Multiple Imputation (SRMI) can be applied. The SRMI procedure
was suggested by Raghunathan et al. (2001). The method consists of running
sequential regressions to estimate the parameters of interest used to draw the
imputed values. After a first step, multiple imputations are used as a complete
dataset and the estimation procedure is run again, until the estimates converge.
In the analysis this method may provide an improvement of the estimation task
because the estimated parameters will be less related to reported consumption
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which is used as a proxy for the unknown true consumption.
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Figure 3.1: Figures of non durable consumption distribution for each wave from
1991 to 2000
SHIW SFB weighted Average SHIW imputations
1991
1993
1995
1998
2000
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Figure 3.2: Figures of non durable consumption distribution for each wave from
2002 to 2010
SHIW SFB weighted Average SHIW imputations
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
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Figure 3.3: Cumulative distribution functions of reported and imputed non durable
consumption from SHIW and reported consumption from SFB
1991 1993 1995
1998 2000 2002
2004 2006 2008
2010 2012
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Figure 3.4: Rounding at different multiples for reported food consumption before
and after Euro adoption
Figure 3.5: Rounding at different multiples for reported non durable consumption
before and after Euro adoption
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Table 3.1: Sample differences of main variables between SFB and SHIW survey by wave from 1989 to 2000
Variables 1989 1991 1993 1995 1998 2000
SFB SHIW SFB SHIW SFB SHIW SFB SHIW SFB SHIW SFB SHIW
Number of members 18-24 0.0853 0.0941 0.0822 0.0863 0.0781 0.0864 0.0799 0.0790 0.0665 0.0647 0.0619 0.0610
Number of members 25-39 0.2047 0.1974 0.2089 0.2046 0.2181 0.2077 0.2197 0.2120 0.2198 0.2138 0.2157 0.2079
Number of members 40-59 0.2508 0.2486 0.2514 0.2496 0.2485 0.2336 0.2533 0.2404 0.2499 0.2403 0.2516 0.2475
Number of members 60-69 0.1570 0.1688 0.1567 0.1542 0.1550 0.1445 0.1465 0.1472 0.1584 0.1525 0.1548 0.1476
Number of members 70+ 0.1505 0.1483 0.1603 0.1681 0.1629 0.1866 0.1648 0.1949 0.1862 0.2056 0.1937 0.2160
Central Italy 0.1907 0.1926 0.1943 0.2007 0.1949 0.1873 0.1937 0.1825 0.1855 0.1906 0.1854 0.1948
Southern Italy 0.3360 0.3289 0.3361 0.3229 0.3345 0.3214 0.3307 0.3322 0.3163 0.3292 0.3138 0.3363
Number of children 0-5 0.0433 0.0389 0.0408 0.0378 0.0379 0.0417 0.0379 0.0384 0.0337 0.0326 0.0353 0.0335
Number of children 6-14 0.0719 0.0685 0.0639 0.0646 0.0622 0.0668 0.0619 0.0615 0.0575 0.0659 0.0601 0.0614
Number of children 15-17 0.0303 0.0317 0.0297 0.0309 0.0296 0.0293 0.0268 0.0236 0.0214 0.0225 0.0204 0.0219
Number of children 18+ 0.1126 0.1295 0.1140 0.1374 0.1172 0.1340 0.1278 0.1409 0.1269 0.1274 0.1209 0.1225
At least 2 members 0.7889 0.8268 0.7763 0.8179 0.7766 0.8247 0.7946 0.8169 0.7842 0.7931 0.7548 0.7913
At least 3 members 0.5479 0.5787 0.5320 0.5808 0.5322 0.5783 0.5477 0.5628 0.5052 0.5252 0.4931 0.5109
At least 4 members 0.3255 0.3416 0.3109 0.3422 0.3110 0.3430 0.3263 0.3282 0.2654 0.2941 0.2717 0.2857
Gender (male) 0.7848 0.8161 0.7755 0.7978 0.7764 0.7855 0.7818 0.7806 0.7683 0.7717 0.7560 0.7738
Age 18-24 0.0110 0.0109 0.0083 0.0093 0.0080 0.0070 0.0073 0.0050 0.0057 0.0043 0.0057 0.0067
Age 25-39 0.2265 0.2114 0.2243 0.1999 0.2230 0.2144 0.2139 0.2022 0.1985 0.1966 0.1937 0.1860
Age 40-59 0.3954 0.4058 0.3891 0.3999 0.3855 0.3952 0.3982 0.3931 0.3762 0.3864 0.3823 0.3896
Age 60-69 0.1937 0.2074 0.1954 0.1966 0.1952 0.1760 0.1870 0.1887 0.1965 0.1853 0.1905 0.1816
Age 70+ 0.1728 0.1645 0.1825 0.1942 0.1871 0.2073 0.1929 0.2110 0.2188 0.2273 0.2239 0.2359
Head unemployed 0.0153 0.0082 0.0141 0.0130 0.0204 0.0202 0.0249 0.0367 0.0286 0.0399 0.0262 0.0280
Head out of labor force 0.4113 0.3899 0.4220 0.4125 0.4332 0.4273 0.4445 0.4435 0.4887 0.4498 0.4771 0.4618
Education ≥ 8 0.4770 0.5218 0.5159 0.5320 0.5416 0.5426 0.5705 0.5641 0.6140 0.6138 0.6359 0.6200
Education ≥ 13 0.2219 0.2839 0.2500 0.2895 0.2596 0.2675 0.2827 0.2959 0.3333 0.3456 0.3479 0.3516
University degree 0.0502 0.0698 0.0563 0.0651 0.0604 0.0622 0.0646 0.0654 0.0760 0.0778 0.0845 0.0820147
Homeowner 0.6794 0.6417 0.6996 0.6558 0.7019 0.6332 0.7257 0.6566 0.6959 0.6655 0.7196 0.6941
Table 3.2: Sample differences of main variables between SFB and SHIW survey by wave from 2002 to 2012
Variables 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
SFB SHIW SFB SHIW SFB SHIW SFB SHIW SFB SHIW SFB SHIW
Number of members 18-24 0.0579 0.0563 0.0515 0.0548 0.0532 0.0501 0.0528 0.0471 0.0509 0.0549 0.0507 0.0534
Number of members 25-39 0.2126 0.2120 0.1998 0.2080 0.1962 0.2115 0.1882 0.1949 0.1836 0.1629 0.1653 0.1671
Number of members 40-59 0.2514 0.2579 0.2665 0.2691 0.2752 0.2703 0.2805 0.2723 0.2846 0.2788 0.2966 0.2915
Number of members 60-69 0.1496 0.1442 0.1446 0.1422 0.1420 0.1411 0.1438 0.1467 0.1410 0.1521 0.1413 0.1456
Number of members 70+ 0.2054 0.2153 0.2245 0.2203 0.2159 0.2173 0.2195 0.2311 0.2269 0.2387 0.2350 0.2329
Central Italy 0.1942 0.1993 0.1955 0.2049 0.1951 0.2015 0.1967 0.2091 0.1981 0.1988 0.1984 0.1893
Southern Italy 0.3261 0.3352 0.3226 0.3185 0.3221 0.3132 0.3203 0.3093 0.3189 0.3168 0.3183 0.3222
Number of children 0-5 0.0357 0.0297 0.0292 0.0299 0.0339 0.0315 0.0331 0.0324 0.0342 0.0312 0.0332 0.0303
Number of children 6-14 0.0607 0.0599 0.0589 0.0549 0.0577 0.0547 0.0574 0.0536 0.0554 0.0568 0.0557 0.0555
Number of children 15-17 0.0201 0.0218 0.0198 0.0178 0.0194 0.0201 0.0189 0.0188 0.0188 0.0209 0.0177 0.0195
Number of children 18+ 0.1249 0.1219 0.1246 0.1129 0.1126 0.1110 0.1082 0.1025 0.1074 0.1006 0.1068 0.0985
At least 2 members 0.7452 0.7671 0.7365 0.7435 0.7163 0.7471 0.7065 0.7279 0.6970 0.7444 0.6834 0.7067
At least 3 members 0.4838 0.5006 0.4631 0.4606 0.4486 0.4596 0.4357 0.4308 0.4234 0.4365 0.4097 0.4292
At least 4 members 0.2680 0.2841 0.2498 0.2533 0.2409 0.2485 0.2327 0.2351 0.2206 0.2414 0.2239 0.2342
Gender (male) 0.7371 0.7710 0.7322 0.7548 0.7227 0.7600 0.7228 0.7500 0.7118 0.7527 0.7065 0.7286
Age 18-24 0.0047 0.0065 0.0031 0.0061 0.0055 0.0042 0.0063 0.0064 0.0055 0.0081 0.0044 0.0115
Age 25-39 0.1869 0.1820 0.1609 0.1837 0.1719 0.1847 0.1658 0.1654 0.1610 0.1394 0.1453 0.1458
Age 40-59 0.3765 0.3919 0.3922 0.3968 0.3903 0.3963 0.3948 0.3934 0.3969 0.4027 0.4054 0.4084
Age 60-69 0.1837 0.1780 0.1752 0.1671 0.1729 0.1704 0.1708 0.1726 0.1666 0.1837 0.1669 0.1765
Age 70+ 0.2384 0.2417 0.2611 0.2463 0.2496 0.2444 0.2538 0.2621 0.2633 0.2661 0.2719 0.2578
Head unemployed 0.0251 0.0300 0.0250 0.0286 0.0251 0.0304 0.0279 0.0280 0.0296 0.0345 0.0394 0.0535
Head out of labor force 0.4854 0.4426 0.4770 0.4359 0.4725 0.4286 0.4701 0.4419 0.4730 0.4354 0.4792 0.4037
Education ≥ 8 0.6341 0.6358 0.6657 0.6673 0.6908 0.7044 0.7143 0.7136 0.7303 0.7395 0.7406 0.7548
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Education ≥ 13 0.3381 0.3569 0.3728 0.3807 0.3935 0.4098 0.4100 0.3458 0.4443 0.3668 0.4454 0.3791
University degree 0.0745 0.0788 0.0825 0.0871 0.0919 0.0941 0.1002 0.0968 0.1177 0.1124 0.1182 0.1169
Homeowner 0.7273 0.6936 0.7282 0.6836 0.7328 0.6950 0.7504 0.7017 0.7358 0.6882 0.7239 0.6782
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Table 3.3: Estimation of Φ for non durable consumption and for waves between 1991 and 2010 - recursive method
1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
w 0.703*** 0.813*** 0.709*** 0.744*** 0.783*** 0.909*** 0.897*** 0.784*** 0.816*** 0.798***
(0.050) (0.048) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.052) (0.055) (0.054) (0.051) (0.065)
g∗t−1 = −1 0.021 -0.174 0.033 -0.180 0.041 0.018 -0.429*** -0.191 -0.381** -0.098
(0.079) (0.112) (0.158) (0.138) (0.151) (0.112) (0.139) (0.127) (0.160) (0.177)
g∗t−1 = 1 -0.005 -0.071** -0.084** -0.132*** -0.094** -0.147** -0.207*** -0.254*** -0.366*** -0.104
(0.032) (0.033) (0.040) (0.035) (0.037) (0.060) (0.070) (0.072) (0.075) (0.109)
g∗t−1 = 2 0.020 0.052 0.043 0.074 0.029 -0.046 -0.088*** -0.091*** -0.142*** 0.030
(0.079) (0.055) (0.060) (0.051) (0.055) (0.036) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.046)
g∗t−1 = 3 0.060 0.123* 0.131** 0.338*** 0.216*** 0.121** 0.072 0.139** 0.178*** 0.322***
(0.085) (0.065) (0.065) (0.054) (0.057) (0.057) (0.053) (0.057) (0.056) (0.076)
Having a bank account 0.114*** 0.050 0.056 0.054 -0.028 -0.104** 0.075 0.146*** 0.067 -0.086
(0.036) (0.037) (0.042) (0.041) (0.039) (0.040) (0.057) (0.050) (0.055) (0.093)
Bank payments 0.055 0.052 0.070** 0.091*** - - -0.094*** -0.163*** -0.066** 0.057
(0.035) (0.033) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.045)
POS payments 0.032 -0.026 0.000 0.076** -0.002 -0.017 -0.010 -0.009 -0.085** -0.025
(0.052) (0.042) (0.036) (0.034) (0.033) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.042) (0.056)
Credit card 0.148*** 0.138*** 0.258*** 0.141*** 0.138*** 0.146*** 0.180*** 0.212*** 0.139*** 0.171***
(0.047) (0.042) (0.039) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.049)
Age > 70 -0.054 -0.003 0.052 -0.091* -0.193*** -0.062 -0.090* -0.039 -0.059 -0.040
(0.039) (0.046) (0.052) (0.049) (0.050) (0.051) (0.049) (0.047) (0.053) (0.082)
Fair understanding -0.038 -0.009 0.088* -0.200*** -0.124** -0.026 0.038 -0.027 -0.111** -0.020
(0.062) (0.043) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.050) (0.047) (0.045) (0.050) (0.076)
Good understanding -0.150 0.114** 0.116*** -0.131*** -0.146*** -0.034 0.107** 0.070 0.078 -0.011
(0.107) (0.048) (0.045) (0.042) (0.055) (0.058) (0.045) (0.044) (0.048) (0.072)
Excellent understanding 0.013 0.039 -0.026 -0.110*** 0.083** 0.083* 0.066* -0.074** -0.073** -0.039
(0.043) (0.043) (0.046) (0.040) (0.038) (0.043) (0.039) (0.037) (0.037) (0.050)
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1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Long interview - 0.236*** 0.072 0.134*** 0.117*** 0.101*** 0.001 0.003 -0.013 0.006
(0.046) (0.044) (0.042) (0.046) (0.039) (0.037) (0.034) (0.040) (0.052)
Euro - - - - 0.029*** 0.022** - - - -
(0.010) (0.011)
τ1 5.101*** 5.816*** 5.089*** 5.147*** 4.194*** 4.851*** 4.722*** 3.930*** 4.045*** 3.900***
(0.361) (0.344) (0.362) (0.358) (0.325) (0.355) (0.374) (0.364) (0.346) (0.438)
τ2 5.790*** 6.522*** 5.818*** 5.901*** 5.793*** 6.671*** 6.652*** 5.864*** 5.981*** 5.889***
(0.362) (0.345) (0.363) (0.359) (0.328) (0.359) (0.378) (0.367) (0.349) (0.443)
w w w w w w w w w w
Number of members 18-24 0.064*** 0.060*** 0.112*** 0.110*** 0.097*** 0.093*** 0.032 0.078*** 0.057** 0.098***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.031) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.036)
Number of members 25-39 0.099*** 0.112*** 0.160*** 0.158*** 0.155*** 0.121*** 0.083*** 0.102*** 0.100*** 0.110***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.027) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.032)
Number of members 40-59 0.091*** 0.133*** 0.131*** 0.154*** 0.168*** 0.133*** 0.099*** 0.138*** 0.124*** 0.090***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.026) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.031)
Number of members 60-69 0.069*** 0.085*** 0.073*** 0.094*** 0.116*** 0.076*** 0.088*** 0.090*** 0.065*** 0.049
(0.020) (0.020) (0.028) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.033)
Number of members 70+ 0.025 0.033 0.050 0.021 0.047* -0.004 0.050* 0.057** 0.003 -0.012
(0.022) (0.022) (0.032) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.036)
Central Italy 0.021 0.032 -0.001 0.051 0.121*** -0.020 0.007 0.070* -0.074* -0.006
(0.036) (0.036) (0.050) (0.041) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.038) (0.041) (0.061)
Southern Italy -0.176*** -0.204*** -0.143*** -0.190*** -0.093*** -0.160*** -0.134*** -0.150*** -0.117*** -0.155***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.043) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.050)
Number of children 0-5 0.022 0.019 0.041** 0.029* 0.014 0.015 0.033* 0.004 -0.038* 0.008
(0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.028)
Number of children 6-14 0.039*** 0.004 0.053*** 0.038*** -0.005 0.036** 0.016 0.023 -0.001 -0.004
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.022)
151
1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Number of children 15-17 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.054*** 0.050*** 0.012 0.038* 0.021 -0.012 0.004 0.007
(0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.028)
Number of children 18+ 0.043*** 0.031* -0.022 -0.006 -0.005 -0.002 0.044** 0.002 -0.001 -0.035
(0.016) (0.017) (0.023) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.025)
Number of retired members 0.024* 0.030** 0.075*** 0.062*** 0.091*** 0.074*** 0.056*** 0.085*** 0.080*** 0.094***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.021)
At least 2 members 0.320*** 0.259*** 0.273*** 0.235*** 0.180*** 0.191*** 0.233*** 0.224*** 0.237*** 0.245***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.034)
At least 3 members 0.120*** 0.085*** 0.116*** 0.105*** 0.098*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.080*** 0.092*** 0.132***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.029)
At least 4 members 0.052*** 0.068*** 0.023 0.056*** 0.055** 0.013 0.049** 0.061*** 0.063*** 0.011
(0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.020) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.032)
Gender (male) 0.135*** 0.076*** 0.115*** 0.079*** 0.046** 0.077*** 0.095*** 0.056*** 0.123*** 0.112***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.026) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.026)
Age of the head 0.017*** 0.011*** 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.012*** 0.005 0.013*** 0.007* 0.003 0.017***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Age of the head2 -1.343*** -0.667* -1.576*** -1.209*** -0.611 0.050 -0.936** -0.144 0.368 -0.810
(0.343) (0.349) (0.487) (0.376) (0.390) (0.370) (0.373) (0.353) (0.370) (0.537)
Head unemployed -0.278*** -0.410*** -0.386*** -0.323*** -0.354*** -0.337*** -0.318*** -0.322*** -0.339*** -0.437***
(0.026) (0.022) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.023) (0.030)
Head out of labor force -0.083*** -0.084*** -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.113*** -0.141*** -0.092*** -0.105*** -0.085*** -0.073***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.023)
Education ≥ 8 0.120*** 0.146*** 0.132*** 0.111*** 0.154*** 0.132*** 0.104*** 0.097*** 0.109*** 0.115***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.030)
Education ≥ 13 0.107*** 0.079*** 0.091*** 0.086*** 0.138*** 0.100*** 0.115*** 0.143*** 0.126*** 0.145***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.021) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.023)
University degree 0.190*** 0.183*** 0.214*** 0.178*** 0.179*** 0.179*** 0.172*** 0.107*** 0.135*** 0.144***
(0.027) (0.024) (0.031) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.031)
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1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Center * number 18-24 -0.018 -0.030 -0.011 -0.023 -0.025 -0.003 -0.070** -0.047* 0.011 -0.038
(0.021) (0.020) (0.028) (0.026) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.042)
Center * number 25-39 -0.038** -0.043** -0.051** -0.053*** -0.045** 0.054*** -0.032 -0.058*** 0.019 0.012
(0.018) (0.017) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.031)
Center * number 40-59 0.014 -0.015 -0.013 -0.069*** -0.056** 0.054*** -0.002 -0.036* 0.024 0.002
(0.019) (0.019) (0.025) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.031)
Center * number 60-69 0.000 -0.043** -0.008 -0.037 -0.058** 0.055** -0.005 -0.044* 0.027 0.009
(0.022) (0.021) (0.030) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.033)
Center * number 70+ 0.051** -0.011 -0.013 -0.010 -0.023 0.072*** -0.009 -0.069*** 0.029 0.059*
(0.023) (0.023) (0.032) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.034)
Center * education ≥ 8 0.000 -0.008 0.029 0.002 -0.016 -0.026 0.042 0.027 0.030 -0.016
(0.028) (0.028) (0.040) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.031) (0.034) (0.050)
Center * education ≥ 13 0.041 0.021 -0.020 0.033 -0.030 0.008 0.003 -0.028 -0.002 0.047
(0.030) (0.029) (0.036) (0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.042)
Center * degree -0.082* -0.053 -0.093* -0.033 -0.053 0.006 -0.010 -0.010 0.025 -0.002
(0.047) (0.045) (0.053) (0.045) (0.050) (0.044) (0.042) (0.040) (0.038) (0.056)
Center * gender -0.065** -0.029 -0.058 0.032 0.040 -0.023 0.000 0.032 -0.042 -0.070
(0.032) (0.032) (0.042) (0.034) (0.035) (0.033) (0.032) (0.030) (0.032) (0.045)
South * number 18-24 -0.057*** -0.049*** -0.043* -0.055*** -0.058** -0.043** -0.049** -0.034* -0.042* -0.032
(0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.030)
South * number 25-39 -0.046*** -0.054*** -0.058*** -0.076*** -0.086*** -0.006 -0.057*** -0.028* -0.031* -0.040
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.025)
South * number 40-59 -0.011 -0.045*** -0.026 -0.084*** -0.091*** -0.028 -0.043** -0.091*** -0.068*** -0.014
(0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.026)
South * number 60-69 -0.005 -0.031 -0.017 -0.058*** -0.079*** -0.024 -0.023 -0.074*** -0.047** 0.010
(0.018) (0.019) (0.025) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.029)
South * number 70+ 0.052** 0.017 -0.029 0.020 -0.048** 0.045* -0.018 -0.057*** -0.012 0.037
(0.022) (0.022) (0.029) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.032)
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1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
South * education≥ 8 0.048** -0.012 0.002 0.072*** 0.010 -0.001 0.038 0.019 -0.005 0.004
(0.024) (0.024) (0.033) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.041)
South * education≥ 13 0.064** 0.133*** 0.069** 0.054** 0.004 0.077*** 0.026 0.055** 0.086*** 0.022
(0.027) (0.025) (0.032) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.036)
South * degree 0.058 0.061 0.035 0.039 0.037 0.054 0.048 0.102*** 0.090** 0.143***
(0.040) (0.038) (0.046) (0.038) (0.042) (0.041) (0.038) (0.038) (0.036) (0.050)
South * gender -0.071** 0.024 -0.067* 0.003 0.035 -0.006 0.007 0.077*** -0.006 -0.025
(0.028) (0.027) (0.036) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.038)
Total surface 2.831* 10.222*** 6.319*** 6.693*** 10.981*** 13.072*** 10.203*** 10.690*** 12.906*** 16.277***
(1.585) (1.471) (1.828) (1.526) (1.703) (1.991) (1.831) (1.755) (1.890) (2.639)
Per-capita surface 15.123*** -4.174 6.542 6.918** 1.071 -1.000 0.062 -3.855 -1.638 -2.790
(3.296) (3.047) (4.077) (3.071) (3.301) (3.953) (3.712) (3.528) (3.862) (5.424)
Homeowner 0.042*** 0.064*** 0.036*** 0.047*** 0.079*** 0.071*** 0.067*** 0.075*** 0.107*** 0.162***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015)
Secondary residence 0.119*** 0.112*** 0.209*** 0.144*** 0.152*** 0.141*** 0.151*** 0.120*** 0.168*** 0.111***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027)
Constant 5.942*** 6.270*** 5.813*** 6.096*** 5.604*** 5.932*** 5.887*** 6.002*** 6.023*** 5.544***
(0.100) (0.101) (0.138) (0.111) (0.114) (0.108) (0.109) (0.104) (0.107) (0.160)
ln (σ) -1.013*** -1.025*** -0.799*** -0.933*** -0.887*** -0.916*** -0.978*** -1.013*** -0.973*** -0.938***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012)
N 7684 7667 6811 7583 7471 7441 7146 7235 7155 3729
N1 7375 7416 6668 7435 7211 7316 6957 7103 6976 3660
F-test instruments 45.89 73.68 100.18 94.66 49.02 42.97 63.04 83.68 58.61 18.74
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
F-test g∗t−1 1.53 16.65 13.95 85.85 33.73 18.79 32.12 40.60 82.92 28.71
p-value 0.82 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics for non durable consumption
SHIW reported SFB weighted Panel imputations(1) Cross imputations(1) Simple Matching(1)
Mean Median Sd Mean Median Sd Mean Median Sd Mean Median Sd Mean Median Sd
1991 1511.33 1400 747.65 2411.91 1918.62 1954.64 1548.65 1418.75 759.98 1548.65 1418.75 759.98 2195.48 2018.36 1121.77
1993 1628.71 1500 823.62 2338.40 1885.55 1834.07 1671.95 1524.89 841.50 1671.87 1523.67 840.99 2151.46 1961.05 1113.53
1995 1829.15 1600 945.24 2579.10 2084.68 1996.86 1882.27 1704.55 966.48 1880.89 1703.86 964.85 2392.75 2175.60 1261.98
1998 1880.98 1700 1228.95 2728.73 2372.19 1746.18 1927.92 1720.92 1101.50 1925.90 1719.99 1098.15 2545.26 2397.42 1133.04
2000 2013.54 1800 1106.04 2754.94 2347.77 1836.76 2069.09 1845.26 1130.63 2067.81 1842.63 1130.36 2565.16 2391.15 1209.24
2002 1070.66 1000 621.56 1483.32 1245.41 1023.82 1108.00 962.84 637.63 1107.66 962.13 637.80 1392.62 1289.86 689.18
2004 1177.64 1000 677.52 1542.70 1305.72 1026.26 1213.85 1073.39 693.33 1213.13 1072.84 693.30 1449.41 1344.95 691.69
2006 1236.47 1100 679.65 1604.98 1365.71 1081.65 1282.27 1142.49 690.11 1279.94 1141.26 690.88 1510.05 1404.24 704.54
2008 1251.99 1100 648.77 1595.84 1353.23 1048.44 1299.39 1166.00 666.33 1297.81 1164.92 665.78 1508.78 1400.21 700.95
2010 1309.84 1200 732.90 1558.44 1321.48 1018.77 1362.48 1207.33 749.58 1360.86 1204.27 749.67 1475.09 1369.50 667.44
2012 1303.98 1200 729.31 1544.82 1330.45 983.12 1355.83 1181.21 752.57 1354.61 1179.82 750.46 1454.86 1337.30 658.72
(1) All the multiply imputed values from the 100 implicats are considered.
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Table 3.5: Descriptive statistics for food consumption
SHIW reported SFB weighted Panel imputations(1) Cross imputations(1)
Mean Median Sd Mean Median Sd Mean Median Sd Mean Median Sd
1991 755.43 700 359.21 820.03 738.06 449.70 759.78 718.31 363.11 759.78 718.31 363.11
1993 825.54 800 402.68 811.18 730.81 442.75 830.85 761.21 407.03 830.69 761.12 406.94
1995 868.10 800 443.31 866.44 780.90 473.82 874.16 794.84 448.40 873.89 795.12 448.04
1998 864.82 800 452.86 944.99 853.15 515.02 870.19 793.08 457.30 868.56 791.23 454.90
2000 882.66 800 459.94 934.14 835.19 537.66 888.98 812.72 465.91 888.76 812.68 465.13
2002 478.72 400 260.07 536.97 445.77 365.93 481.57 435.69 263.93 480.80 435.40 263.60
2004 511.16 500 267.29 523.97 453.91 321.05 513.74 462.80 270.42 513.27 462.58 270.21
2006 527.97 500 267.62 543.91 476.03 330.32 531.27 482.23 269.24 530.64 481.79 269.29
2008 523.39 500 248.09 553.56 481.24 335.13 527.91 483.61 252.31 527.28 482.82 252.29
2010 529.36 500 258.27 546.12 480.85 324.55 532.55 492.05 262.62 532.20 492.31 262.23
(1) All the multiply imputed values from the 100 implicats are considered.
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Table 3.6: Estimation of Euler equation with reported, panel and cross imputed non durable consumption
Data 1/γ β θAD θCH θEA κ N m Hansen J test
Reported non durable AGMM 0.771*** 0.110*** 0.0825*** 0.0377 14,233 14.45
consumption (0.256) (0.0254) (0.0192) (0.0291) 0.002
EGMM 1.316*** 0.962*** 0.0957** 0.0842** 0.0313** 20,995 - 185.4
(0.452) (0.0160) (0.0480) (0.0328) (0.0155) 0.000
GMM-K 1.664*** 0.980*** 0.0859*** 0.0825*** 0.0235 1.030*** 20,995 - 396.3
(0.543) (0.00166) (0.0252) (0.0153) (0.0162) (0.0173) 0.000
GMM-D 0.815*** 0.976*** 0.176*** 0.186** 0.110 20,995 - -
(0.190) (0.00418) (0.0587) (0.0780) (0.0720)
Panel imputations of AGMM 0.691*** 0.111*** 0.084*** 0.038 14,233 100 12.155
non durable consumption (0.270) (0.027) (0.020) (0.031) 0.007
EGMM 0.776*** 0.915*** 0.173*** 0.126** 0.070*** 20,995 100 40.89
(0.164) (0.030) (0.061) (0.065) (0.029) 0.000
GMM-K 0.960*** 0.975*** 0.137*** 0.102*** 0.066** 1.098*** 20,995 93 78.19
(0.288) (0.005) (0.040) (0.030) (0.035) (0.067) 0.000
GMM-D 0.711** 0.975*** 0.207 0.250 0.189 20,995 75 -
(0.314) (0.007) (0.338) (0.460) (0.184)
Cross imputations of AGMM 0.699*** 0.112*** 0.085*** 0.040 14,233 100 12.038
non durable consumption (0.272) (0.027) (0.021) (0.031) 0.007
EGMM 0.781*** 0.915*** 0.170*** 0.123** 0.071*** 20,995 100 40.99
(0.163) (0.029) (0.059) (0.064) (0.029) 0.000
GMM-K 0.943*** 0.975*** 0.139*** 0.102*** 0.070** 1.103*** 20,995 92 73.03
(0.289) (0.005) (0.040) (0.030) (0.038) (0.075) 0.000
GMM-D 0.718*** 0.975*** 0.202 0.240 0.179 20,995 75 -
(0.305) (0.006) (0.179) (0.262) (0.161)
AGMM: constant and dummy for wave 1998 are not reported; endogenous variables are ln (1 + rt+1), 4adt+1, 4cht+1 , 4eat+1; instruments are ln (1 + rt−1), adt−1, adt−2, cht−1, cht−2,
eat−1, eat−2. EGMM: instruments are (1 + rt), adt, adt−1, cht, cht−1, eat, eat−1. GMM-K: instruments for the first equation are (1 + rt−1), adt−1, cht−1 and instruments for the second
equation are adt−1, cht−1, eat−1. GMM-D: instruments are (1 + rt−2), adt−1, cht−1,eat−1.Column m reports the number of valid estimations (the model converged or the ratio between
the max and min eigenvalue was less than 200,000). Hansen J test for the imputed dataset is the geometric average of the tests run on each single implicate. Degrees of freedom are 3 for
AGMM and EGMM, and 2 for GMM-K. No test of overidentifying restriction is run for GMM-D because of exact identification.
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Table 3.7: Estimation of Euler equation with reported, panel and cross imputed non durable consumption for non-single households
1/γ β θAD θCH θEA κ N m Hansen J test
Reported non durable AGMM 0.725*** - 0.0883*** 0.0879*** 0.0525* 11,745 16.70
consumption (0.277) (0.0269) (0.0192) (0.0285) 0.001
EGMM 1.121** 0.954*** 0.0995 0.0832 0.0306* 17,273 72.18
(0.460) (0.0259) (0.0767) (0.0525) (0.0172) 0.000
GMM-K 1.220*** 0.978*** 0.0989*** 0.0846*** 0.0350** 1.049*** 17,273 171.6
(0.330) (0.00224) (0.0328) (0.0241) (0.0166) (0.0267) 0.000
GMM-D 0.830*** 0.974*** 0.121*** 0.103** 0.0737 17,273 -
(0.168) (0.00484) (0.0360) (0.0511) (0.0630)
Panel imputations of AGMM 0.635*** 0.088*** 0.087*** 0.049 11,745 100 13.672
non durable consumption (0.294) (0.029) (0.020) (0.030) 0.003
EGMM 0.690*** 0.899*** 0.209** 0.173** 0.067** 17,273 100 10.76
(0.150) (0.038) (0.092) (0.098) (0.034) 0.013
GMM-K 0.563*** 0.965*** 0.235*** 0.177** 0.123** 1.305*** 17,273 100 3.435
(0.142) (0.012) (0.083) (0.085) (0.064) (0.199) 0.329
GMM-D 0.721*** 0.972*** 0.136** 0.141* 0.146 17,273 93 -
(0.271) (0.009) (0.064) (0.092) (0.141)
Cross imputations of AGMM 0.640*** 0.090*** 0.088*** 0.050 11,745 100 13.619
non durable consumption (0.296) (0.029) (0.020) (0.030) 0.003
EGMM 0.702*** 0.902*** 0.200*** 0.162** 0.067** 17,273 100 11.96
(0.148) (0.036) (0.083) (0.090) (0.034) 0.007
GMM-K 0.559*** 0.964*** 0.236*** 0.172** 0.126** 1.313*** 17,273 99 3.220
(0.149) (0.015) (0.088) (0.090) (0.075) (0.220) 0.359
GMM-D 0.712*** 0.972*** 0.141** 0.146 0.148 17,273 87 -
(0.301) (0.014) (0.080) (0.117) (0.199)
AGMM: constant and dummy for wave 1998 are not reported; endogenous variables are ln (1 + rt+1), 4adt+1, 4cht+1 , 4eat+1; instruments are ln (1 + rt−1), adt−1, adt−2, cht−1, cht−2,
eat−1, eat−2. EGMM: instruments are (1 + rt), adt, adt−1, cht, cht−1, eat, eat−1. GMM-K: instruments for the first equation are (1 + rt−1), adt−1, cht−1 and instruments for the second
equation are adt−1, cht−1, eat−1. GMM-D: instruments are (1 + rt−2), adt−1, cht−1,eat−1.Column m reports the number of valid estimations (the model converged or the ratio between
the max and min eigenvalue was less than 200,000). Hansen J test for the imputed dataset is the geometric average of the tests run on each single implicate. Degrees of freedom are 3 for
AGMM and EGMM, and 2 for GMM-K. No test of overidentifying restriction is run for GMM-D because of exact identification.
158
Table 3.8: Estimation of Euler equation without the number of earners variable
1/γ β θAD θCH θEA κ N m Hansen J test
Reported nondurable AGMM 0.842*** 0.105*** 0.0308 - 14,233 - 11.69
consumption (0.256) (0.0182) (0.0298) 0.003
EGMM 1.290** 0.961*** 0.0989* 0.0808** - 20,995 155.1
(0.511) (0.0194) (0.0592) (0.0370) 0.000
GMM-K 1.418*** 0.979*** 0.0990*** 0.0811*** - 1.039*** 20,995 294.4
(0.439) (0.00223) (0.0320) (0.0176) (0.0230) 0.000
GMM-D 0.890*** 0.976*** 0.179*** 0.165*** - 20,995 -
(0.167) (0.00347) (0.0479) (0.0584)
Panel imputations of AGMM 0.765*** 0.107*** 0.031 - 14,233 100 10.250
nondurable consumption (0.270) (0.019) (0.032) 0.006
EGMM 0.732*** 0.905*** 0.197*** 0.133* - 20,995 100 23.74
(0.167) (0.037) (0.075) (0.074) 0.000
GMM-K 0.826*** 0.972*** 0.170*** 0.104*** - 1.129*** 20,995 100 41.54
(0.204) (0.006) (0.046) (0.034) (0.071) 0.000
GMM-D 0.808*** 0.975*** 0.200* 0.189 - 20,995 100 -
(0.264) (0.005) (0.105) (0.129)
Reported nondurable AGMM 0.791*** 0.106*** 0.0507* - 11,377 13.55
consumption (0.276) (0.0179) (0.0290) 0.001
for non-single households EGMM 1.096** 0.953*** 0.105 0.0843 - 17,273 61.68
(0.497) (0.0300) (0.0910) (0.0605) 0.000
GMM-K 1.127*** 0.977*** 0.111*** 0.0887*** - 1.056*** 17,273 137.4
(0.289) (0.00250) (0.0376) (0.0270) (0.0301) 0.000
chk GMM-D 0.886*** 0.975*** 0.131*** 0.105** - 17,273 -
(0.155) (0.00374) (0.0333) (0.0459)
Panel imputations of AGMM 0.704*** 0.106*** 0.047 - 11,377 100 11.38
nondurable consumption (0.292) (0.019) (0.031) 0.003
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for non-single households EGMM 0.664*** 0.892*** 0.233** 0.190 - 17,273 100 6.465
(0.171) (0.049) (0.117) (0.117) 0.039
GMM-K 0.826*** 0.972*** 0.170*** 0.104*** - 1.129*** 17,273 100 2.428
(0.204) (0.006) (0.046) (0.034) (0.071) 0.297
GMM-D 0.802*** 0.975*** 0.154*** 0.137* - 17,273 -
(0.244) (0.007) (0.064) (0.081)
AGMM: constant and dummy for wave 1998 are not reported; endogenous variables are ln (1 + rt+1), 4adt+1, 4cht+1; instruments are ln (1 + rt−1), adt−1, adt−2, cht−1, cht−2. EGMM:
instruments are (1 + rt), adt, adt−1, cht, cht−1. GMM-K: instruments for the first equation are (1 + rt−1), adt−1, cht−1 and instruments for the second equation are adt−1, cht−1.
GMM-D: instruments are (1 + rt−2), adt−1, cht−1. Column m reports the number of valid estimations (the model converged or the ratio between the max and min eigenvalue was less than
200,000). Hansen J test for the imputed dataset is the geometric average of the tests run on each single implicate. Degrees of freedom are 2 for AGMM and EGMM, and 1 for GMM-K. No
test of overidentifying restriction is run for GMM-D because of exact identification.
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Table 3.9: Estimation of Euler equation with reported, panel and cross imputed food consumption
1/γ β θAD θCH θEA κ N m Hansen J test
Reported food AGMM 0.324 0.0798*** 0.151*** 0.114*** 13,136 9.305
consumption (0.342) (0.0289) (0.0213) (0.0328) 0.026
EGMM -1.406 0.965*** -0.0982 -0.0496 -0.0265 19,354 120.6
(1.863) (0.0594) (0.182) (0.219) (0.0320) 0.000
GMM-K -6.173*** 0.983*** 0.00612 0.0650*** -0.0387*** 1.014*** 19,354 2066
(2.279) (0.000434) (0.00995) (0.00907) (0.00449) (0.00233) 0.000
GMM-D 1.136*** 0.973*** 0.173*** 0.196*** 0.0528 19,354 -
(0.169) (0.00260) (0.0346) (0.0466) (0.0361)
Panel imputations of AGMM 0.233 0.090*** 0.148*** 0.112*** 13,136 100 8.319
food consumption (0.355) (0.031) (0.022) (0.034) 0.040
EGMM -1.205** 0.955*** -0.124* -0.073 -0.029** 19,354 44 82.87
(0.581) (0.032) (0.084) (0.108) (0.014) 0.000
GMM-K -4.717** 0.983*** -0.003 0.056*** -0.040*** 1.016*** 19,354 73 1644.3
(2.180) (0.001) (0.016) (0.015) (0.006) (0.005) 0.000
GMM-D 1.127*** 0.973*** 0.162*** 0.190*** 0.073** 19,354 100 -
(0.178) (0.003) (0.033) (0.048) (0.040)
Reported food AGMM 0.454 0.0434 0.149*** 0.120*** 10,894 16.16
consumption (0.366) (0.0309) (0.0212) (0.0317) 0.001
for non-single households EGMM -1.252* 0.959*** -0.0984 -0.0447 -0.0236 15,998 88.12
(0.661) (0.0284) (0.0631) (0.0697) (0.0161) 0.000
GMM-K - - - - - - 15,998 -
chk GMM-D 1.119*** 0.974*** 0.161*** 0.178*** 0.0121 15,998 -
(0.189) (0.00243) (0.0366) (0.0481) (0.0362)
Panel imputations of AGMM 0.320 0.056* 0.145*** 0.116*** 10,894 100 14.026
food consumption (0.380) (0.033) (0.022) (0.033) 0.003
for non-single households EGMM -0.920** 0.934*** -0.140** -0.082 -0.027* 15,998 92 33.23
(0.410) (0.049 (0.079) (0.109) (0.019) 0.000161
GMM-K -15.625 0.981*** 0.012 0.068*** -0.043*** 1.012*** 15,998 28 3017.1
(25.63) (0.001 (0.015) (0.014) (0.005) (0.003) 0.000
GMM-D 1.079 0.973 0.150 0.174 0.033 15,998 100 -
(0.206) (0.003 (0.037) (0.053) (0.041)
AGMM: constant and dummy for wave 1998 are not reported; endogenous variables are ln (1 + rt+1), 4adt+1, 4cht+1 , 4eat+1; instruments are ln (1 + rt−1), adt−1, adt−2, cht−1, cht−2,
eat−1, eat−2. EGMM: instruments are (1 + rt), adt, adt−1, cht, cht−1, eat, eat−1. GMM-K: instruments for the first equation are (1 + rt−1), adt−1, cht−1 and instruments for the second
equation are adt−1, cht−1, eat−1. GMM-D: instruments are (1 + rt−2), adt−1, cht−1,eat−1.Column m reports the number of valid estimations (the model converged or the ratio between
the max and min eigenvalue was less than 200,000). Hansen J test for the imputed dataset is the geometric average of the tests run on each single implicate. Degrees of freedom are 3 for
AGMM and EGMM, and 2 for GMM-K. No test of overidentifying restriction is run for GMM-D because of exact identification.
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Table 3.10: Estimations of Euler equation with a simple matching tecnique
1/γ β θAD θCH θEA κ N m Hansen J test
Simple Matched AGMM 1.408*** 0.028 0.168*** 0.064* 14,233 100 2.625
non durable consumption (0.321) (0.032) (0.025) (0.037) 0.453
EGMM 0.566*** 0.843*** 0.274*** 0.043 0.033 20,995 100 3.889
(0.126) (0.056) (0.081) (0.082) (0.032) 0.274
GMM-K -1.812 0.989*** -0.052 0.048 -0.049 1.142** 20,995 9 678.5
(3.515) (0.007) (0.140) (0.069) (0.057) (0.501) 0.000
GMM-D 1.189*** 0.970*** 0.150*** 0.071** 0.014 20,995 100 -
(0.197) (0.003) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
Simple Matching tecnique AGMM 1.730*** 0.011 0.147*** 0.043 11,044 100 3.22
non durable consumption (0.347) (0.034) (0.027) (0.039) 0.359
for non-single households EGMM 0.589*** 0.855*** 0.233*** 0.020 0.021 17,273 100 3.58
(0.130) (0.050) (0.074) (0.076) (0.031) 0.310
GMM-K -1.912 0.989*** -0.050 0.054*** -0.036** 1.066*** 17,273 21 445.2
(2.376) (0.006) (0.076) (0.020) (0.021) 0.174 0.000
GMM-D 1.307*** 0.971*** 0.118*** 0.042* -0.002 17,273 100 -
(0.212) (0.002) (0.027) (0.031) (0.030)
AGMM: constant and dummy for wave 1998 are not reported; endogenous variables are ln (1 + rt+1), 4adt+1, 4cht+1 , 4eat+1; instruments are ln (1 + rt−1), adt−1, adt−2, cht−1, cht−2,
eat−1, eat−2. EGMM: instruments are (1 + rt), adt, adt−1, cht, cht−1, eat, eat−1. GMM-K: instruments for the first equation are (1 + rt−1), adt−1, cht−1 and instruments for the second
equation are adt−1, cht−1, eat−1. GMM-D: instruments are (1 + rt−2), adt−1, cht−1,eat−1.Column m reports the number of valid estimations (the model converged or the ratio between
the max and min eigenvalue was less than 200,000). Hansen J test for the imputed dataset is the geometric average of the tests run on each single implicate. Degrees of freedom are 3 for
AGMM and EGMM, and 2 for GMM-K. No test of overidentifying restriction is run for GMM-D because of exact identification.
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Table 3.11: Estimations of Euler equation with reported non durable consumption including rents and non-monetary transfers
1/γ β θAD θCH θEA κ N m Hansen J test
Reported non durable AGMM 0.972*** - 0.0999*** 0.0606*** 0.00976 14,233 - 10.13
consumption including (0.220) (0.0222) (0.0166) (0.0253) 0.018
rents and non monetary EGMM 0.665*** 0.928*** 0.190*** 0.121* 0.0412** 20,995 - 16.86
transfers (0.100) (0.0179) (0.0596) (0.0635) (0.0197) 0.001
GMM-K 0.737*** 0.983*** 0.158*** 0.116*** 0.0541*** 1.108*** 20,995 - 20.00
(0.146) (0.00197) (0.0393) (0.0348) (0.0167) (0.0465) 0.000
GMM-D 1.038*** 0.984*** 0.0902*** 0.0811*** 0.0629** 20,995 - -
(0.133) (0.00136) (0.0204) (0.0281) (0.0287)
Reported non durable AGMM 0.943*** 0.0852*** 0.0724*** 0.0310 11,745 - 9.902
consumption including (0.229) (0.0235) (0.0170) (0.0256) 0.019
rents and non monetary EGMM 0.668*** 0.929*** 0.187*** 0.124* 0.0271 17,273 - 11.94
transfers (0.102) (0.0180) (0.0601) (0.0652) (0.0203) 0.008
for non-single households GMM-K 0.587*** 0.984*** 0.209*** 0.167*** 0.0401 1.181*** 17,273 - 4.298
(0.093) (0.00287) (0.0561) (0.0630) (0.0258) (0.0646) 0.117
GMM-D 0.970*** 0.984*** 0.0833*** 0.0655** 0.0559* 17,273 - -
(0.146) (0.00153) (0.0229) (0.0307) (0.0326)
AGMM: constant and dummy for wave 1998 are not reported; endogenous variables are ln (1 + rt+1), 4adt+1, 4cht+1 , 4eat+1; instruments are ln (1 + rt−1), adt−1, adt−2, cht−1, cht−2,
eat−1, eat−2. EGMM: instruments are (1 + rt), adt, adt−1, cht, cht−1, eat, eat−1. GMM-K: instruments for the first equation are (1 + rt−1), adt−1, cht−1 and instruments for the second
equation are adt−1, cht−1, eat−1. GMM-D: instruments are (1 + rt−2), adt−1, cht−1,eat−1.Column m reports the number of valid estimations (the model converged or the ratio between
the max and min eigenvalue was less than 200,000). Hansen J test for the imputed dataset is the geometric average of the tests run on each single implicate. Degrees of freedom are 3 for
AGMM and EGMM, and 2 for GMM-K. No test of overidentifying restriction is run for GMM-D because of exact identification.
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Figure A.1: Figures of food consumption distribution per wave from 1991 to 2000
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Figure A.2: Figures of food consumption distribution per wave from 2002 to 2010
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Figure A.3: Comulative distribution functions of reported and imputed food con-
sumption from SHIW and reported consumption from SFB
1991 1993 1995
1998 2000 2002
2004 2006 2008
2010
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Table A.1: Estimation of Φ for food consumption for waves between 1991 and 2010 - recursive method
1991 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
w 0.734*** 0.799*** 0.805*** 0.841*** 0.792*** 0.878*** 0.937*** 0.978*** 0.843*** 0.900***
(0.062) (0.055) (0.051) (0.056) (0.053) (0.047) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050)
g∗t−1 = −1 -0.131 -0.089 -0.183* -0.214* -0.084 -0.173* -0.063 -0.164 -0.382** -0.030
(0.114) (0.076) (0.094) (0.126) (0.105) (0.094) (0.106) (0.141) (0.187) (0.169)
g∗t−1 = 1 0.026 -0.069** -0.044 0.053 -0.015 0.010 -0.049 -0.109** -0.180*** -0.167***
(0.040) (0.033) (0.032) (0.037) (0.032) (0.031) (0.045) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
g∗t−1 = 2 0.099 0.034 0.177** 0.154* 0.115 0.163** 0.083** 0.011 0.016 0.020
(0.145) (0.124) (0.088) (0.090) (0.078) (0.076) (0.035) (0.034) (0.032) (0.034)
g∗t−1 = 3 0.052 0.100 0.326*** 0.175* 0.233** 0.198** 0.224** 0.148* 0.201** 0.279***
(0.189) (0.139) (0.103) (0.099) (0.091) (0.086) (0.089) (0.082) (0.084) (0.094)
Having a bank account 0.046 0.121*** 0.046 0.062 0.062 -0.002 -0.034 0.034 0.090* 0.199***
(0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.046) (0.045) (0.039) (0.040) (0.054) (0.049) (0.054)
Bank payments 0.070* 0.020 0.014 0.058 0.049 -0.072** -0.063** -0.022
(0.042) (0.038) (0.035) (0.036) (0.034) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
POS payments -0.023 -0.086 -0.061 -0.006 0.011 -0.026 0.022 0.035 0.000 -0.005
(0.075) (0.057) (0.045) (0.038) (0.036) (0.033) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.041)
Credit card 0.116** 0.119** 0.091** 0.155*** 0.057 0.101*** 0.020 0.051 0.085** 0.052
(0.048) (0.049) (0.043) (0.041) (0.038) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Age > 70 0.019 -0.103** 0.055 0.094* -0.097* -0.143*** -0.060 -0.016 -0.014 -0.023
(0.056) (0.042) (0.050) (0.057) (0.053) (0.050) (0.050) (0.048) (0.046) (0.053)
Fair understanding -0.072 0.056 0.054 -0.030 -0.119** 0.073 -0.096** -0.020 -0.032
(0.068) (0.046) (0.053) (0.051) (0.048) (0.049) (0.045) (0.044) (0.049)
Good understanding -0.233* 0.152*** 0.112** 0.021 -0.100* -0.010 0.003 0.021 0.012
(0.123) (0.051) (0.050) (0.046) (0.055) (0.057) (0.044) (0.042) (0.046)
Excellent understanding 0.075 -0.063 0.072 0.019 0.027 0.064 0.005 -0.014 0.013
(0.047) (0.048) (0.050) (0.045) (0.038) (0.042) (0.038) (0.036) (0.036)169
1991 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Long interview 0.000 -0.004 0.163*** 0.010 0.009 0.028 0.032 0.013
(0.049) (0.048) (0.044) (0.045) (0.038) (0.036) (0.033) (0.039)
Euro 0.009 0.030***
(0.010) (0.010)
τ1 5.442*** 5.739*** 5.750*** 6.082*** 5.622*** 4.470*** 5.024*** 4.979*** 4.221*** 4.614***
(0.402) (0.364) (0.334) (0.363) (0.344) (0.280) (0.303) (0.308) (0.301) (0.298)
τ2 5.999*** 6.311*** 6.328*** 6.666*** 6.207*** 6.219*** 6.834*** 6.852*** 6.090*** 6.562***
(0.404) (0.365) (0.335) (0.364) (0.345) (0.284) (0.308) (0.312) (0.305) (0.303)
w w w w w w w w w w
Number of members 18-24 0.102*** 0.093*** 0.116*** 0.101*** 0.128*** 0.115*** 0.151*** 0.052** 0.138*** 0.096***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027)
Number of members 25-39 0.122*** 0.119*** 0.113*** 0.142*** 0.147*** 0.158*** 0.163*** 0.102*** 0.153*** 0.089***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Number of members 40-59 0.132*** 0.130*** 0.172*** 0.159*** 0.169*** 0.147*** 0.179*** 0.139*** 0.195*** 0.126***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
Number of members 60-69 0.107*** 0.114*** 0.150*** 0.162*** 0.142*** 0.119*** 0.147*** 0.128*** 0.181*** 0.116***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
Number of members 70+ 0.100*** 0.087*** 0.103*** 0.105*** 0.057** 0.074*** 0.103*** 0.090*** 0.156*** 0.051*
(0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.030) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027)
Central Italy 0.058 0.035 0.142*** 0.075 0.089** 0.029 0.004 0.026 0.047 -0.134***
(0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.047) (0.044) (0.041) (0.039) (0.040) (0.037) (0.042)
Southern Italy -0.163*** -0.085** -0.059* -0.174*** -0.140*** -0.134*** -0.148*** -0.018 -0.083** -0.074**
(0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.040) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.034) (0.033) (0.036)
Number of children 0-5 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.057*** 0.076*** 0.067*** 0.036* 0.041** 0.058*** 0.047*** 0.016
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020)
Number of children 6-14 0.055*** 0.076*** 0.056*** 0.101*** 0.081*** 0.038** 0.066*** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.053***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016)
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1991 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Number of children 15-17 0.061*** 0.081*** 0.100*** 0.072*** 0.087*** 0.074*** 0.060*** 0.084*** 0.032* 0.022
(0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
Number of children 18+ 0.022 0.009 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.013 -0.041** 0.038** -0.031* -0.009
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
Number of retired members 0.008 0.029** 0.007 0.027 0.028* 0.041*** 0.020 0.023 0.024* 0.045***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
At least 2 members 0.267*** 0.360*** 0.286*** 0.279*** 0.287*** 0.305*** 0.303*** 0.304*** 0.305*** 0.312***
(0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.027) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025)
At least 3 members 0.115*** 0.151*** 0.133*** 0.135*** 0.125*** 0.148*** 0.092*** 0.093*** 0.092*** 0.131***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
At least 4 members 0.042** 0.069*** 0.086*** 0.045** 0.048** 0.045* 0.042* 0.026 0.041** 0.063***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
Gender (male) 0.032 0.097*** 0.066*** 0.102*** 0.044** 0.061*** 0.049** 0.083*** 0.004 0.072***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Age of the head 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.010** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Age of the head2 -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.009** -0.009** -0.008** -0.011*** -0.003 -0.009** -0.008** 0.007*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Head unemployed -0.202*** -0.207*** -0.329*** -0.286*** -0.262*** -0.276*** -0.249*** -0.183*** -0.242*** -0.225***
(0.035) (0.029) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.023)
Head out of labor force -0.095*** -0.032** -0.019 -0.018 -0.036** -0.048*** -0.064*** -0.026 -0.056*** -0.028*
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Education ≥ 8 0.088*** 0.105*** 0.152*** 0.126*** 0.120*** 0.153*** 0.135*** 0.093*** 0.076*** 0.090***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020)
Education ≥ 13 0.019 0.031* 0.037** 0.025 0.025 0.053*** 0.019 0.045*** 0.067*** 0.070***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017)
University degree 0.104*** 0.053* 0.078*** 0.162*** 0.110*** 0.080*** 0.081*** 0.104*** 0.071*** 0.070***
(0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029) (0.025) (0.027) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
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1991 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Center * number 18-24 -0.062*** -0.025 -0.018 0.009 -0.054* -0.022 -0.026 -0.051* -0.037 -0.030
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.026) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
Center * number 25-39 -0.036* -0.045** -0.022 -0.016 -0.035* -0.032 0.020 -0.039** -0.043** 0.033
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Center * number 40-59 0.013 -0.002 -0.029 -0.009 -0.038* 0.003 0.023 -0.019 -0.033 0.045**
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
Center * number 60-69 0.034 -0.007 -0.094*** -0.017 -0.041 0.025 0.023 -0.002 -0.033 0.016
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
Center * number 70+ 0.040 0.021 -0.050* 0.008 0.007 0.050* 0.028 0.031 -0.045* 0.044*
(0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025)
Center * education≥8 -0.004 0.000 -0.094*** -0.040 -0.039 0.007 -0.044 0.027 -0.016 -0.020
(0.031) (0.030) (0.032) (0.037) (0.035) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.030) (0.034)
Center * education≥13 0.024 0.019 0.040 0.026 0.039 0.043 0.056* 0.039 0.025 0.003
(0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.031) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029)
Center * degree -0.042 -0.048 -0.034 -0.073 0.006 -0.063 -0.008 0.015 0.014 0.045
(0.050) (0.051) (0.050) (0.049) (0.047) (0.051) (0.045) (0.042) (0.040) (0.039)
Center * gender -0.029 -0.036 -0.007 -0.069* 0.052 -0.035 -0.006 -0.026 0.045 0.011
(0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.039) (0.036) (0.036) (0.033) (0.032) (0.030) (0.032)
South * number 18-24 -0.052*** -0.041** -0.046** -0.003 -0.062*** -0.057** -0.046** -0.050** -0.054*** -0.040*
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022)
South * number 25-39 -0.056*** -0.037** -0.011 -0.038** -0.042** -0.060*** -0.024 -0.061*** -0.034** -0.017
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018)
South * number 40-59 -0.041** -0.041** -0.041** -0.024 -0.065*** -0.064*** -0.037** -0.081*** -0.069*** -0.079***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
South * number 60-69 -0.016 -0.038* -0.035* -0.053** -0.067*** -0.047** -0.047** -0.064*** -0.091*** -0.063***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
South * number 70+ 0.019 0.019 0.003 -0.033 0.003 -0.023 -0.035 -0.080*** -0.092*** -0.051**
(0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.027) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
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1991 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
South * education≥ 8 0.032 0.032 -0.031 -0.013 0.029 -0.005 -0.010 0.043 0.050** 0.044
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027) (0.025) (0.028)
South * education≥ 13 0.081*** 0.107*** 0.123*** 0.113*** 0.099*** 0.076*** 0.129*** 0.051** 0.034 0.035
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
South * degree 0.015 0.102** 0.117*** 0.008 0.043 0.110** 0.084** 0.052 0.055 0.027
(0.040) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.043) (0.041) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037)
South * gender 0.064** -0.045 -0.006 0.003 0.039 0.041 0.045 0.020 0.047* 0.024
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.034) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027) (0.026) (0.028)
Total surface 0.039** -0.011 0.023 0.016 0.025 0.033* 0.042** 0.050*** 0.027 0.056***
(0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019)
Per-capita surface 0.020 0.102*** 0.010 0.067* 0.047 0.038 0.084** -0.021 0.009 -0.018
(0.043) (0.036) (0.034) (0.038) (0.033) (0.034) (0.040) (0.037) (0.035) (0.039)
Homeowner 0.030*** 0.007 0.043*** 0.031*** 0.049*** 0.051*** 0.035*** 0.057*** 0.078*** 0.097***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Secondary residence 0.049*** 0.061*** 0.075*** 0.132*** 0.096*** 0.084*** 0.082*** 0.111*** 0.046** 0.048**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Constant 5.303*** 5.030*** 5.248*** 5.225*** 5.276*** 4.580*** 4.857*** 4.916*** 4.832*** 5.173***
(0.108) (0.109) (0.113) (0.129) (0.118) (0.117) (0.109) (0.109) (0.102) (0.108)
ln (σ) -0.940*** -0.922*** -0.913*** -0.873*** -0.871*** -0.853*** -0.900*** -0.968*** -1.020*** -0.954***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
N 7816 7685 7662 6795 7580 7471 7441 7141 7235 7155
N1 6891 7172 7221 6471 7192 7206 7310 7031 7125 6976
F-test instruments 16.54 37.82 27.34 44.37 43.57 18.63 34.93 18.04 17.64 27.28
p-value 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.00
F-test g∗t−1 3.97 8.24 32.19 14.49 17.01 19.28 18.94 15.34 36.06 38.04
p-value 0.41 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table A.2: Estimation of Φ for food consumption for waves between 1991 and 2010 - cross method
1991 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
w 0.741*** 0.808*** 0.836*** 0.856*** 0.813*** 0.901*** 0.964*** 1.005*** 0.883*** 0.937***
(0.0618) (0.0549) (0.0503) (0.0552) (0.0521) (0.0470) (0.0495) (0.0507) (0.0498) (0.0494)
Having a bank account 0.0460 0.121*** 0.0480 0.0652 0.0632 -0.000216 -0.0322 0.0345 0.0969** 0.203***
(0.0389) (0.0385) (0.0394) (0.0456) (0.0448) (0.0389) (0.0398) (0.0543) (0.0485) (0.0536)
Bank payments 0.0705* 0.0223 0.0118 0.0584 0.0516 -0.0706** -0.0671** -0.0211
(0.0418) (0.0377) (0.0352) (0.0359) (0.0336) (0.0312) (0.0314) (0.0321)
POS payments -0.0205 -0.0843 -0.0659 -0.00536 0.0113 -0.0252 0.0245 0.0382 0.00356 -0.00292
(0.0754) (0.0566) (0.0445) (0.0382) (0.0355) (0.0329) (0.0356) (0.0358) (0.0372) (0.0412)
Credit card 0.115** 0.120** 0.101** 0.156*** 0.0628* 0.103*** 0.0231 0.0549 0.0878*** 0.0570*
(0.0475) (0.0492) (0.0431) (0.0407) (0.0375) (0.0360) (0.0346) (0.0341) (0.0337) (0.0338)
Age > 70 0.0208 0.0762 -0.0589 0.0742 0.0206 0.0273 0.0113 0.00588 -0.0168 0.00815
(0.0563) (0.0469) (0.0480) (0.0499) (0.0445) (0.0382) (0.0382) (0.0384) (0.0362) (0.0365)
Fair understanding -0.103** 0.0570 0.0930 -0.0986* -0.143*** -0.0639 -0.0112 -0.0202 -0.0200
(0.0425) (0.0503) (0.0568) (0.0532) (0.0499) (0.0499) (0.0478) (0.0455) (0.0528)
Good understanding -0.0726 0.0585 0.0532 -0.0302 -0.120** 0.0701 -0.0925** -0.0269 -0.0329
(0.0684) (0.0461) (0.0527) (0.0508) (0.0484) (0.0494) (0.0453) (0.0442) (0.0490)
Excellent understanding -0.234* 0.158*** 0.114** 0.0219 -0.101* -0.0115 0.00512 0.0171 0.0131
(0.123) (0.0510) (0.0495) (0.0458) (0.0545) (0.0571) (0.0436) (0.0423) (0.0463)
Long interview -0.00624 0.163*** 0.0161 0.0645 0.0286 0.0369 0.0178
(0.0482) (0.0444) (0.0449) (0.0418) (0.0359) (0.0332) (0.0388)
Euro 0.00944 0.0303***
(0.0100) (0.0104)
Panel 0.0189 -0.0535* 0.000940 0.0689** 0.0182 0.0351 0.0424 -0.0173 -0.0207 -0.00970
(0.0350) (0.0298) (0.0290) (0.0314) (0.0289) (0.0275) (0.0273) (0.0278) (0.0276) (0.0282)
τ1 5.303*** 5.797*** 5.965*** 6.191*** 5.768*** 4.609*** 5.188*** 5.152*** 4.474*** 4.850***
(0.108) (0.361) (0.330) (0.361) (0.341) (0.277) (0.300) (0.304) (0.297) (0.294)
174
1991 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
τ2 5.491*** 6.369*** 6.540*** 6.774*** 6.352*** 6.356*** 6.995*** 7.022*** 6.337*** 6.791***
(0.401) (0.362) (0.331) (0.362) (0.342) (0.281) (0.304) (0.308) (0.301) (0.299)
w w w w w w w w w w
Number of members 18-24 0.102*** 0.0932*** 0.116*** 0.101*** 0.127*** 0.115*** 0.151*** 0.0518** 0.139*** 0.0962***
(0.0230) (0.0237) (0.0249) (0.0285) (0.0278) (0.0288) (0.0272) (0.0256) (0.0253) (0.0268)
Number of members 25-39 0.122*** 0.119*** 0.113*** 0.141*** 0.147*** 0.158*** 0.162*** 0.102*** 0.153*** 0.0887***
(0.0211) (0.0207) (0.0223) (0.0250) (0.0246) (0.0253) (0.0244) (0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0232)
Number of members 40-59 0.132*** 0.130*** 0.172*** 0.159*** 0.169*** 0.147*** 0.178*** 0.139*** 0.195*** 0.127***
(0.0205) (0.0197) (0.0212) (0.0242) (0.0234) (0.0241) (0.0235) (0.0223) (0.0220) (0.0230)
Number of members 60-69 0.107*** 0.114*** 0.151*** 0.162*** 0.142*** 0.119*** 0.147*** 0.128*** 0.181*** 0.116***
(0.0221) (0.0214) (0.0225) (0.0263) (0.0250) (0.0259) (0.0253) (0.0238) (0.0233) (0.0244)
Number of members 70+ 0.0997*** 0.0866*** 0.103*** 0.106*** 0.0568** 0.0736*** 0.103*** 0.0892*** 0.156*** 0.0510*
(0.0256) (0.0244) (0.0250) (0.0296) (0.0273) (0.0280) (0.0275) (0.0264) (0.0251) (0.0269)
Central Italy 0.0580 0.0349 0.143*** 0.0751 0.0883** 0.0289 0.00359 0.0259 0.0473 -0.133***
(0.0399) (0.0394) (0.0404) (0.0466) (0.0436) (0.0413) (0.0392) (0.0396) (0.0373) (0.0416)
Southern Italy -0.163*** -0.0849** -0.0590* -0.173*** -0.141*** -0.134*** -0.148*** -0.0184 -0.0826** -0.0745**
(0.0343) (0.0342) (0.0349) (0.0404) (0.0369) (0.0367) (0.0354) (0.0340) (0.0330) (0.0359)
Number of children 0-5 0.0397*** 0.0414*** 0.0565*** 0.0757*** 0.0666*** 0.0359* 0.0404** 0.0576*** 0.0474*** 0.0162
(0.0148) (0.0157) (0.0163) (0.0188) (0.0184) (0.0203) (0.0195) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0198)
Number of children 6-14 0.0552*** 0.0760*** 0.0551*** 0.101*** 0.0812*** 0.0379** 0.0652*** 0.0546*** 0.0532*** 0.0528***
(0.0114) (0.0124) (0.0127) (0.0142) (0.0149) (0.0164) (0.0159) (0.0149) (0.0144) (0.0157)
Number of children 15-17 0.0610*** 0.0807*** 0.100*** 0.0717*** 0.0876*** 0.0745*** 0.0604*** 0.0842*** 0.0329* 0.0215
(0.0142) (0.0158) (0.0168) (0.0184) (0.0194) (0.0208) (0.0206) (0.0194) (0.0189) (0.0206)
Number of children 18+ 0.0219 0.00955 -0.00210 -0.000922 0.000201 -0.0128 -0.0409** 0.0380** -0.0315* -0.00859
(0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0184) (0.0209) (0.0190) (0.0189) (0.0184) (0.0175) (0.0176) (0.0174)
Number of retired members 0.00806 0.0290** 0.00716 0.0267 0.0280* 0.0411*** 0.0196 0.0226 0.0236* 0.0444***
(0.0146) (0.0140) (0.0143) (0.0164) (0.0153) (0.0152) (0.0150) (0.0146) (0.0137) (0.0152)
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1991 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
At least 2 members 0.267*** 0.360*** 0.286*** 0.279*** 0.287*** 0.304*** 0.303*** 0.304*** 0.305*** 0.312***
(0.0249) (0.0234) (0.0237) (0.0268) (0.0244) (0.0258) (0.0257) (0.0238) (0.0229) (0.0249)
At least 3 members 0.115*** 0.151*** 0.133*** 0.135*** 0.125*** 0.148*** 0.0924*** 0.0932*** 0.0910*** 0.130***
(0.0172) (0.0174) (0.0178) (0.0200) (0.0195) (0.0208) (0.0203) (0.0189) (0.0185) (0.0202)
At least 4 members 0.0416** 0.0694*** 0.0869*** 0.0453** 0.0485** 0.0453** 0.0425* 0.0258 0.0409** 0.0628***
(0.0174) (0.0182) (0.0187) (0.0208) (0.0209) (0.0231) (0.0223) (0.0212) (0.0206) (0.0222)
Gender (male) 0.0318 0.0966*** 0.0662*** 0.102*** 0.0442** 0.0606*** 0.0497** 0.0827*** 0.00382 0.0717***
(0.0217) (0.0207) (0.0218) (0.0243) (0.0218) (0.0211) (0.0194) (0.0182) (0.0175) (0.0189)
Age of the head 0.0180*** 0.0218*** 0.0145*** 0.0147*** 0.0145*** 0.0173*** 0.00962** 0.0133*** 0.0141*** -0.000243
(0.00399) (0.00401) (0.00415) (0.00482) (0.00431) (0.00429) (0.00401) (0.00402) (0.00375) (0.00401)
Age of the head2 -0.0155*** -0.0156*** -0.00923** -0.00921** -0.00826** -0.0105*** -0.00348 -0.00871** -0.00757** 0.00681*
(0.00376) (0.00374) (0.00389) (0.00453) (0.00399) (0.00398) (0.00373) (0.00372) (0.00348) (0.00373)
Head unemployed -0.202*** -0.207*** -0.329*** -0.285*** -0.261*** -0.276*** -0.248*** -0.182*** -0.241*** -0.224***
(0.0347) (0.0287) (0.0243) (0.0242) (0.0271) (0.0285) (0.0272) (0.0262) (0.0246) (0.0229)
Head out of labor force -0.0946*** -0.0316** -0.0191 -0.0183 -0.0363** -0.0480*** -0.0635*** -0.0252 -0.0555*** -0.0280*
(0.0152) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0169) (0.0161) (0.0169) (0.0163) (0.0159) (0.0153) (0.0159)
Education ≥ 8 0.0882*** 0.105*** 0.151*** 0.126*** 0.120*** 0.152*** 0.136*** 0.0934*** 0.0759*** 0.0894***
(0.0179) (0.0173) (0.0179) (0.0212) (0.0202) (0.0195) (0.0193) (0.0185) (0.0173) (0.0201)
Education ≥ 13 0.0193 0.0311* 0.0365** 0.0249 0.0245 0.0535*** 0.0192 0.0451*** 0.0666*** 0.0703***
(0.0183) (0.0188) (0.0183) (0.0194) (0.0181) (0.0179) (0.0169) (0.0153) (0.0152) (0.0165)
University degree 0.104*** 0.0528* 0.0777*** 0.162*** 0.111*** 0.0804*** 0.0804*** 0.104*** 0.0720*** 0.0708***
(0.0270) (0.0288) (0.0266) (0.0286) (0.0253) (0.0268) (0.0240) (0.0224) (0.0219) (0.0226)
Center * number 18-24 -0.0621*** -0.0256 -0.0171 0.00925 -0.0542* -0.0219 -0.0257 -0.0512* -0.0362 -0.0303
(0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0228) (0.0260) (0.0278) (0.0290) (0.0282) (0.0276) (0.0279) (0.0285)
Center * number 25-39 -0.0361* -0.0449** -0.0226 -0.0162 -0.0344* -0.0324 0.0204 -0.0382* -0.0438** 0.0325
(0.0199) (0.0195) (0.0193) (0.0213) (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0201) (0.0196) (0.0195) (0.0211)
Center * number 40-59 0.0127 -0.00218 -0.0295 -0.00927 -0.0383* 0.00286 0.0234 -0.0182 -0.0329 0.0460**
(0.0218) (0.0209) (0.0208) (0.0232) (0.0220) (0.0223) (0.0207) (0.0208) (0.0205) (0.0222)
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1991 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Center * number 60-69 0.0344 -0.00746 -0.0951*** -0.0177 -0.0406 0.0247 0.0232 -0.00170 -0.0332 0.0162
(0.0243) (0.0236) (0.0239) (0.0276) (0.0259) (0.0252) (0.0237) (0.0233) (0.0220) (0.0234)
Center * number 70+ 0.0400 0.0210 -0.0499* 0.00720 0.00706 0.0499* 0.0282 0.0320 -0.0446* 0.0436*
(0.0275) (0.0252) (0.0256) (0.0301) (0.0281) (0.0275) (0.0258) (0.0253) (0.0237) (0.0251)
Center * education ≥ 8 -0.00414 2.70e-05 -0.0942*** -0.0401 -0.0391 0.00749 -0.0439 0.0260 -0.0164 -0.0202
(0.0309) (0.0304) (0.0316) (0.0369) (0.0351) (0.0341) (0.0333) (0.0331) (0.0303) (0.0339)
Center * education ≥ 13 0.0242 0.0190 0.0405 0.0264 0.0396 0.0431 0.0562* 0.0393 0.0255 0.00242
(0.0333) (0.0326) (0.0323) (0.0337) (0.0327) (0.0329) (0.0305) (0.0288) (0.0283) (0.0288)
Center * degree -0.0419 -0.0480 -0.0336 -0.0722 0.00569 -0.0635 -0.00786 0.0146 0.0143 0.0454
(0.0501) (0.0513) (0.0500) (0.0492) (0.0474) (0.0512) (0.0444) (0.0416) (0.0397) (0.0385)
Center * gender -0.0293 -0.0356 -0.00654 -0.0685* 0.0524 -0.0338 -0.00566 -0.0255 0.0453 0.0107
(0.0357) (0.0348) (0.0356) (0.0392) (0.0364) (0.0355) (0.0328) (0.0321) (0.0300) (0.0319)
South * number 18-24 -0.0520*** -0.0409** -0.0460** -0.00313 -0.0621*** -0.0564** -0.0464** -0.0497** -0.0544*** -0.0402*
(0.0169) (0.0176) (0.0179) (0.0208) (0.0217) (0.0231) (0.0217) (0.0216) (0.0203) (0.0223)
South * number 25-39 -0.0557*** -0.0365** -0.0108 -0.0383** -0.0413** -0.0595*** -0.0240 -0.0605*** -0.0339** -0.0168
(0.0162) (0.0165) (0.0166) (0.0180) (0.0167) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0164) (0.0162) (0.0174)
South * number 40-59 -0.0414** -0.0405** -0.0407** -0.0242 -0.0646*** -0.0645*** -0.0372** -0.0806*** -0.0689*** -0.0794***
(0.0180) (0.0183) (0.0185) (0.0203) (0.0188) (0.0194) (0.0189) (0.0178) (0.0176) (0.0189)
South * number 60-69 -0.0163 -0.0377* -0.0349* -0.0529** -0.0669*** -0.0465** -0.0463** -0.0645*** -0.0906*** -0.0628***
(0.0202) (0.0199) (0.0208) (0.0233) (0.0217) (0.0223) (0.0219) (0.0203) (0.0197) (0.0207)
South * number 70+ 0.0188 0.0189 0.00358 -0.0331 0.00298 -0.0226 -0.0341 -0.0799*** -0.0917*** -0.0508**
(0.0249) (0.0235) (0.0240) (0.0268) (0.0241) (0.0248) (0.0237) (0.0223) (0.0216) (0.0227)
South * education≥ 8 0.0318 0.0324 -0.0305 -0.0128 0.0294 -0.00446 -0.0102 0.0423 0.0497** 0.0446
(0.0253) (0.0257) (0.0263) (0.0302) (0.0285) (0.0288) (0.0280) (0.0273) (0.0253) (0.0278)
South * education≥ 13 0.0812*** 0.107*** 0.123*** 0.113*** 0.0997*** 0.0758*** 0.129*** 0.0513** 0.0345 0.0346
(0.0277) (0.0288) (0.0284) (0.0294) (0.0286) (0.0292) (0.0275) (0.0254) (0.0246) (0.0255)
South * degree 0.0155 0.102** 0.118*** 0.00843 0.0429 0.110** 0.0847** 0.0517 0.0544 0.0270
(0.0396) (0.0430) (0.0419) (0.0422) (0.0405) (0.0428) (0.0412) (0.0383) (0.0375) (0.0365)
177
1991 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
South * gender 0.0639** -0.0448 -0.00548 0.00323 0.0385 0.0409 0.0454 0.0209 0.0481* 0.0250
(0.0302) (0.0300) (0.0302) (0.0337) (0.0302) (0.0302) (0.0288) (0.0270) (0.0262) (0.0275)
Total surface 0.0391** -0.0103 0.0235 0.0162 0.0257 0.0337* 0.0425** 0.0503*** 0.0273 0.0569***
(0.0191) (0.0172) (0.0164) (0.0169) (0.0161) (0.0173) (0.0200) (0.0182) (0.0172) (0.0190)
Per-capita surface 0.0197 0.101*** 0.00988 0.0670* 0.0472 0.0369 0.0841** -0.0197 0.00961 -0.0194
(0.0427) (0.0359) (0.0344) (0.0379) (0.0325) (0.0336) (0.0398) (0.0370) (0.0347) (0.0389)
Homeowner 0.0303*** 0.00705 0.0426*** 0.0309*** 0.0490*** 0.0511*** 0.0354*** 0.0572*** 0.0781*** 0.0969***
(0.00958) (0.00983) (0.0100) (0.0113) (0.0108) (0.0110) (0.0106) (0.0102) (0.00984) (0.0105)
Secondary residence 0.0488*** 0.0609*** 0.0757*** 0.132*** 0.0963*** 0.0835*** 0.0821*** 0.111*** 0.0463** 0.0484**
(0.0183) (0.0181) (0.0179) (0.0201) (0.0206) (0.0223) (0.0212) (0.0193) (0.0185) (0.0192)
Constant 6.048*** 5.031*** 5.248*** 5.224*** 5.277*** 4.579*** 4.857*** 4.916*** 4.833*** 5.174***
(0.402) (0.109) (0.113) (0.129) (0.118) (0.116) (0.109) (0.108) (0.102) (0.108)
ln (σ) -0.940*** -0.922*** -0.913*** -0.873*** -0.871*** -0.853*** -0.899*** -0.968*** -1.020*** -0.954***
(0.00800) (0.00807) (0.00808) (0.00858) (0.00813) (0.00819) (0.00820) (0.00837) (0.00832) (0.00836)
N 7816 7685 7662 6795 7580 7471 7441 7141 7235 7155
N1 6891 7172 7221 6471 7192 7206 7310 7031 7125 6976
F-test instruments 16.91 41.09 29.71 50.85 46.58 20.77 38.14 18.68 20.91 29.86
p-value 0.00963 4.82e-06 0.000956 1.86e-07 1.12e-06 0.0228 3.59e-05 0.0445 0.0217 0.000902
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Table B.1: Estimation of Φ for non durable consumption for waves between 1991 and 2010 - cross method
1991 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
w 0.514*** 0.706*** 0.832*** 0.727*** 0.797*** 0.813*** 0.936*** 0.939*** 0.829*** 0.873*** 0.838***
(0.0492) (0.0497) (0.0474) (0.0497) (0.0487) (0.0487) (0.0515) (0.0544) (0.0529) (0.0503) (0.0647)
Having a bank account 0.0606* 0.114*** 0.0531 0.0569 0.0529 -0.0227 -0.104** 0.0810 0.148*** 0.0769 -0.0870
(0.0357) (0.0359) (0.0369) (0.0416) (0.0409) (0.0391) (0.0404) (0.0565) (0.0497) (0.0544) (0.0929)
Bank payments 0.0461 0.0556 0.0536 0.0751** 0.105*** -0.0959*** -0.164*** -0.0716** 0.0553
(0.0380) (0.0348) (0.0331) (0.0337) (0.0316) (0.0321) (0.0324) (0.0326) (0.0447)
POS payments 0.231*** 0.0333 -0.0242 0.000554 0.0818** 0.00374 -0.0139 -0.00785 -0.00543 -0.0832** -0.0196
(0.0688) (0.0522) (0.0421) (0.0363) (0.0338) (0.0333) (0.0364) (0.0368) (0.0381) (0.0417) (0.0553)
Credit card 0.116*** 0.149*** 0.143*** 0.261*** 0.152*** 0.147*** 0.152*** 0.187*** 0.221*** 0.160*** 0.189***
(0.0438) (0.0465) (0.0415) (0.0392) (0.0362) (0.0370) (0.0360) (0.0355) (0.0352) (0.0349) (0.0482)
Age > 70 -0.0136 0.0130 0.0379 -0.0246 -0.109*** 0.0827** 0.106*** 0.0684* -0.0744** -0.0811** -0.0450
(0.0497) (0.0434) (0.0435) (0.0456) (0.0404) (0.0379) (0.0388) (0.0394) (0.0370) (0.0370) (0.0502)
Fair understanding -0.0536 -0.00544 0.0509 -0.0982** -0.194*** -0.0639 -0.0874* -0.0422 -0.0571 -0.0381
(0.0387) (0.0462) (0.0516) (0.0484) (0.0497) (0.0505) (0.0489) (0.0466) (0.0532) (0.0821)
Good understanding -0.0375 -0.00849 0.0869* -0.200*** -0.127*** -0.0305 0.0383 -0.0301 -0.108** -0.0225
(0.0625) (0.0426) (0.0478) (0.0467) (0.0484) (0.0502) (0.0465) (0.0453) (0.0497) (0.0760)
Excellent understanding -0.150 0.117** 0.116*** -0.134*** -0.147*** -0.0350 0.110** 0.0744* 0.0880* -0.0104
(0.107) (0.0480) (0.0449) (0.0422) (0.0545) (0.0583) (0.0451) (0.0436) (0.0474) (0.0721)
Long interview 0.237*** 0.0749* 0.145*** 0.130*** 0.0852** 0.00249 0.00469 -0.0127 0.0135
(0.0460) (0.0443) (0.0421) (0.0454) (0.0428) (0.0372) (0.0340) (0.0397) (0.0522)
Euro 0.0292*** 0.0222**
(0.00999) (0.0106)
Panel 0.0274 0.00496 -0.0181 -0.0110 0.0110 -0.00339 -0.0256 -0.0787*** -0.0573** -0.105*** 0.0792**
(0.0316) (0.0273) (0.0270) (0.0293) (0.0269) (0.0277) (0.0279) (0.0285) (0.0283) (0.0288) (0.0402)
τ1 3.968*** 5.123*** 5.967*** 5.223*** 5.554*** 4.405*** 5.040*** 5.029*** 4.263*** 4.475*** 4.191***
(0.350) (0.359) (0.342) (0.359) (0.354) (0.322) (0.351) (0.368) (0.358) (0.340) (0.432)179
1991 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
τ2 4.521*** 5.812*** 6.672*** 5.951*** 6.302*** 5.999*** 6.856*** 6.953*** 6.189*** 6.397*** 6.173***
(0.351) (0.360) (0.343) (0.360) (0.355) (0.324) (0.355) (0.372) (0.361) (0.344) (0.438)
w w w w w w w w w w w
Number of members 0.00166 0.0636*** 0.0595*** 0.112*** 0.110*** 0.0963*** 0.0933*** 0.0330 0.0780*** 0.0564** 0.0970***
18-24 (0.0208) (0.0218) (0.0224) (0.0307) (0.0262) (0.0282) (0.0269) (0.0256) (0.0256) (0.0265) (0.0356)
Number of members 0.126*** 0.0985*** 0.111*** 0.161*** 0.158*** 0.156*** 0.120*** 0.0834*** 0.102*** 0.100*** 0.109***
25-39 (0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0200) (0.0270) (0.0231) (0.0247) (0.0241) (0.0231) (0.0234) (0.0230) (0.0322)
Number of members 0.128*** 0.0905*** 0.133*** 0.132*** 0.154*** 0.168*** 0.133*** 0.0995*** 0.138*** 0.125*** 0.0897***
40-59 (0.0185) (0.0181) (0.0190) (0.0261) (0.0220) (0.0236) (0.0232) (0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0228) (0.0308)
Number of members 0.0923*** 0.0685*** 0.0851*** 0.0739*** 0.0937*** 0.116*** 0.0759*** 0.0877*** 0.0900*** 0.0641*** 0.0481
60-69 (0.0200) (0.0197) (0.0202) (0.0284) (0.0236) (0.0253) (0.0251) (0.0238) (0.0236) (0.0242) (0.0324)
Number of members 0.0871*** 0.0251 0.0331 0.0499 0.0204 0.0468* -0.00323 0.0498* 0.0568** 0.00326 -0.0130
70+ (0.0231) (0.0225) (0.0224) (0.0319) (0.0256) (0.0274) (0.0272) (0.0263) (0.0255) (0.0266) (0.0363)
Central Italy -0.0284 0.0207 0.0322 -0.000774 0.0526 0.120*** -0.0194 0.00829 0.0718* -0.0721* -0.00629
(0.0361) (0.0362) (0.0362) (0.0500) (0.0410) (0.0404) (0.0387) (0.0395) (0.0378) (0.0411) (0.0609)
Southern Italy -0.177*** -0.176*** -0.203*** -0.142*** -0.188*** -0.0926*** -0.158*** -0.132*** -0.149*** -0.117*** -0.154***
(0.0309) (0.0314) (0.0312) (0.0434) (0.0347) (0.0358) (0.0351) (0.0340) (0.0334) (0.0355) (0.0502)
Number of children -0.00187 0.0224 0.0186 0.0415** 0.0292* 0.0137 0.0148 0.0323* 0.00348 -0.0381* 0.00814
0-5 (0.0134) (0.0145) (0.0146) (0.0204) (0.0173) (0.0199) (0.0193) (0.0181) (0.0183) (0.0196) (0.0279)
Number of children 0.00844 0.0391*** 0.00440 0.0532*** 0.0383*** -0.00490 0.0353** 0.0159 0.0226 -0.00130 -0.00479
6-14 (0.0103) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0154) (0.0140) (0.0161) (0.0158) (0.0148) (0.0146) (0.0156) (0.0224)
Number of children 0.0178 0.0412*** 0.0415*** 0.0539*** 0.0509*** 0.0117 0.0377* 0.0209 -0.0127 0.00289 0.00743
15-17 (0.0129) (0.0146) (0.0151) (0.0199) (0.0183) (0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0194) (0.0192) (0.0204) (0.0283)
Number of children 0.0963*** 0.0430*** 0.0311* -0.0218 -0.00604 -0.00547 -0.00186 0.0443** 0.00259 -0.000562 -0.0342
18+ (0.0160) (0.0163) (0.0165) (0.0225) (0.0179) (0.0185) (0.0182) (0.0176) (0.0178) (0.0172) (0.0246)
Number of retired 0.0283** 0.0239* 0.0305** 0.0758*** 0.0628*** 0.0906*** 0.0735*** 0.0564*** 0.0853*** 0.0806*** 0.0941***
members (0.0132) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0177) (0.0144) (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0146) (0.0139) (0.0150) (0.0212)
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1991 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
At least 2 members 0.246*** 0.320*** 0.258*** 0.272*** 0.234*** 0.179*** 0.190*** 0.233*** 0.224*** 0.237*** 0.245***
(0.0224) (0.0215) (0.0212) (0.0288) (0.0229) (0.0252) (0.0254) (0.0238) (0.0232) (0.0247) (0.0341)
At least 3 members 0.106*** 0.120*** 0.0848*** 0.116*** 0.104*** 0.0980*** 0.0717*** 0.0723*** 0.0796*** 0.0911*** 0.131***
(0.0156) (0.0160) (0.0159) (0.0215) (0.0183) (0.0204) (0.0201) (0.0189) (0.0187) (0.0200) (0.0286)
At least 4 members 0.0398** 0.0522*** 0.0679*** 0.0232 0.0564*** 0.0556** 0.0136 0.0490** 0.0617*** 0.0634*** 0.0110
(0.0158) (0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0225) (0.0197) (0.0226) (0.0221) (0.0212) (0.0209) (0.0220) (0.0319)
Gender (male) 0.0466** 0.135*** 0.0761*** 0.114*** 0.0793*** 0.0466** 0.0770*** 0.0943*** 0.0553*** 0.122*** 0.112***
(0.0196) (0.0190) (0.0195) (0.0262) (0.0204) (0.0206) (0.0192) (0.0182) (0.0178) (0.0186) (0.0262)
Age of the head 0.0116*** 0.0175*** 0.0110*** 0.0232*** 0.0183*** 0.0121*** 0.00538 0.0132*** 0.00713* 0.00285 0.0171***
(0.00360) (0.00368) (0.00372) (0.00516) (0.00405) (0.00420) (0.00397) (0.00402) (0.00380) (0.00397) (0.00587)
Age of the head2 -1.176*** -1.343*** -0.664* -1.583*** -1.191*** -0.603 0.0496 -0.929** -0.132 0.366 -0.798
(0.339) (0.343) (0.348) (0.487) (0.375) (0.389) (0.369) (0.372) (0.352) (0.369) (0.535)
Head unemployed -0.377*** -0.278*** -0.410*** -0.385*** -0.321*** -0.352*** -0.336*** -0.318*** -0.321*** -0.338*** -0.434***
(0.0314) (0.0263) (0.0217) (0.0260) (0.0254) (0.0279) (0.0269) (0.0262) (0.0249) (0.0227) (0.0298)
Head out of labor force -0.175*** -0.0826*** -0.0843*** -0.0819*** -0.0823*** -0.113*** -0.141*** -0.0926*** -0.105*** -0.0856*** -0.0728***
(0.0138) (0.0143) (0.0139) (0.0182) (0.0152) (0.0165) (0.0162) (0.0159) (0.0155) (0.0157) (0.0226)
Education ≥ 8 0.0996*** 0.120*** 0.146*** 0.132*** 0.111*** 0.154*** 0.132*** 0.104*** 0.0972*** 0.109*** 0.116***
(0.0161) (0.0159) (0.0160) (0.0228) (0.0189) (0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0185) (0.0175) (0.0199) (0.0303)
Education ≥ 13 0.102*** 0.107*** 0.0794*** 0.0913*** 0.0863*** 0.138*** 0.100*** 0.115*** 0.143*** 0.126*** 0.145***
(0.0165) (0.0173) (0.0164) (0.0209) (0.0170) (0.0175) (0.0167) (0.0153) (0.0154) (0.0163) (0.0234)
University degree 0.186*** 0.190*** 0.183*** 0.215*** 0.178*** 0.180*** 0.179*** 0.172*** 0.108*** 0.135*** 0.144***
(0.0245) (0.0266) (0.0239) (0.0310) (0.0239) (0.0263) (0.0238) (0.0225) (0.0222) (0.0223) (0.0311)
Center * number 18-24 -0.0467** -0.0180 -0.0299 -0.0112 -0.0243 -0.0247 -0.00302 -0.0700** -0.0473* 0.0118 -0.0377
(0.0203) (0.0207) (0.0204) (0.0282) (0.0263) (0.0285) (0.0280) (0.0276) (0.0283) (0.0282) (0.0421)
Center * number 25-39 -0.0258 -0.0375** -0.0429** -0.0515** -0.0530*** -0.0455** 0.0532*** -0.0322* -0.0586*** 0.0179 0.0125
(0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0173) (0.0230) (0.0195) (0.0203) (0.0199) (0.0196) (0.0198) (0.0209) (0.0312)
Center * number 40-59 0.0126 0.0136 -0.0144 -0.0132 -0.0689*** -0.0558** 0.0537*** -0.00261 -0.0366* 0.0237 0.00337
(0.0197) (0.0192) (0.0186) (0.0251) (0.0207) (0.0218) (0.0205) (0.0208) (0.0207) (0.0219) (0.0312)
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1991 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Center * number 60-69 0.0330 -0.000487 -0.0434** -0.00809 -0.0366 -0.0570** 0.0546** -0.00503 -0.0440** 0.0281 0.0101
(0.0220) (0.0217) (0.0214) (0.0298) (0.0244) (0.0247) (0.0235) (0.0233) (0.0223) (0.0232) (0.0333)
Center * number 70+ 0.0559** 0.0514** -0.0111 -0.0134 -0.0104 -0.0233 0.0711*** -0.0101 -0.0692*** 0.0295 0.0597*
(0.0248) (0.0233) (0.0230) (0.0324) (0.0264) (0.0270) (0.0256) (0.0253) (0.0240) (0.0248) (0.0342)
Center*education≥8 -0.0282 0.000225 -0.00846 0.0283 0.00108 -0.0151 -0.0257 0.0415 0.0271 0.0302 -0.0157
(0.0279) (0.0280) (0.0283) (0.0398) (0.0329) (0.0334) (0.0329) (0.0330) (0.0307) (0.0335) (0.0494)
Center*education≥13 -0.00193 0.0409 0.0211 -0.0202 0.0337 -0.0304 0.00841 0.00384 -0.0283 -0.00223 0.0473
(0.0301) (0.0300) (0.0290) (0.0364) (0.0308) (0.0323) (0.0302) (0.0288) (0.0287) (0.0285) (0.0418)
Center * degree -0.0376 -0.0821* -0.0532 -0.0927* -0.0329 -0.0530 0.00536 -0.0109 -0.0114 0.0251 -0.00363
(0.0453) (0.0472) (0.0450) (0.0531) (0.0447) (0.0502) (0.0441) (0.0417) (0.0403) (0.0382) (0.0554)
Center * gender 0.00691 -0.0653** -0.0295 -0.0576 0.0318 0.0399 -0.0232 1.42e-05 0.0322 -0.0429 -0.0709
(0.0322) (0.0319) (0.0319) (0.0421) (0.0341) (0.0347) (0.0324) (0.0320) (0.0304) (0.0315) (0.0450)
South * number 18-24 -0.0537*** -0.0566*** -0.0498*** -0.0430* -0.0557*** -0.0571** -0.0437** -0.0491** -0.0347* -0.0423* -0.0316
(0.0153) (0.0162) (0.0161) (0.0224) (0.0204) (0.0226) (0.0215) (0.0216) (0.0206) (0.0221) (0.0301)
South * number 25-39 -0.0867*** -0.0460*** -0.0537*** -0.0577*** -0.0762*** -0.0856*** -0.00596 -0.0572*** -0.0288* -0.0310* -0.0400
(0.0147) (0.0151) (0.0149) (0.0194) (0.0157) (0.0169) (0.0170) (0.0163) (0.0164) (0.0173) (0.0249)
South * number 40-59 -0.0431*** -0.0108 -0.0452*** -0.0264 -0.0835*** -0.0908*** -0.0277 -0.0433** -0.0917*** -0.0681*** -0.0144
(0.0162) (0.0169) (0.0165) (0.0219) (0.0177) (0.0190) (0.0187) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0187) (0.0262)
South * number 60-69 -0.0246 -0.00484 -0.0307* -0.0175 -0.0583*** -0.0781*** -0.0242 -0.0239 -0.0738*** -0.0470** 0.00963
(0.0182) (0.0183) (0.0186) (0.0251) (0.0204) (0.0219) (0.0216) (0.0203) (0.0200) (0.0205) (0.0284)
South * number 70+ -0.000948 0.0524** 0.0168 -0.0289 0.0191 -0.0482** 0.0448* -0.0191 -0.0577*** -0.0122 0.0377
(0.0225) (0.0216) (0.0215) (0.0289) (0.0226) (0.0243) (0.0235) (0.0223) (0.0219) (0.0225) (0.0316)
South*education≥ 8 0.0416* 0.0483** -0.0122 0.00218 0.0730*** 0.0100 -0.00164 0.0371 0.0189 -0.00436 0.00242
(0.0229) (0.0237) (0.0236) (0.0325) (0.0268) (0.0282) (0.0277) (0.0273) (0.0257) (0.0275) (0.0410)
South*education≥13 0.0200 0.0641** 0.133*** 0.0694** 0.0542** 0.00367 0.0764*** 0.0257 0.0545** 0.0844*** 0.0216
(0.0250) (0.0265) (0.0254) (0.0317) (0.0269) (0.0286) (0.0272) (0.0253) (0.0249) (0.0252) (0.0355)
South * degree 0.00117 0.0585 0.0611 0.0340 0.0412 0.0372 0.0545 0.0485 0.102*** 0.0915** 0.143***
(0.0358) (0.0397) (0.0377) (0.0458) (0.0382) (0.0420) (0.0408) (0.0383) (0.0381) (0.0362) (0.0501)
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1991 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
South * gender 0.0451* -0.0708** 0.0237 -0.0675* 0.00233 0.0341 -0.00708 0.00724 0.0772*** -0.00562 -0.0243
(0.0272) (0.0275) (0.0270) (0.0362) (0.0283) (0.0295) (0.0285) (0.0270) (0.0265) (0.0272) (0.0382)
Total surface 4.878*** 2.837* 10.23*** 6.353*** 6.788*** 11.02*** 13.13*** 10.23*** 10.77*** 13.01*** 16.38***
(1.725) (1.585) (1.469) (1.825) (1.519) (1.698) (1.986) (1.825) (1.749) (1.881) (2.632)
Per-capita surface 4.033 15.12*** -4.155 6.517 6.805** 1.092 -1.037 0.0343 -3.918 -1.675 -2.853
(3.845) (3.295) (3.043) (4.069) (3.058) (3.292) (3.943) (3.698) (3.517) (3.844) (5.407)
Homeowner 0.0740*** 0.0419*** 0.0637*** 0.0358*** 0.0467*** 0.0790*** 0.0709*** 0.0670*** 0.0750*** 0.107*** 0.161***
(0.00865) (0.00904) (0.00895) (0.0121) (0.0102) (0.0108) (0.0105) (0.0102) (0.00996) (0.0104) (0.0149)
Secondary residence 0.0895*** 0.119*** 0.112*** 0.209*** 0.144*** 0.152*** 0.142*** 0.151*** 0.121*** 0.169*** 0.111***
(0.0166) (0.0167) (0.0161) (0.0218) (0.0194) (0.0219) (0.0210) (0.0193) (0.0188) (0.0190) (0.0268)
Constant 6.264*** 5.942*** 6.270*** 5.810*** 6.098*** 5.604*** 5.932*** 5.888*** 6.006*** 6.023*** 5.546***
(0.0973) (0.100) (0.101) (0.138) (0.111) (0.114) (0.108) (0.108) (0.103) (0.107) (0.160)
ln (σ) -1.054*** -1.013*** -1.025*** -0.799*** -0.933*** -0.887*** -0.916*** -0.978*** -1.013*** -0.973*** -0.938***
(0.00800) (0.00807) (0.00808) (0.00857) (0.00813) (0.00819) (0.00820) (0.00837) (0.00832) (0.00837) (0.0116)
N 7816 7684 7667 6811 7583 7471 7441 7146 7235 7155 3729
N1 7202 7375 7416 6668 7435 7211 7316 6957 7103 6976 3660
F-test instruments 39.51 46.48 77.70 105.0 108.9 54.12 46.25 72.79 94.53 85.20 26.02
p-value 0.000 4.90e-07 0 0 0 4.61e-08 1.29e-06 0 0 0 0.00372
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Table C.1: Regression models of non durable consumption using SFB data - Simple matching tecnique
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
VARIABLES 1991 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Number of members 18-24 -0.0401 -0.0742 0.166** -0.0378 0.0213 -0.126 -0.238** 0.0686 -0.0367 0.155 -0.265
(0.0888) (0.0834) (0.0806) (0.102) (0.103) (0.114) (0.111) (0.122) (0.117) (0.143) (0.161)
Number of members 25-39 0.0457 0.0486 0.171** -0.0102 0.0567 0.00950 -0.0913 0.170 -0.0759 0.143 -0.301**
(0.0852) (0.0791) (0.0767) (0.0958) (0.0957) (0.107) (0.0999) (0.112) (0.108) (0.133) (0.147)
Number of members 40-59 -0.0299 0.0165 0.126* -0.00748 0.00456 0.0500 -0.0847 0.149 -0.0529 0.181 -0.235
(0.0827) (0.0780) (0.0756) (0.0936) (0.0929) (0.105) (0.0986) (0.110) (0.106) (0.131) (0.145)
Number of members 60-69 -0.194** -0.141* -0.0602 -0.130 -0.0875 -0.0521 -0.167* 0.0900 -0.163 0.109 -0.268*
(0.0823) (0.0773) (0.0753) (0.0932) (0.0922) (0.106) (0.0985) (0.110) (0.106) (0.132) (0.144)
Number of members 70+ -0.440*** -0.333*** -0.266*** -0.362*** -0.392*** -0.310*** -0.445*** -0.250** -0.405*** -0.161 -0.467***
(0.0832) (0.0788) (0.0759) (0.0930) (0.0925) (0.107) (0.0989) (0.109) (0.106) (0.131) (0.143)
Central Italy -0.0345 -0.0453 -0.0122 -0.124** 0.0545 0.0719 0.0581 -0.156*** 0.0478 0.0598 -0.0695
(0.0475) (0.0474) (0.0504) (0.0591) (0.0609) (0.0549) (0.0583) (0.0583) (0.0597) (0.0615) (0.0637)
Southern Italy -0.123*** -0.235*** -0.204*** -0.209*** -0.116** -0.0803* -0.138*** -0.226*** -0.159*** -0.0800 -0.244***
(0.0408) (0.0391) (0.0400) (0.0471) (0.0465) (0.0448) (0.0472) (0.0469) (0.0485) (0.0495) (0.0492)
Number of children 0-5 -0.469*** -0.389*** -0.372*** -0.340*** -0.284*** -0.435*** -0.435*** -0.275** -0.421*** -0.106 -0.452***
(0.0765) (0.0719) (0.0698) (0.0904) (0.0915) (0.102) (0.0988) (0.110) (0.107) (0.129) (0.145)
Number of children 6-14 -0.303*** -0.254*** -0.218*** -0.276*** -0.244*** -0.276*** -0.408*** -0.184* -0.348*** -0.0534 -0.369***
(0.0736) (0.0699) (0.0672) (0.0867) (0.0862) (0.0988) (0.0937) (0.107) (0.102) (0.127) (0.142)
Number of children 15-17 -0.114 -0.115 -0.0937 -0.181* -0.0846 -0.136 -0.282*** -0.102 -0.195* -0.00980 -0.188
(0.0782) (0.0743) (0.0727) (0.0928) (0.0924) (0.105) (0.0993) (0.113) (0.111) (0.133) (0.147)
Number of children 18+ 0.200*** 0.181*** 0.110*** 0.103** 0.0417 0.141*** 0.128*** -0.0549 0.0149 0.0264 0.0493
(0.0396) (0.0353) (0.0346) (0.0443) (0.0440) (0.0435) (0.0440) (0.0463) (0.0459) (0.0468) (0.0471)
At least 2 members 0.370*** 0.363*** 0.353*** 0.349*** 0.340*** 0.375*** 0.372*** 0.384*** 0.359*** 0.321*** 0.301***
(0.0134) (0.0127) (0.0120) (0.0157) (0.0147) (0.0130) (0.0128) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0127) (0.0127)
At least 3 members 0.205*** 0.207*** 0.220*** 0.180*** 0.173*** 0.198*** 0.186*** 0.208*** 0.184*** 0.183*** 0.146***
184
VARIABLES 1991 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
(0.0131) (0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0147) (0.0154) (0.0137) (0.0135) (0.0143) (0.0141) (0.0148) (0.0149)
At least 4 members 0.166*** 0.177*** 0.154*** 0.132*** 0.116*** 0.160*** 0.144*** 0.162*** 0.135*** 0.131*** 0.140***
(0.0104) (0.00990) (0.00982) (0.0116) (0.0119) (0.0113) (0.0117) (0.0120) (0.0126) (0.0131) (0.0127)
Gender (male) 0.110*** 0.0894*** 0.0945*** 0.0784*** 0.0752*** 0.0670*** 0.0727*** 0.0124 0.0560*** 0.0767*** 0.0855***
(0.0158) (0.0150) (0.0142) (0.0169) (0.0164) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0158) (0.0155) (0.0160) (0.0153)
Age of the head=18-24 0.0141 0.0323 -0.0440 0.00955 -0.0799 0.175*** 0.0432 0.0553 -0.0453 -0.0379 0.0604
(0.0475) (0.0428) (0.0538) (0.0735) (0.0743) (0.0646) (0.0859) (0.0678) (0.0691) (0.0730) (0.0962)
Age of the head=25-39 -0.0578*** -0.0690*** -0.0698*** -0.0443** -0.0894*** -0.00875 -0.0534** -0.0725*** -0.0306 0.00527 0.00414
(0.0182) (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0207) (0.0215) (0.0208) (0.0216) (0.0222) (0.0230) (0.0231) (0.0255)
Age of the head=60-69 0.0431** 0.0416** 0.0406** 0.0257 0.0318 0.0332 0.0241 0.0282 0.0623*** 0.0722*** 0.0384
(0.0195) (0.0187) (0.0187) (0.0218) (0.0223) (0.0215) (0.0220) (0.0233) (0.0229) (0.0239) (0.0252)
Age of the head=70plus 0.0639** 0.0269 0.0456* 0.0452 0.0870*** 0.0526* 0.0636** 0.0829*** 0.102*** 0.157*** 0.116***
(0.0279) (0.0258) (0.0252) (0.0321) (0.0324) (0.0294) (0.0293) (0.0316) (0.0316) (0.0324) (0.0347)
Head unemployed -0.126*** -0.135*** -0.180*** -0.186*** -0.242*** -0.159*** -0.140*** -0.199*** -0.133*** -0.149*** -0.186***
(0.0302) (0.0245) (0.0237) (0.0266) (0.0280) (0.0258) (0.0274) (0.0289) (0.0289) (0.0292) (0.0255)
Head out of labor force -0.102*** -0.0991*** -0.0888*** -0.0818*** -0.0765*** -0.0885*** -0.0929*** -0.0779*** -0.0771*** -0.0856*** -0.103***
(0.0119) (0.0112) (0.0113) (0.0128) (0.0127) (0.0124) (0.0128) (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0153) (0.0153)
Education ≥ 8 0.107*** 0.144*** 0.130*** 0.119*** 0.157*** 0.155*** 0.147*** 0.149*** 0.150*** 0.183*** 0.132***
(0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0126) (0.0151) (0.0149) (0.0147) (0.0158) (0.0164) (0.0170) (0.0180) (0.0181)
Education ≥ 13 0.153*** 0.110*** 0.130*** 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.113*** 0.0889*** 0.0915*** 0.105*** 0.118*** 0.140***
(0.0140) (0.0133) (0.0126) (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0130) (0.0132) (0.0138) (0.0133) (0.0140) (0.0138)
University degree 0.117*** 0.169*** 0.127*** 0.134*** 0.142*** 0.117*** 0.108*** 0.138*** 0.142*** 0.131*** 0.142***
(0.0225) (0.0218) (0.0202) (0.0216) (0.0194) (0.0201) (0.0202) (0.0193) (0.0201) (0.0191) (0.0179)
Center * number 18-24 -0.123** -0.00479 -0.0840 5.95e-05 -0.118 -0.0535 -0.00605 0.0496 -0.200** -0.243*** -0.0251
(0.0625) (0.0614) (0.0641) (0.0808) (0.0793) (0.0813) (0.0913) (0.0798) (0.0887) (0.0866) (0.101)
Center * number 25-39 -0.0459 0.0110 -0.0832 0.0778 -0.132** -0.0246 -0.103* 0.123* -0.0394 -0.120* 0.00624
(0.0555) (0.0540) (0.0555) (0.0637) (0.0631) (0.0589) (0.0622) (0.0626) (0.0628) (0.0654) (0.0680)
Center * number 40-59 0.0190 -0.0100 -0.0930* 0.0669 -0.135** -0.0738 -0.162*** 0.0632 -0.104* -0.0909 -0.00118
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(0.0514) (0.0511) (0.0518) (0.0613) (0.0625) (0.0573) (0.0600) (0.0604) (0.0618) (0.0631) (0.0654)
Center * number 60-69 0.0131 -0.0515 -0.0587 0.0544 -0.173*** -0.0953* -0.159*** -0.0330 -0.0926 -0.0874 0.0418
(0.0461) (0.0462) (0.0484) (0.0576) (0.0587) (0.0533) (0.0562) (0.0565) (0.0567) (0.0587) (0.0604)
Center * number 70+ 0.00423 -0.0547 -0.0835* 0.0731 -0.239*** -0.125** -0.137** 0.0744 -0.0786 -0.0730 0.0434
(0.0485) (0.0482) (0.0498) (0.0593) (0.0599) (0.0544) (0.0567) (0.0567) (0.0578) (0.0587) (0.0608)
Center * education ≥ 8 0.0299 -0.0554*** -0.0347* 0.0645** -0.0772*** -0.0282 -0.0356 -0.00105 -0.0273 -0.0364 -0.0132
(0.0210) (0.0212) (0.0209) (0.0279) (0.0294) (0.0265) (0.0282) (0.0290) (0.0299) (0.0313) (0.0322)
Center * education ≥ 13 -0.0169 0.0395* 0.0207 -0.00750 -0.0235 -0.0243 0.0194 -0.000918 -0.00284 -0.0156 -0.0246
(0.0235) (0.0227) (0.0216) (0.0255) (0.0261) (0.0243) (0.0250) (0.0246) (0.0246) (0.0253) (0.0255)
Center * degree 0.0116 -0.0446 0.00660 0.00899 -0.0189 0.0123 -0.0141 -0.0364 0.000663 0.0241 0.00422
(0.0366) (0.0363) (0.0345) (0.0385) (0.0344) (0.0381) (0.0342) (0.0349) (0.0338) (0.0340) (0.0334)
Center * gender -0.0257 -0.0115 0.0173 -0.00708 0.0257 0.00938 0.0156 0.0472** 0.0193 -0.0141 -0.00309
(0.0223) (0.0221) (0.0214) (0.0272) (0.0282) (0.0235) (0.0237) (0.0239) (0.0243) (0.0245) (0.0246)
South * number 18-24 -0.173*** -0.0850* -0.264*** -0.179*** -0.162** -0.128** -0.168** -0.126* -0.236*** -0.121* -0.0732
(0.0521) (0.0508) (0.0520) (0.0601) (0.0643) (0.0602) (0.0712) (0.0672) (0.0714) (0.0703) (0.0687)
South * number 25-39 -0.127*** -0.0695 -0.174*** -0.0471 -0.118** -0.146*** -0.131** -0.0179 -0.0331 -0.113** 0.0276
(0.0481) (0.0449) (0.0459) (0.0519) (0.0504) (0.0488) (0.0512) (0.0509) (0.0532) (0.0542) (0.0545)
South * number 40-59 -0.184*** -0.146*** -0.179*** -0.0586 -0.165*** -0.202*** -0.140*** -0.0656 -0.120** -0.137*** -0.0326
(0.0444) (0.0421) (0.0433) (0.0503) (0.0490) (0.0465) (0.0502) (0.0487) (0.0509) (0.0509) (0.0512)
South * number 60-69 -0.209*** -0.114*** -0.162*** -0.105** -0.196*** -0.246*** -0.148*** -0.115** -0.101** -0.162*** -0.0284
(0.0399) (0.0381) (0.0394) (0.0465) (0.0451) (0.0442) (0.0464) (0.0453) (0.0469) (0.0476) (0.0467)
South * number 70+ -0.154*** -0.0610 -0.185*** -0.0988** -0.157*** -0.189*** -0.148*** -0.0399 -0.128*** -0.196*** -0.0149
(0.0428) (0.0403) (0.0402) (0.0476) (0.0463) (0.0444) (0.0464) (0.0460) (0.0478) (0.0482) (0.0470)
South * education≥ 8 0.0160 -0.0136 -0.0152 0.0397* 0.0113 -0.0218 0.000702 -0.0179 -0.0144 -0.0543** -0.0225
(0.0188) (0.0178) (0.0186) (0.0229) (0.0224) (0.0217) (0.0227) (0.0233) (0.0245) (0.0259) (0.0252)
South * education≥ 13 -0.0247 0.0469** 0.0359* 0.0659*** 0.0510** 0.0636*** 0.0702*** 0.0499** 0.0455** 0.0177 -0.00186
(0.0215) (0.0199) (0.0188) (0.0211) (0.0207) (0.0197) (0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0203) (0.0210) (0.0204)
South * degree 0.104*** -0.0252 0.0354 0.00659 0.0431 0.0259 0.0732** 0.0414 0.00695 0.0162 0.0399
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(0.0339) (0.0332) (0.0304) (0.0329) (0.0301) (0.0323) (0.0318) (0.0298) (0.0295) (0.0296) (0.0279)
South * gender 6.56e-06 0.000620 0.0311 0.0215 0.0187 0.0182 -0.0192 0.0533** 0.0276 0.00350 -0.0103
(0.0216) (0.0202) (0.0194) (0.0242) (0.0226) (0.0205) (0.0206) (0.0207) (0.0210) (0.0211) (0.0199)
Homeowner 0.0597*** 0.0617*** 0.0662*** 0.0943*** 0.0757*** 0.0836*** 0.0987*** 0.0942*** 0.138*** 0.144*** 0.160***
(0.00701) (0.00682) (0.00686) (0.00849) (0.00863) (0.00817) (0.00832) (0.00870) (0.00912) (0.00939) (0.00905)
Secondary residence 0.350*** 0.374*** 0.388*** 0.203*** 0.224*** 0.218*** 0.212*** 0.218*** 0.221*** 0.239*** 0.196***
(0.0141) (0.0134) (0.0123) (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0137)
Constant 7.015*** 7.017*** 7.023*** 7.222*** 7.250*** 6.564*** 6.786*** 6.618*** 6.761*** 6.467*** 6.927***
(0.0814) (0.0767) (0.0745) (0.0921) (0.0912) (0.105) (0.0979) (0.109) (0.105) (0.131) (0.143)
Observations 32,132 34,242 34,374 21,420 23,563 27,084 24,507 23,230 23,063 21,945 22,669
loglikelihood -25923 -26925 -26954 -16080 -18357 -21510 -19053 -18007 -17904 -16742 -17304
Root MSE 0.543 0.532 0.530 0.513 0.528 0.536 0.527 0.526 0.526 0.519 0.520
R2 Adjusted 0.415 0.424 0.437 0.392 0.398 0.412 0.403 0.388 0.373 0.369 0.342
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table D.1: Propensity score to compute weights for SFB
1991 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
VARIABLES shiw shiw shiw shiw shiw shiw shiw shiw shiw shiw shiw
Number of members 18-24 1.471*** 2.422*** 2.012*** 1.520*** 1.208*** -0.00188 0.809* -0.803* -0.0720 -0.421 -1.293***
(0.404) (0.427) (0.418) (0.492) (0.441) (0.452) (0.451) (0.455) (0.440) (0.449) (0.441)
Number of members 25-39 1.982*** 2.649*** 2.367*** 1.539*** 1.304*** 0.213 0.143 -0.753* -0.0228 -0.614 -1.434***
(0.393) (0.415) (0.405) (0.470) (0.419) (0.428) (0.424) (0.425) (0.411) (0.418) (0.412)
Number of members 40-59 2.342*** 3.156*** 2.987*** 2.132*** 2.037*** 0.737* 0.675 -0.324 0.278 -0.234 -0.896**
(0.386) (0.408) (0.398) (0.461) (0.409) (0.421) (0.416) (0.416) (0.403) (0.409) (0.399)
Number of members 60-69 2.431*** 3.711*** 3.516*** 2.771*** 2.436*** 1.339*** 1.171*** 0.264 0.911** 0.280 -0.224
(0.383) (0.405) (0.396) (0.456) (0.405) (0.419) (0.415) (0.414) (0.399) (0.406) (0.397)
Number of members 70+ 2.621*** 4.297*** 4.291*** 3.173*** 3.058*** 1.769*** 1.405*** 0.721* 1.389*** 0.898** 0.326
(0.384) (0.405) (0.395) (0.454) (0.403) (0.420) (0.414) (0.411) (0.399) (0.405) (0.394)
Central Italy 0.742*** 0.778*** 0.728*** 1.050*** 1.368*** 0.283 0.280 -0.0779 0.0454 0.567** 0.314
(0.201) (0.204) (0.209) (0.228) (0.227) (0.221) (0.227) (0.230) (0.230) (0.229) (0.228)
Southern Italy 0.655*** 0.470*** 0.549*** 0.784*** 0.646*** 0.0851 0.313* 0.0140 0.336* 0.724*** 0.314*
(0.161) (0.167) (0.169) (0.186) (0.179) (0.182) (0.185) (0.186) (0.184) (0.188) (0.186)
Number of children 0-5 1.202*** 2.206*** 2.173*** 1.315*** 1.180*** -0.892** 0.0154 -1.073*** -0.248 -1.630*** -2.412***
(0.369) (0.395) (0.383) (0.456) (0.407) (0.419) (0.415) (0.414) (0.404) (0.403) (0.397)
Number of children 6-14 1.759*** 2.373*** 2.335*** 1.603*** 1.157*** -0.568 -0.254 -1.102*** -0.249 -1.086*** -1.813***
(0.357) (0.384) (0.372) (0.440) (0.391) (0.403) (0.399) (0.399) (0.387) (0.387) (0.378)
Number of children 15-17 1.883*** 1.995*** 1.963*** 1.656*** 1.415*** -0.0726 -0.197 -0.349 0.141 -1.150*** -1.237***
(0.372) (0.401) (0.392) (0.460) (0.415) (0.425) (0.424) (0.424) (0.413) (0.416) (0.407)
Number of children 18+ 0.791*** 0.466*** 0.797*** 0.446*** 0.358** -0.202 -0.304* 0.415** 0.185 -0.199 -0.247
(0.147) (0.144) (0.143) (0.170) (0.156) (0.163) (0.164) (0.167) (0.164) (0.166) (0.166)
Number of retired members 0.193*** 0.456*** 0.366*** 0.223*** 0.278*** 0.279*** 0.194*** 0.145*** 0.229*** 0.275*** 0.215***
(0.0508) (0.0493) (0.0482) (0.0535) (0.0475) (0.0450) (0.0439) (0.0435) (0.0428) (0.0431) (0.0418)
At least 2 members 0.0470 0.186*** 0.121** 0.0514 0.00474 0.239*** 0.0620 0.0455 -0.0339 0.0863* 0.237***
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(0.0493) (0.0478) (0.0478) (0.0554) (0.0510) (0.0501) (0.0502) (0.0516) (0.0509) (0.0515) (0.0518)
At least 3 members 0.244*** 0.259*** 0.220*** 0.118** 0.147*** 0.166*** 0.110** -0.00349 0.101** 0.143*** 0.140***
(0.0409) (0.0406) (0.0408) (0.0461) (0.0445) (0.0445) (0.0459) (0.0473) (0.0477) (0.0478) (0.0475)
At least 4 members -0.0488 -0.144** 0.00195 0.119* 0.213*** 0.0672 0.0411 0.118** 0.0412 -0.0135 0.0367
(0.0599) (0.0572) (0.0568) (0.0631) (0.0565) (0.0540) (0.0535) (0.0532) (0.0522) (0.0531) (0.0519)
Gender (male) 0.645*** 0.122 0.349* 0.457** 1.024*** 0.771*** 0.921*** 0.333 0.499** 0.539** 0.903***
(0.168) (0.186) (0.183) (0.233) (0.197) (0.221) (0.226) (0.237) (0.211) (0.215) (0.220)
Age of the head = 25-39 0.111 0.110 0.207*** 0.154* 0.255*** 0.154* 0.314*** 0.0770 -0.0655 -0.0978 0.0881
(0.0729) (0.0726) (0.0733) (0.0829) (0.0807) (0.0829) (0.0845) (0.0877) (0.0875) (0.0898) (0.0908)
Age of the head = 60-69 -0.0792 -0.303*** -0.119 -0.116 -0.165** -0.244*** -0.275*** -0.256*** -0.194** 0.0559 0.113
(0.0731) (0.0731) (0.0728) (0.0831) (0.0779) (0.0805) (0.0831) (0.0865) (0.0861) (0.0841) (0.0855)
Age of the head = 70+ -0.258** -0.724*** -0.758*** -0.529*** -0.745*** -0.638*** -0.690*** -0.679*** -0.541*** -0.332*** -0.270**
(0.102) (0.0990) (0.0981) (0.113) (0.105) (0.104) (0.106) (0.112) (0.111) (0.110) (0.111)
Head unemployed 0.165 0.294*** 0.596*** 0.610*** 0.318*** 0.312*** 0.212** 0.305*** 0.223*** 0.470*** 0.564***
(0.106) (0.0870) (0.0748) (0.0748) (0.0805) (0.0834) (0.0844) (0.0875) (0.0850) (0.0781) (0.0684)
Head out of labor force 0.0890** 0.0328 -0.155*** -0.357*** -0.169*** -0.193*** -0.0373 -0.202*** -0.254*** -0.465*** -0.598***
(0.0438) (0.0431) (0.0420) (0.0451) (0.0430) (0.0439) (0.0448) (0.0475) (0.0474) (0.0474) (0.0463)
Education ≥ 8 0.243*** 0.0835* 0.0680 0.213*** 0.123** 0.0809 -0.00971 0.147** 0.409*** 0.629*** 0.451***
(0.0509) (0.0491) (0.0503) (0.0588) (0.0559) (0.0537) (0.0562) (0.0570) (0.0561) (0.0599) (0.0595)
Education ≥ 13 0.316*** 0.188*** 0.273*** 0.224*** 0.294*** 0.182*** 0.117** 0.0978** -0.508*** -0.477*** -0.437***
(0.0531) (0.0534) (0.0517) (0.0546) (0.0512) (0.0501) (0.0500) (0.0490) (0.0494) (0.0511) (0.0501)
University degree 0.0497 0.0753 0.0445 -0.0518 -0.0163 -0.0416 0.134* -0.00269 0.375*** 0.302*** 0.258***
(0.0812) (0.0841) (0.0776) (0.0814) (0.0728) (0.0752) (0.0722) (0.0718) (0.0711) (0.0696) (0.0681)
Center * number 18-24 -0.652** -0.467* -0.390 -0.203 -0.370 0.493 -0.276 0.0377 -0.0759 -0.186 0.132
(0.263) (0.263) (0.269) (0.302) (0.305) (0.308) (0.323) (0.330) (0.331) (0.333) (0.336)
Center * number 25-39 -0.565** -0.597** -0.710*** -0.347 -0.745*** -0.111 -0.0715 -0.138 0.0108 -0.390 0.00474
(0.232) (0.238) (0.241) (0.253) (0.248) (0.246) (0.248) (0.255) (0.256) (0.256) (0.262)
Center * number 40-59 -0.613*** -0.826*** -0.758*** -0.460* -0.720*** -0.0787 -0.143 -0.156 -0.0569 -0.529** -0.165
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(0.218) (0.220) (0.221) (0.239) (0.231) (0.233) (0.235) (0.241) (0.243) (0.241) (0.240)
Center * number 60-69 -0.598*** -0.831*** -0.958*** -0.677*** -0.807*** 0.0129 -0.0914 0.232 0.0518 -0.224 0.0340
(0.196) (0.199) (0.204) (0.222) (0.217) (0.214) (0.219) (0.221) (0.221) (0.218) (0.218)
Center * number 70+ -0.435** -0.943*** -0.842*** -0.658*** -0.844*** -0.0607 -0.103 0.138 0.124 -0.366* -0.123
(0.202) (0.204) (0.206) (0.224) (0.221) (0.216) (0.220) (0.222) (0.222) (0.218) (0.218)
Center * education ≥ 8 -0.276*** -0.0657 -0.234*** -0.211** -0.253** -0.181* -0.157 -0.0907 -0.0683 -0.246** -0.152
(0.0889) (0.0877) (0.0896) (0.105) (0.102) (0.0959) (0.0995) (0.103) (0.100) (0.105) (0.106)
Center * education ≥ 13 -0.247** -0.0686 -0.0195 -0.0506 -0.250*** -0.0567 0.0253 0.0123 0.0356 0.102 0.100
(0.0962) (0.0941) (0.0926) (0.0984) (0.0948) (0.0926) (0.0913) (0.0922) (0.0927) (0.0913) (0.0909)
Center * degree -0.0612 -0.180 -0.190 0.00415 -0.202 -0.0224 -0.305** -0.0465 -0.120 0.0483 -0.0844
(0.146) (0.149) (0.143) (0.143) (0.135) (0.142) (0.132) (0.132) (0.129) (0.121) (0.119)
Center * gender 0.0291 -0.0256 0.0540 -0.171* -0.280*** -0.107 0.0854 0.0834 0.0701 0.110 0.108
(0.0900) (0.0889) (0.0893) (0.0981) (0.0926) (0.0841) (0.0831) (0.0850) (0.0833) (0.0838) (0.0836)
South * number 18-24 -0.328 -0.0276 -0.0473 0.0896 0.0233 -0.0833 -0.380 -0.252 0.00367 -0.173 0.119
(0.205) (0.215) (0.219) (0.246) (0.241) (0.255) (0.260) (0.271) (0.261) (0.267) (0.269)
South * number 25-39 -0.594*** -0.431** -0.357* -0.138 0.166 0.0532 -0.525** -0.104 -0.137 -0.392* 0.321
(0.190) (0.199) (0.198) (0.212) (0.203) (0.206) (0.211) (0.210) (0.209) (0.213) (0.214)
South * number 40-59 -0.440** -0.433** -0.235 -0.388* -0.161 0.134 -0.259 0.00260 -0.258 -0.417** 0.0678
(0.176) (0.183) (0.182) (0.198) (0.188) (0.191) (0.194) (0.195) (0.194) (0.197) (0.196)
South * number 60-69 -0.0977 -0.166 -0.287* -0.372** -0.178 0.0859 -0.344* 0.0140 -0.283 -0.373** -0.00143
(0.157) (0.162) (0.164) (0.180) (0.174) (0.177) (0.180) (0.181) (0.178) (0.180) (0.177)
South * number 70+ -0.260 -0.428** -0.482*** -0.241 -0.0774 0.0379 -0.227 -0.145 -0.402** -0.622*** -0.226
(0.166) (0.167) (0.168) (0.183) (0.175) (0.177) (0.180) (0.182) (0.178) (0.181) (0.179)
South * education≥ 8 -0.116 -0.0794 -0.175** -0.348*** -0.365*** -0.179** -0.172** -0.271*** -0.482*** -0.608*** -0.355***
(0.0745) (0.0742) (0.0753) (0.0859) (0.0817) (0.0812) (0.0834) (0.0854) (0.0839) (0.0867) (0.0853)
South * education≥ 13 -0.201** -0.0246 -0.171** -0.137 -0.289*** -0.170** -0.152* -0.0757 0.232*** 0.172** 0.133*
(0.0816) (0.0826) (0.0806) (0.0838) (0.0805) (0.0807) (0.0802) (0.0797) (0.0795) (0.0787) (0.0767)
South * degree 0.277** 0.0242 0.0964 0.219* 0.190 0.340*** 0.0375 0.0237 -0.334*** -0.147 -0.112
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(0.121) (0.126) (0.121) (0.122) (0.116) (0.120) (0.120) (0.119) (0.119) (0.112) (0.108)
South * gender 0.0423 -0.0907 -0.194** -0.158* -0.261*** -0.137* -0.0526 0.0148 0.0234 0.0282 -0.121*
(0.0793) (0.0773) (0.0762) (0.0855) (0.0777) (0.0738) (0.0735) (0.0740) (0.0727) (0.0724) (0.0699)
Homeowner -0.445*** -0.448*** -0.450*** -0.193*** -0.239*** -0.305*** -0.221*** -0.268*** -0.301*** -0.276*** -0.175***
(0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0273) (0.0311) (0.0298) (0.0295) (0.0300) (0.0306) (0.0309) (0.0312) (0.0307)
Secondary residence 0.0468 0.159*** 0.105** -0.287*** -0.325*** -0.437*** -0.432*** -0.317*** -0.291*** -0.410*** -0.273***
(0.0542) (0.0523) (0.0516) (0.0561) (0.0567) (0.0598) (0.0590) (0.0588) (0.0581) (0.0578) (0.0539)
Constant -3.888*** -4.775*** -4.593*** -3.618*** -3.400*** -1.967*** -1.691*** -0.729* -1.375*** -1.012** -0.433
(0.382) (0.404) (0.394) (0.456) (0.405) (0.418) (0.414) (0.414) (0.399) (0.407) (0.396)
Observations 40,320 42,331 42,509 28,566 31,561 35,095 32,519 30,998 31,038 29,896 30,820
loglikelihood -19978 -20270 -20336 -15794 -17593 -18565 -17903 -17222 -17353 -16894 -17379
N 40320 42331 42509 28566 31561 35095 32519 30998 31038 29896 30820
Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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